As the dry bulk sector progresses into the first weeks of 2026, the market is entering what is traditionally the softest period of the year, with seasonal patterns exerting their usual downward pressure on freight rates across all segments. Yet unlike previous cycles, Q1 has begun from a noticeably firmer base, reflecting the structural tightness carried over from 2025 and the continued firmness in major commodity flows.
The usual early-year slowdown is therefore unfolding within a more balanced framework, with the market demonstrating resilience even as seasonal demand ebbs.
Last year’s Q1 decline was more pronounced, shaped by soft Chinese demand, patchy weather in Brazil, and increased uncertainty. In contrast, 2026 has opened with steadier fundamentals and a clearer macro backdrop, reinforcing the industry’s expectation of “higher lows” and laying the groundwork for a smoother seasonal progression into Q2. Iron ore remains the cornerstone of the dry bulk complex, and the comparison between 2025 and early 2026 illustrates both continuity and change.
China ended 2025 with record imports surpassing 1.24 billion tonnes, driven by stockpiling behaviour, favourable pricing, and intermittent stimulus measures aimed at stabilising construction and manufacturing activity.
Entering 2026, portside inventories have risen for a seventh consecutive week, reaching 162.7 million tonnes – just shy of the all-time high. This accumulation reflects both steady
seaborne arrivals and more measured steel output, producing a market that feels heavy but still fundamentally supported.
Capesize sentiment naturally softens in Q1. However, 2026 is opening from a stronger foundation than last year: despite recent corrections, the C5 and C3 spot routes continue to trade above their early-2025 troughs. Vessel supply in both basins is more evenly distributed compared with the dislocations of 2025, reducing volatility but also signalling that any early-Q2 pickup in Brazil may generate a more orderly tightening. Overall, the Capesize market is mirroring seasonal softness, yet retains a firmer undertone.
The Panamax segment is moving through its customary seasonal soft patch, yet it continues to perform from a noticeably firmer base than in early 2025.
Coal demand across India and Southeast Asia has softened in line with seasonal norms, but procurement patterns remain more orderly than last year, when high inventories and inconsistent industrial consumption pushed the market into deeper early-year troughs.
In grains, the pre-harvest lull is evident, but sentiment has improved thanks to a resurgence of interest in Nopac and Indo stems, which are offering welcome support in the Pacific. These early fixtures – though not yet large in volume – have helped stabilise regional lists and provide a sense that demand is more resilient than the calendar would suggest.
Meanwhile, flows out of ECSA remain steady but limited, reflecting the natural pause before Brazil’s soybean export season accelerates, yet even these modest volumes are contributing to a more balanced Atlantic market compared with the disruptions seen in early 2025.
With vessel positioning more evenly spread, the Panamax market is softer on a weekly basis but structurally stronger,
reinforcing the broader expectation that this year’s seasonal lows will settle at higher levels than those observed last year.
Ultramax dynamics entering 2026 highlight a sector that continues to display underlying resilience.
Throughout 2025, the segment benefitted from persistent imbalances in the Indian Ocean, strong coal movements into South Asia, and dense minor grain traffic across SEAsia and the Pacific.
As the new year begins, the familiar seasonal pullback is unfolding, with softer tonnage demand ahead of the main harvest cycle and with regional coal flows pausing before they typically rebound toward the end of the Q1. Even so, the market stands on a firmer foundation than it did at the same point in 2025. Indian coal demand, though seasonally lower, remains supported by the country’s expanding power generation needs and a steady rise in industrial activity.
Additionally, Ultramax remained buoyant on the back of improved demand from Indo and Nopac, while Australia continues to lag. The Atlantic is also enjoying a more constructive tone, with ECSA offering a steadier stream of cargoes than seen in previous Januarys, contributing to more balanced vessel positioning on both sides of the basin. As a result, although weekly fluctuations remain part of the seasonal pattern, the Ultramax market enters its annual trough in a noticeably firmer posture, with a clearer and more credible path toward a stronger rebound as agricultural flows gain momentum heading into the second quarter.
The Handysize market continues to reflect both seasonal behaviour and evolving macroeconomic conditions. Q1 typically brings subdued activity in the minor bulks and this pattern is visible again in 2026. European industrial activity remains soft, weighing on steel-related and project cargo demand, and
dampening the momentum that supported Handysize vessels during parts of 2025.
However, Asian coastal activity remains solid, with aggregates, bauxite, fertilizers, and short-haul grains providing stable employment.
Latin America is also showing early signs of improved cargo flow as agricultural preparations begin, albeit still weeks away from meaningful export volumes. While Handysize earnings are seasonally muted, the base from which they are correcting remains higher, maintaining the theme that this year’s market is avoiding the deeper troughs of last year and is positioned for a more controlled seasonal recovery.
Taken together, the dry bulk market’s early-2026 performance illustrates a familiar seasonal dip layered onto a structurally stronger foundation. Iron ore remains the anchor, and while inventories are heavy, import momentum remains relatively steady.
Coal and grain flows continue to support Panamax and Ultramax employment, even as seasonal softness temporarily suppresses earnings. Minor bulks are moving through their typical Q1 contraction, yet underlying trade lanes remain stable and vessel lists balanced.
Looking ahead, the key variables shaping the next phase of the market include China’s policy stance following its January economic signals, the strength and timing of Brazil’s grain exports, India’s energy and industrial demand, and the broader impact of easing global financial conditions.
Overall, the market appears better positioned than a year ago. As seasonal volumes build into Q2, the prospect of a more constructive year – anchored by higher lows and firmer structural support – remains credible.
Capesize
Dalian iron ore futures declined for a second consecutive session on Friday, weighed down by a further accumulation of portside inventories in China, although expectations of an improvement in demand allowed the market to post a weekly gain overall. In the freight market, the Baltic Capesize Average fell sharply, losing 15 percent week-on-week to settle at USD 23,947 per day.
In the Pacific, iron ore inventories at major Chinese ports continued their upward trajectory, rising for a seventh straight week to 162.7 million tonnes by January 8. This marks a 1.9 percent weekly increase and leaves stock levels just shy of the all-time high of 162.8 million tonnes.
Despite subdued steel production, China’s iron ore imports are expected to set a fresh record in 2025, surpassing the 1.24 billion tonnes seen in 2024. The increase reflects heightened stockpiling activity, attractive seaborne prices, and continued expectations of government support for the broader economy.
Australia and Brazil remain the dominant suppliers, though India is gaining traction as an alternative source. Spot activity in the Pacific softened over the week. Steady enquiry from miners and operators was outweighed by growing vessel availability, which exerted persistent pressure on rates. The West Australia–China trade weakened further, pushing the C5 index down to USD 7.855 per tonne, a drop of 7 percent week-on- week, while the C10_182 time charter index averaged USD 19,136 per day, 15.4 percent lower on the week.
Recent fixtures aligned with market sentiment: Rio Tinto reportedly covered a TBN 170,000/10 cargo from Dampier for 24–26 January at USD 7.80 per tonne, while FMG fixed a TBN 160,000/10 stem from Port Hedland for 22–24 January to Qingdao.
Atlantic
In the Atlantic, iron ore shipments from Australia and Brazil fell sharply in late December and early January, declining 10.6 percent week-on-week to 26.7 million tonnes. Both origins saw reductions, with Brazilian exports down a notable 16 percent as Vale’s shipments eased.
Nevertheless, Brazil concluded 2025 with a record export volume of 416.4 million tonnes, up 7.1 percent year-on-year, supported by stronger production—particularly from Vale—and sustained Chinese demand. Shipments were especially robust in the final months of the year, marking the first time Brazil surpassed the 400-million-tonne annual threshold, coinciding with what was likely a record year for Chinese imports.
The Atlantic spot market weakened as the week progressed despite pockets of early support. Activity out of Brazil improved on Tuesday, lifting the C3 index as January stems traded at a premium. However, sentiment reversed mid-week under the weight of increased positional pressure, lower bids, and declining transatlantic returns.
As activity slowed towards week’s end, reduced enquiry from Brazil and West Africa dragged the C3 Tubarão Qingdao index down to USD 20.823 per tonne, a 6.2 percent weekly fall. The C8_182 transatlantic round softened to USD 28,344 per day, down 17.7 percent week-on-week, while the C9_182 fronthaul concluded at USD 48,389 per day, 9 percent lower on the week.
Recent fixtures reflected the weaker tone:
Panocean reportedly took the Prometheus (181,577 dwt, 2024) to load in Tubarão 23–30 January for Qingdao at USD 22.35 per tonne. Further north, the Mineral Marouane (181,020 dwt, 2014) was placed via Sept-Îles 22 31 January to Rotterdam at USD 11.65 per tonne, while the Saiko (180,178 dwt, 2010) was
fixed via Seven Islands 22–28 January to Qingdao at USD
28.80 per tonne with Glencore.
No period fixtures were reported during the week.
Chinese portside iron ore stocks climbed for a seventh week to
162.7 million tonnes, a 1.9 percent weekly gain and near the record high of 162.8 million tonnes.
Panamax
Back to reality but without gravity, the second week of the year closed with an unmistakably buoyant tone, with the P82 ending at USD 12,108, up 4.96% w-o-w, as both basins emitted supportive signals.
Pacific
In the Pacific commodities news, Indonesia is moving towards tighter supply control in key dry bulk commodities.
Authorities are considering a coal output quota of around 600 MMT for 2026, significantly below last year’s production, with the aim of underpinning prices, while actual output has often exceeded official limits. A similar, demand-linked approach will apply to nickel, with quotas calibrated to domestic smelter needs as new capacity comes online. These measures point to a more disciplined export environment, with implications for coal and nickel ore seaborne volumes out of Indonesia.
In China, policy developments directly affecting dry bulk trade include the continuation of a 28% tariff on U.S. coking coal and
metcoke, effectively excluding U.S. material from the Chinese market and redirecting demand toward alternative suppliers.
At the same time, overproduction inspections, rising long term domestic supply contracts for 2026, and falling coal imports underline China’s reduced reliance on overseas coal. While total coal output remains high, tighter standards and shifting usage are expected to support demand for higher-quality imported coal, keeping selective import routes relevant even as overall import volumes trend lower.
As New Year festivities concluded and desks returned to full staffing, Panamax activity firmed, driven mainly by Indonesia and NoPac while Australia lagged. The P3A_82 reflected the improved sentiment, settling at USD 10,889, up 12.3% w-o-w, with fixtures including Argonaut (81,117 dwt, 2016) ex Yosu 10– 12 Jan back to S. Korea at USD 10,750 for grain via NoPac, while from Australia Shandong Fu Zhi (81,784 dwt, 2019) from Zhoushan 11–12 Jan fixed to India at USD 10,000 for
coal via ECAUS.
Despite negative coal news, Indonesian routes rebounded strongly, with the P5_82 settling at USD 9,872, up a notable 35.77% w-o-w albeit from a low base, supported by fixtures such as Chailease Cherish (76,195 dwt, 2013) fixing Xiamen 13 Jan to South China at USD 9,250 for coal via Indonesia.
Atlantic
In the Atlantic commodities news, Brazilian soybean exports are set to remain near record levels despite a partial loss of market share to the United States in China. Anec expects Brazil to ship around 112 MMT of soybeans overall, with exports to China seen at about 77 million tonnes in 2026, down from 2025 as China resumes sizeable purchases from the U.S. following the trade truce. Volumes diverted from China are likely to be redirected to other Asian and European buyers such as Spain,
Thailand, Turkey and Iran, while January loadings are expected to compensate for weather-related delays late last year.
Soymeal and corn exports are also forecast to stay strong, reinforcing Brazil’s role as a key Atlantic grain supplier.
On the demand side, China has stepped up U.S. soybean imports, with Sinograin recently purchasing around 600,000 tonnes, lifting total U.S. buying close to 10 million tonnes and underpinning Chicago prices. This comes despite ample domestic supplies in China, where auctions to clear inventories have met with weaker prices and low clearance rates.
For dry bulk shipping, the combination of robust Brazilian export volumes, shifting trade flows away from China toward alternative destinations, and renewed U.S.–China soybean trade points to continued Atlantic basin activity, albeit with evolving cargo distribution and voyage patterns.
In the spot arena, the holiday lull ended decisively this week as ECSA activity improved and export volumes toward the East increased, lifting the P6_82 to USD 12,710, up 8.8% w-o-w, highlighted by the above BKI spec’d Dokos (82,024 dwt, 2022) fixing ECSA 25 Jan to Spore/Japan at USD 16,000 plus USD 600k GBB with Norden for grains.
In slight contrast, the N. Atlantic remained short of both T/A and fronthaul volume, with the P1A_82 Skaw–Gib T/A easing to USD 12,230, down 2.88% w-o-w, while the P2A_82 edged higher to USD 18,152, up 1.68%, supported by fixtures such as Panafrican (83,690 dwt, 2008) fixing USG 7 Jan to the East Med at USD 14,500 plus USD 450k GBB with Bulk Trading.
Period desks, supported by a fairly positive forward curve and spot opportunities in both basins, showed strong confidence in booking tonnage. A notable fixture was the Maia (82,193 dwt, 2009), which fixed delivery Visakhapatnam 12–23 Jan at
USD 14,000 with Paralalos for a 17–19 month period in direct continuation.
For dry bulk shipping, the combination of robust Brazilian export volumes, shifting trade flows away from China toward alternative destinations, and renewed U.S.–China soybean trade points to continued Atlantic basin activity.
Supramax
The Supramax segment closed the first full week of the year on a notably weaker footing as the post-holiday restart failed to generate meaningful fresh enquiry, leaving owners exposed against a heavy prompt tonnage backdrop.
The Atlantic remained lethargic, initially hampered by additional European holidays, while the US Gulf stayed under pressure and could not arrest the broader decline despite pockets of enquiry.
West Africa and the South Atlantic were similarly subdued, with rates largely guided by last done and limited fixing information surfacing early on.
In Asia, sentiment remained negative, with cargo cover described as restrained and an abundance of tonnage keeping Charterers firmly in control.
By Friday, the S63 11TC weighted average had fallen to
$12,223, down $1,378 w-o-w (10.1%), while the ASIA 3TC eased to $9,325, mirroring the continued slide across Pacific- leaning routes.
Pacific
In the Pacific and Indian Ocean, the week remained under downward pressure, with limited fresh impetus and coal-related demand increasingly competed by larger sizes.
In the Far East, the ‘W Liberty’ (53,565 dwt, 2005) open Fangcheng 10/15 January fixed a run to the Arabian Gulf at
$8,000, while the ‘Ares’ (64,100 dwt, 2026) fixed a NoPac round voyage redelivery SE Asia at $11,000 with delivery passing Busan.
In SE Asia, the ‘Shanghai Bulker’ (56,719 dwt, 2012) was covered basis delivery Samarinda prompt for a trip via Indonesia to the Philippines at $12,500, while the ‘Lynux Innovation’ (61,392 dwt, 2014) open Port Kelang fixed an Indonesian coal run to WC India at $11,000.
In the India–PG region, the ‘Mandarin Phoenix’ (57,000 dwt, 2010) was fixed basis delivery Mumbai for a trip to the
Arabian Gulf with bauxite at $9,000, while an ultramax was heard fixed delivery Mina Saqr prompt for a trip to
Bangladesh at $15,000. The ‘Estrella’ (60,405 dwt, 2016)
scrubber fitted was heard fixed at $15,000 APS Dibba for a trip to Bangladesh, though others heard that it was a Sohar to EC India run. A 56,000 dwt was also linked to a trip from Fujairah to Bangladesh with fertilizers at $16,000, Macro
signals remained mixed for Pacific employment: Indonesia’s indication of a lower 2026 coal output quota may offer some short-term support in an environment which is currently dominated by weak demand.
Atlantic
The Atlantic remained in the doldrums, with the US Gulf continuing to trend lower and the wider basin struggling to absorb prompt lists after the holiday break.
From West Africa, the ‘Kai Hang Fa Zhan’ (63,472 dwt, 2018) spot Lagos was heard fixed around $17,000 for a West Africa trip to China, while the ‘Nan Bei Hu’ (63,550 dwt, 2019) open Conakry fixed $14,500 + $450,000 bb for a trip via upriver to SE Asia. Earlier in the week, the ‘Xin Hai Tong 51’ (56,607 dwt, 2011) open Cotonou 2/7 January was reported fixed for a fronthaul run to the Far East at $17,000, while the ‘Bao Chang’ (56,136 dwt, 2010) open Lome fixed via South Africa redelivery China at $11,000.
From the Continent, the ‘SSI Discovery’ (63,712 dwt, 2023) open Rotterdam was rumoured fixed via ARAG redelivery East Mediterranean with scrap at $17,500, while the ‘Ghala’ (50,409 dwt, 2013) open Skaw was also rumoured fixed via North Continent redelivery East Mediterranean at $16,500.
In the Mediterranean, the ‘Turicum’ (58,097 dwt, 2012) was heard fixed in the $7,000s delivery Garrucha for a trip to the US East Coast.
Atlantic-side commodity indicators were mixed:
Turkish scrap imports remained subdued despite higher steel output, while EU grain and oilseed flows showed divergent trends and Brazil reported record soybean and soymeal shipments in 2025.
No period time-charter fixtures were reported this week and sentiment remained cautious, with market participants largely focused on short-term positioning and the direction of enquiry into the following week rather than committing to forward coverage.
Handysize
The Handysize market began the new year on unsteady footing, with losses accelerating across both basins. The 7TC Average fell sharply to $10,897, marking a steep -13.1% week- on-week decline.
The Atlantic bore the brunt of the downturn, sliding by -19.7%, while the Pacific proved comparatively less exposed, easing by
-7.4%. With the holiday dust barely settled, the market found itself back at the drawing board, as thin enquiry, widening bid– offer gaps, and swelling prompt tonnage lists left owners with little room to manoeuvre.
In the Pacific, sentiment remained under pressure throughout the week as charterers continued to test the lower end of the market and owners struggled to hold the line.
The Far East opened quietly, with bidding levels slipping below recently concluded business. The ‘Canvasback’ (39,557 DWT, 2025), fitted with scrubbers, was reported fixed basis delivery Kobe for a North Pacific round with grains in the high $9,000s. Meanwhile, the ‘Paula Trader’ (39,498 DWT, 2020) was heard fixed for delivery Lanshan 2–5 January via Newcastle to Japan with coal at $8,500. The ‘Ocean Fortune’ (37,595 DWT, 2014), open Caojing 8–9 January, was reported fixed for a Southeast Asia trip at around $8,000.
As the week progressed, the tone failed to recover, with many pointing to a lengthy tonnage list continuing to cap any upside.
Further south, the ‘Allegra’ (40,005 DWT, 2024), open Kaohsiung, was heard fixed for a trip via South Korea to Southeast Asia with steels at $8,500.
Additional softness was reflected in Southeast Asia, where the ‘Ocean Spring’ (33,633 DWT, 2010), open Singapore, was heard fixed for an alumina cargo via Bunbury to China at
$7,500.
The softer tone extended westward into the Indian Ocean.
A 32,000 DWT open in East Africa was fixed for a trip with parcels via South Africa to the Persian Gulf at $12,000.
Meanwhile, a 34,000 DWT was fixed for a trip via East Coast India to ECSA at $5,850 for the first 50 days and balance at $10,000.
Further west, a 35,000 DWT from East Coast India was
fixed for a trip with steel slabs to the Continent via COGH at $8,000 for the first 60 days, with the balance at $10,000 routing.
Although some isolated demand surfaced, the Pacific continued to feel as though it was treading water, waiting for a clearer signal to break the current drift.
In the Atlantic, conditions deteriorated more markedly, as the basin lost altitude at a faster pace amid a stubborn imbalance between supply and demand.
On the Continent and in the Mediterranean, activity remained sparse, with many owners reassessing their expectations. A 38,000 DWT was fixed from Egypt to Brazil at $6,000, underscoring the uneven and often unforgiving nature of the market. Elsewhere, a 28,000 DWT in Spain was fixed for a scrap run via the Continent to the West Mediterranean at
$10,500, basis delivery passing Ushant. Some positional activity emerged in the South Atlantic, offering brief pockets of
support. The ‘Jiu Xu 36’ (35,159 DWT, 2010), ballasting from West Africa, was heard fixed for a Recalada to Peru trip at
$18,250, while the ‘Quest’ (36,903 DWT, 2011) was also heard fixing similar business in the $18,000s. The ‘White Defender’ (36,940 DWT, 2012) fixed from Vila do Conde to Norway at around $16,000, while the ‘Legiony Polskie’ (39,071 DWT, 2016) was fixed from Aratu via Recalada to Morocco at
$16,250. In addition, the ‘Agia Irini’ (38,273 DWT, 2011) was heard fixed to Morocco via San Nicolas at around $18,500.
Further fixtures included a 34,000 DWT fixed for delivery East Coast South America to the Continent at $16,000 and a 38,000 DWT fixed from Upriver to Morocco at $16,000. Despite these deals, sentiment remained fragile, with charterers largely dictating terms. Moreover, a 29,000 DWT open Tema 5–7 January was fixed for a Paranagua to Algeria trip at $15,000. In the US Gulf, the ‘Alinda’ (35,075 DWT, 2012) was fixed basis delivery Mississippi River for a-grains run to Turkey at $14,750. Meanwhile, in the Caribbean Sea, the ‘Thalis’ (37,189 DWT, 2012), open Puerto Limon, was heard fixed for delivery Southwest Pass to Spain at $15,000. Period activity provided only limited distraction from the softer spot market. Early in the week, the ‘Ocean Victory’ (28,386 DWT, 2011), open Malaysia 13–16 January, was reported fixed for a one-year period with worldwide redelivery at $10,500, though further details remained undisclosed. Starting the year on the back foot, the market has yet to find its stride — owners held firm where they could, while charterers pressed their advantage, leaving the opening chapters of January written in a cautious hand.
Sale & Purchase
The year ended on a subdued note, with softer freight rates across most dry segments. Subsequently, sentiment was a bit muted coming into the New Year. And with new geopolitical developments – and perhaps any ensuing unrest – industry
players and pundits are working to find their footing. With the recent dip in hire rates, we are of course seeing prices drop in some corners of the market. However, competition on more sought-after tonnage continues to bolster prices elsewhere; in some cases, the final price falls short of seller’s expectations (whether or not there exists competition), and in other cases they meet them. Sellers continue to be enticed to sell ships with upcoming surveys. Alternatively, more resolute sellers pass their ships through surveys and obtain a bit more on price. In case the market continues to soften, some buyers will welcome the consequent drop in second-hand prices. There is appetite out of the East for older Handies and Supras, and demand for similarly-aged Panamax bulkers definitely persists out of China.
There were just a handful of deals to report as the year changed. The capsize BC ‘Cape Merlin’ (206K DWT, 2005, Imabari) was sold for $23.5 mio to Chinese buyers with surveys due, a firm price compared to the last done which was concluded in the high $22s.
In the Supramax segment, the ‘Eleen Eva’ (58K DWT, 2012, Shin Kurushima) went to Vietnamese takes for $17.5 mio with surveys freshly passed, which seems soft when compared to the one-year older ‘Super Saka’ sold recently at $17 mio. The smaller ‘Wariya Naree’ (53K DWT, 2011, Hindustan) was
concluded at a market-level $9.85 mio with surveys due next month. Finally, the OHBS ‘BC Vanessa’ (31K DWT, 2010, Saiki) found a new home for $12.75 mio, a logical level for her OHBS pedigree.
Who decides what invasion means ?
Did last week’s US strike on Venezuela count as an “invasion”? Not if you’re a Polymarket user — the company has not paid out bets placed on an American invasion of the country. Traders betting on US involvement in Greenland would be wise to read the fine print too. And in December, some users were frustrated by payouts tied to TIME’s Person of the Year, which went to the “architects of AI” — bets that “AI” would win didn’t pay out.
These are all examples of a classic challenge for prediction markets, one that’s likely to grow as the industry scales. Developing clear, objective metrics that speak to the things we care about is hard. And as more and more work is done by artificial intelligence, humans will likely spend more and more time arguing about these sorts of disputes.
A good prediction market question satisfies what forecasting researcher Philip Tetlock calls the “clairvoyance test”: “Were it possible to pose the question to a genuine clairvoyant, that omniscient seer must be able to answer it without having to ask for clarification.”
It’s hard to write questions that pass that test, especially about real-world events. Imagine if you’d bet a friend that Trump would receive the Nobel Peace Prize — does it count if last year’s winner just gives it to him?
Prediction markets avoid this mistake by tying verification to the Nobel Prize committee, but it’s not always that simple. The current debate, for example, hinges on whether the US operation was “intended to establish control over any portion of Venezuela.”
Because it’s hard to predict what AI will be good at, you need to test it out first. If you’re trying to decide whether LLMs can take on tasks that your junior investment bankers used to do, for example, you’ll likely need to create some test with a clear rubric of success to see how AI performs — like the one researchers
created here.
Increasingly, humans will write the criteria while AI does the work, verifiability comes in shades of gray.
And that will be the other job for humans: deciding what to do when the metrics don’t quite fit anymore. Humans will determine what “invasion” means; humans will be the arbiters of whether an AI that’s crushing its customer-service benchmarks is actually doing a good job. Humans will write the test for what a good investment banking analyst does — and when an AI occasionally does weird stuff that scores well on the
benchmarks but misses the point, they’ll be the ones to
talk it through and decide how to proceed.
Nguyen argues that wherever there are metrics there will be a gap between what’s being measured and what actually matters. Perhaps that’s a good thing.
· Suspected Pakistan drones spotted over several forward areas along LOC, IB: Report
The flying objects came from the Pakistan side of the
border and returned home after hovering over Indian territory for a few minutes, the news agency said quoting security officials.
A movement of suspected drones was observed in a number of forward areas along the International Border (IB) and Line of Control (LoC) in Samba, Rajouri and Poonch districts of Jammu and Kashmir on Sunday evening, as per a report by PTI.
ANI also reported that Indian armed forces undertook counter-unmanned aerial systems measures, after which the drones went back.
- An Oil super glut is building globally. Supply is rising faster than demand, and prices could slide. For India, that could mean cheaper imports.
- The US’s action in Venezuela could have a major
impact on the global market. Venezuela holds, some of the world’s largest proven oil reserves, but years of International sanctions have constrained output. If US sanctions are lifted following the country’s invasion, it could open the tap for Venezuelan oil.
While higher supply is generally positive for
consumers, it’s not necessarily so for the Oil companies like Exxon Mobil. While it will take time for Venezuelan oil production to come back online, when it does, it will act as a major additional factor in weak oil prices. This is good news for oil-importing countries such as India.
- OPEC members struggling to preserve their market share amid a sinking price for oil now have an unexpected new variable to contend with: President Trump’s move to dominate Venezuela’s oil supply and push the market in a direction that would benefit American consumers.
- Trump, who has long championed increased oil production and a target price of $50 a barrel, is planning a sweeping initiative to rehabilitate Venezuela’s oil fields and market its output, people familiar with the matter said. That would reshape the global oil map—putting the U.S. in charge of the output of one of the founding members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and, along with America’s own prodigious production, give it a potentially disruptive role in a market already struggling with oversupply.
While analysts expect that reviving Venezuela’s dilapidated oil industry will take huge investments and a lot of time, they say even a small near-term output increase—followed by a larger rise over the longer run—could exacerbate the global imbalance and push prices further down.
The country’s oil is concentrated in the Orinoco Belt, a region in the east covering some 20,000 miles. It sits atop a massive deposit of organic-rich rock formed from
ancient marine life. Buried under immense heat and pressure over millions of years, it converted into oil.
United States read it as : 20,800,000 mio barrels
· Is Iran threatening of a Country Revolution?
Tehran cautioned the US and Israel against any intervention over nationwide protests in Iran, even as it sought to placate its citizens. As demonstrations entered their third week, at least 538 people had died, the AP said, citing activists. If the republic
were overthrown, the fall of its clergy would reshape global politics and risk unleashing utter chaos.
· Trump’s Greenland Grab Triggers Incredulity Then Rattles Europe
Denial, dread and now frenetic action are spreading across Europe as it comes to grips with a once- unthinkable reality: The system that has protected Europeans since they last descended into world war suddenly hinges on what Donald Trump does with a sparsely populated and mostly ice-covered island thousands of miles away.
Throughout the week, diplomats and officials fretted as Trump and the US president’s aides said, again and again, that they intend to take control of Greenland. The president ramped up his rhetoric again on Friday. “I would like to make a deal, you know, the easy way. But if we don’t do it the easy way, we’re going to do it the hard way,” he told reporters at the White House.
Never mind that the self-ruling territory is already part of the Kingdom of Denmark, a committed US ally, and secured through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a transatlantic military alliance the US itself helped found and effectively leads. It should be theirs.
· How the Iranian regime plans to survive its own collapse?
When the Islamic Republic begins to crack, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will not simply watch the rubble fall. It will move – methodically, opportunistically, and with plans already rehearsed – to ensure that the regime does not truly end, but merely changes costume.
This is not a conjecture born of cynicism. It is the institutional logic of a revolutionary guard that was built to outlast individuals, to protect the architecture of power rather than the face on the posters, and to treat every political rupture as an opening for reinvention.
The IRGC was not created as a conventional military formation. It was designed as the regime’s guarantor: an armed ideology with its own intelligence organs, its own patronage and procurement networks, and its own commercial empire. It has spent decades perfecting a survival doctrine that can be stated plainly: if the center
wobbles, tighten the perimeter; if legitimacy collapses, manufacture necessity; if the public turns, make the alternative appear worse. The Guard’s greatest fear is not losing an election. It is losing indispensability.
This is why the most dangerous phase of Iran’s struggle may not be the uprising itself, but the moment when the IRGC begins to enact its contingency plans. As “Rome” burns – when the streets swell, the clerical class panics, and the bureaucracy hesitates – many commanders will seek to approach the opposition and feign a late conversion to patriotism. They will arrive with trembling voices and carefully chosen phrases: fear for the country, concern for stability, horror at violence they previously administered. They will offer cooperation.
They will plead for “order.” They will suggest that the future needs them. Some may be sincere; many will not. But the pattern will be structured: controlled defections designed to preserve the institution while shedding the most discredited skin.
The intended outcome is obvious. The IRGC will attempt to seize the transitional moment and present itself as the sole barrier between Iran and chaos. It will claim that without the Guard, the country will become Syria; without the Guard, foreign powers will invade; without the Guard, separatists will tear the nation apart. It will do this because fear has always been its currency, and because it understands that anxious populations can be stampeded into accepting the
familiar jailer as the price of avoiding an unknown disorder.
Do not underestimate the strategic imagination at work here. There are several routes by which the IRGC can try to keep its grip while pretending it has let go.
One route is the “regime-from-within” maneouver: a new arrangement in which senior IRGC networks retain control over security, intelligence, ports, customs, and key industries, while a softer political façade is offered to the world as proof of “change.” This is the sleight of hand that authoritarian systems favor when they want sanctions relief and diplomatic rehabilitation: change the rhetoric, shuffle the personnel, preserve the instruments.
Another is the underground strategy: if it cannot openly dominate, it can sabotage. A Guard that has spent decades training proxies and running deniable operations knows how to foment disorder without leaving a clean signature. It can encourage street violence by intermediaries, sow sectarian and ethnic tension, and use targeted disruption – energy infrastructure, transport, communications – to make a new order look incompetent. The purpose is not merely vengeance. It is to create the conditions in which the public begs for “security,” and the Guard – having manufactured insecurity – offers itself as the cure.
A third route is the decapitation of genuine transition leadership. If there are figures who command consistent loyalty – those who have stood with the
people from the outset, and those around whom a coherent national restoration might be built – the IRGC will attempt to isolate them, compromise them, or fracture their coalition. It will rely on its oldest techniques: infiltration, blackmail, manufactured scandal, and the weaponization of rumour. And yes, it will revive the regime’s favourite incantation: the spectre of “foreign intervention,” not as analysis but as poison – used to delegitimize authentic opposition as agents and to excuse continued coercion as defence of sovereignty.
This is not paranoia. It is a warning about protocols. The IRGC is a bureaucracy of coercion. Bureaucracies, unlike mobs, plan. They maintain files. They cultivate assets. They map loyalties. They keep options open.
They are capable, in the same week, of shooting protesters and then sending “quiet emissaries” to opposition circles to propose a deal. That is not contradiction; it is method.
What should be done, then, if Iran is to avoid the classic fate of revolutions: victory stolen by the men who controlled the guns?
First, Iranians – and those who support them – must reject the seductive lie that stability requires the continued dominance of the very apparatus that destroyed civic life. Stability is not the continuation of fear. Stability is the restoration of law.
Second, any transition worthy of the name must establish disciplined procedures for handling would-be defectors and security officials: vetting, documentation, verified disclosures, conditional leniency for lesser offenses, and prosecution for grave crimes. The IRGC survives on the destruction of evidence and the disappearance of accountability. The transition must survive on the opposite: records preserved, chains of command exposed, financial trails secured.
Third, there must be early, explicit planning for security- sector reform and economic disentanglement. The IRGC is not merely a “force.” It is a political economy. A new Iran cannot breathe while that parallel state retains its commercial empire and intelligence reach. This is not a call for vengeance. It is the minimum requirement for normal statehood.
And finally, Iranians must practice the hardest discipline of liberation: trusting the brave without becoming credulous; accepting help without surrendering the future to late-arriving opportunists. In the decisive hour, many will offer to be forgiven. Some will deserve it. But no nation is obliged to build its new house on the foundations of the old prison.
If the IRGC’s plans succeed, Iran will not collapse into freedom. It will collapse into a managed instability – a permanent crisis from which the Guard extracts power, profit, and supposed indispensability. This is the danger. It is not the fall of the Islamic Republic that should frighten us. It is the prospect that, without
vigilance, the same machinery will survive the flames and rule the ashes.
· Trump Is Briefed on Options for Striking Iran as Protests Continue
President Trump has been briefed in recent days on new options for military strikes in Iran as he considers following through on his threat to attack the country for cracking down on protesters, according to multiple U.S. officials familiar with the matter.
Mr. Trump has not made a final decision, but the officials said he was seriously considering authorizing a strike in response to the Iranian regime’s efforts to suppress demonstrations set off by widespread economic grievances. The president has been presented with a range of options, including strikes on nonmilitary sites in Tehran, the people said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential conversations.
Asked about planning for potential strikes, the White House referred to Mr. Trump’s public comments and social media posts in recent days.
“Iran is looking at FREEDOM, perhaps like never before,” Mr. Trump wrote on social media on Saturday. “The USA stands ready to help!!!”
Signed “Freedom Fighter of the World Award goes to ”
- Hydrogen is widely considered as essential to the global ambition of a net zero society. As a fuel for ships, hydrogen has the potential to deliver the
ultimate goal of net zero emissions shipping by 2050, eliminating the industry’s GHG emissions and increasing air quality.
As with zero-emission solutions, there are technical, commercial and regulatory challenges to be overcome, but there are no roadblocks to hydrogen’s broad adoption in the shipping industry. As a necessary component of other e- fuels such as e-ammonia, e-methanol, and e-LNG, adoption of those other fuel pathways will bring benefits through incentivising investment in green hydrogen production and research into hydrogen technologies. On the regulatory front, global awareness of hydrogen’s role in decarbonisation is supporting work on national hydrogen policies and relevant technical standards. Within shipping, regulations for hydrogen are currently incomplete, but interim guidelines for the safe adoption of hydrogen are in active development at the IMO and are on course to bring greater clarity to support adoption. Such work is vital to understanding and managing fire and explosion risks as well as others arising from the use of hydrogen onboard. The establishment of hydrogen infrastructure will require significant capital investment due to the lack of existing facilities and the specific requirements of hydrogen storage and transportation. The energy density of hydrogen presents integration challenges for larger vessels, requiring efficient propulsion systems and appropriate operating profiles to be viable. Broader challenges include the high price for prime movers, storage, and handling equipment, and the space requirements for LH2 tanks. As production of relevant technologies scale up, equipment costs
will fall, and innovations such as onboard ammonia cracking will expand the fleet for which hydrogen is a viable fuel choice. Technological development is moving at a rapid pace and early experience with hydrogen in shipping is building, often in projects with state support. The greatest challenge for hydrogen in shipping is its commercial viability, which will ultimately be dictated by the world’s commitment to decarbonisation. Higher carbon pricing under market-based measures will improve the competitiveness of hydrogen as a marine fuel, and drive increases in green hydrogen production capacity, improving availability.
· South Korea reclaims one fifth of global shipbuilding orders
South Korean shipbuilders lifted their global market share to 21% in 2025, even as global orders fell 27% from the previous year
China remained at number one in 2025 but lost market share year on year, while South Korean yards expect steady intake and stronger LNG carrier ordering.
· Is the shadow fleet heading for a market downturn?
Venezuela is effectively closed for shadow fleet business, displacing more ships into Russian and Iranian trades — a development that will test the upper limits of the shadow fleet’s growth.
The shadow fleet have had a profitable run over the past few years, but nascent overcapacity and a potentially significant shift in transatlantic enforcement will be weighing heavily on their prospects during 2026
SHADOW fleet traders have been riding a bull market for the past few years.
Unfettered from the costly constraints of regulation, insurance, basic safety standards and operating within the rules-based order of global trade, those prepared to shift sanctioned crude have been profiting handsomely from a lucrative growth market.
Every time a new sanctions crackdown added yet more tankers to the list of designated entities, a seemingly endless supply of previously mainstream vessels would disappear in the shadows chasing risk premiums.
But is the shadow fleet* bubble about to burst?
There are many unanswered questions about Donald Trump’s Venezuela strategy, however, having seized at least five of the Venezuelan shadow fleet regulars that were collectively carrying around $300m of sanctioned crude between them, it seems clear that market is now closed to anyone other than US approved tonnage.
What that means for the 50 shadow feet tankers Lloyd’s List had been tracking carrying or heading to load Venezuelan crude is not yet clear, but a reshuffle beckons.
US blockade has left Venezuela shadow fleet in limbo
Lloyd’s List analysis of Venezuela shadow fleet sees some ships re-routing, some starting to spoof location and several undeterred by the US blockade, but many wait in limbo.
The volume of Venezuelan crude floating at sea has spiked to the highest level in more than three years since the US asserted control over Venezuela’s energy resources.
Much of the shadow fleet previous serving Caracas is currently in limbo, but once the current chaos settles down the majority will be heading into either Russian or Iranian trades where they will be facing stiff competition.
The recent regular influx of mainstream tankers to the shadow fleet plus a rapid injection of tonnage displaced from Venezuela will test the upper limit of how far the shadow fleet can grow.
Russia’s crude oil production plunged by the most in 18 months in December, pincered by western sanctions that are causing the nation’s barrels to pile up at sea and a surge of Ukrainian drone attacks on its energy infrastructure.
Ukraine has used drones multiple times over recent weeks to hit oil tankers from Russia’s shadow fleet and oil infrastructure, escalating the war well beyond the Black Sea in the case of December’s Mediterranean hit on Qendil.
At the same time, Russian oil on the water is growing as some buyers continue to show reluctance to take cargoes following sweeping US sanctions targeting the nation’s two largest producers, Rosneft PJSC and Lukoil PJSC.
Right now, the enforcement theatre is focussed on Venezuela, but Russia, Iran and China are watching carefully.
The fate of Marinera (IMO: 9230880) carries consequences well beyond its immediate nexus of Russian ownership.
This was a ship that had previously been content to cycle through fictious flags trading Russian, Iranian and Venezuelan crude over the past four years. But when it was directly under pressure, the immediate play was to seek protection from the Russian flag.
After an ignominious two-week pursuit across the Atlantic, the US have apparently answered the question of how far Russia is currently prepared to go in protecting its shadow fleet operators.
· US high seas seizures will test Russian resolve to protect shadow fleet
No state has the right to use force against vessels duly registered in the jurisdictions of other states, argues Russia as US seized Russian-flagged shadow fleet ship
For the 40 plus shadow fleet veterans who have spent the past few months quietly reflagging into the Russian register, this week’s show of force, and muted protests from Moscow, offer an instructive lesson in risk management.
Of course, the shadow fleet will now evolve innovative new tactics in response.
Lloyd’s List’s first law of sanctions intervention displacement states that for every action shutting down one illicit activity, an equal and opposite reaction will result in that illicit activity appearing elsewhere.
The second law states that the harder you try to stop an illicit activity, the more complex and difficult to track it becomes in response.
But there is every reason to expect that, as the war in Ukraine risks entering its fifth year, we are about to see a step change in sanctions enforcement.
Despite an impressive volume of sanctions, a lack of transatlantic coordination has effectively allowed Russia to continue trading, albeit at a discounted rate.
Second-guessing Donald Trump’s next move is a fool’s errand, but if the US is prepared to join re-join the EU and UK in moving away from the oil price cap to a full maritime services ban, as we understand they are
currently considering, then the shadow fleet will meet a radically different market reality this year.
As Fearnleys pointed out in their new year outlooks, harsher sanctions and quota constraints among Chinese buyers have left significant volumes without a willing buyer, effectively turning these ships into floating storage.
If this trend persists, it could have consequences for the near future. Extended delays in clearing sanctioned barrels would not only strain shipping logistics but also undermine cashflows for producers, discouraging upstream investments and potentially forcing Iran and Russia to scale back production over time. In short, what began as a logistical adjustment has evolved into a structural risk for Russian and Iranian supply growth.
There is much that could yet upturn all expectations, but the shadow fleet is entering a period of potential headwinds and may have reached the end of their bull market run.
· Scorpio Tankers sheds 11-year-old LR2
Monaco-headquartered product carrier major Scorpio Tankers has sold one of its LR2 tankers.
The New York-listed owner said the 2015-built scrubber-fitted LR2 product tanker STI Kingsway for $57.5m to an undisclosed buyer.
According to the Emanuele Lauro-led company, the sale is expected to close within the first or second quarter of 2026.
After the sale, Scorpio will control a fleet of 92 product tankers, made up of 36 LR2s, 42 MRs, and 14 handymax units, with an average age of 9.8 years.
The company has also reached agreements for four MR newbuilds, as well as a pair of VLCCs and LR2s set to be delivered between 2026 and the second half of 2028.
· Political pressure builds in Europe to tackle stateless shadow tankers
Flow of stateless or fraudulently flagged vessels has not slowed since US and UK seizure of Marinera.
On Monday, there were 23 stateless ships passing through UK and EU waters, and 466 ships operating globally. UK indicating a more robust action against shadow fleet, but legal advice has not changed. The UK government appears to be emboldened by its recent role in the US seizure of Marinera, but legal guidance on boarding stateless ships has not changed and it remains a question of political will and resource, rather than legal nuance.
· VLCC spot rates partially recover from Christmastime plunge
Middle East-China VLCC spot rates nosedived from $122,480 per day in mid-December to $28,709 per day on January 6, and are now more than double that, at $61,704 per day. Spot indexes have only partially rebounded vs 4Q25 peak, yet VLCC equities have
almost fully recovered; BWET tanker ETF posted a new all-time high on Friday. Sinokor’s second-hand buying spree has pushed up VLCC valuations, hiking net asset value estimates for VLCC equities. VLCC rates are well below 2025’s six-figure highs, but the market still has legs. Spot indexes have already recouped a portion of the losses suffered during the holiday period.
· Iran threatens to attack ‘shipping centres’ if US strikes
The country’s parliament speaker made the threat after President Trump said the US would intervene if protesters were killed. That ‘murky’ threat will likely pertain to the Strait of Hormuz, one analyst told Lloyd’s List, which Iran has threatened to close before.
· U.S. Attacked Boat with Aircraft that looked like a Civilian Plane
Even accepting the Trump administration’s claim that there is an armed conflict with suspected drug runners, the laws of war bar ‘perfidy’.
The Pentagon used a secret aircraft painted to look like a civilian plane in its first attack on a boat that the Trump administration said was smuggling drugs, killing 11 people last September, according to officials briefed on the matter. The aircraft also carried its munitions inside the fuselage, rather than visibly under its wings, they said.
The non-military appearance is significant, according to legal specialists, because the administration has argued its lethal boat attacks are lawful — not murders — because President Trump “determined” the United States is in an armed conflict with drug cartels.
But the laws of armed conflict prohibit combatants from feigning civilian status to fool adversaries into dropping their guard, then attacking and killing them. That is war crime called “perfidy”.
· Buy Greenland? Take It? Why? An Old Pact Already Gives Trump a Free Hand.
Analysts say the Cold War agreement allows the president to increase the American military presence almost at will.
President Trump has ridiculed Denmark’s dog sled teams in Greenland.
He has cited mysterious Chinese and Russian ships prowling off the coast.
He seems increasingly fixated on the idea that the United States should take over this gigantic icebound island, with one official saying the president wants to buy it and another suggesting that the United States could simply take it. Just a few days ago, Mr. Trump said: “We need Greenland from the standpoint of national security.”
But the question is: Does the United States even need to buy Greenland — or do something more drastic — to accomplish all of Mr. Trump’s goals?
Under a little-known Cold War agreement, the United States already enjoys sweeping military access in Greenland. Right now, the United States has one base in a very remote corner of the island. But the agreement allows it to “construct, install, maintain, and operate” military bases across Greenland, “house personnel” and “control landings, takeoffs, anchorages, moorings, movements, and operation of ships, aircraft, and waterborne craft.”
In this week’s newsletter, we will take a quick look at some of the critical figures and data in the energy markets this week.
We will then look at some of the key market movers early this week before providing you with the latest analysis of the top news events taking place in the global energy complex over the past few days.
Baltic Indices 13th January, 2026
BALTIC FORWARD ASSESSMENTS – TUESDAY 13 JANUARY 2026
BFA CAPESIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Jan | 26 | 18,618 $/day | -28 ↓ |
| Feb | 26 | 15,554 $/day | -110 ↓ |
| Mar | 26 | 21,136 $/day | 147 ↑ |
| Apr | 26 | 23,393 $/day | 222 ↑ |
| May | 26 | 24,486 $/day | 236 ↑ |
| Jun | 26 | 25,236 $/day | 222 ↑ |
| Q1 | 26 | 18,436 $/day | 3 ↑ |
| Q2 | 26 | 24,371 $/day | 226 ↑ |
| Q3 | 26 | 26,121 $/day | 225 ↑ |
| Q4 | 26 | 26,493 $/day | 204 ↑ |
| Q1 | 27 | 17,279 $/day | 43 ↑ |
| Q2 | 27 | 22,957 $/day | 14 ↑ |
| Cal | 27 | 23,100 $/day | 146 ↑ |
| Cal | 28 | 21,379 $/day | 8 ↑ |
| Cal | 29 | 20,218 $/day | 7 ↑ |
| Cal | 30 | 19,150 $/day | 7 ↑ |
| Cal | 31 | 18,943 $/day | 7 ↑ |
BFA PANAMAX 82
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Jan | 26 | 12,207 $/day | 425 ↑ |
| Feb | 26 | 12,490 $/day | 615 ↑ |
| Mar | 26 | 15,436 $/day | 343 ↑ |
| Apr | 26 | 16,115 $/day | 418 ↑ |
| May | 26 | 15,793 $/day | 221 ↑ |
| Jun | 26 | 15,643 $/day | 225 ↑ |
| Q1 | 26 | 13,378 $/day | 461 ↑ |
| Q2 | 26 | 15,850 $/day | 288 ↑ |
| Q3 | 26 | 15,065 $/day | 281 ↑ |
| Q4 | 26 | 14,536 $/day | 120 ↑ |
| Q1 | 27 | 12,472 $/day | 149 ↑ |
| Q2 | 27 | 13,922 $/day | 136 ↑ |
| Cal | 27 | 13,582 $/day | 201 ↑ |
| Cal | 28 | 13,361 $/day | 85 ↑ |
| Cal | 29 | 13,267 $/day | 33 ↑ |
| Cal | 30 | 13,060 $/day | 22 ↑ |
| Cal | 31 | 12,844 $/day | 11 ↑ |
BFA SUPRAMAX 63
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Jan | 26 | 12,302 $/day | 189 ↑ |
| Feb | 26 | 12,359 $/day | 325 ↑ |
| Mar | 26 | 15,477 $/day | 436 ↑ |
| Apr | 26 | 15,909 $/day | 250 ↑ |
| May | 26 | 15,966 $/day | 250 ↑ |
| Jun | 26 | 16,030 $/day | 300 ↑ |
| Q1 | 26 | 13,379 $/day | 316 ↑ |
| Q2 | 26 | 15,968 $/day | 266 ↑ |
| Q3 | 26 | 15,484 $/day | 182 ↑ |
| Q4 | 26 | 15,123 $/day | 171 ↑ |
| Q1 | 27 | 13,255 $/day | 57 ↑ |
| Q2 | 27 | 14,430 $/day | 35 ↑ |
| Cal | 27 | 14,148 $/day | 64 ↑ |
| Cal | 28 | 14,070 $/day | 54 ↑ |
| Cal | 29 | 13,888 $/day | 11 ↑ |
| Cal | 30 | 13,741 $/day | 8 ↑ |
| Cal | 31 | 13,728 $/day | 8 ↑ |
BFA SUPRAMAX 58
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Jan | 26 | 10,268 $/day | 189 ↑ |
| Feb | 26 | 10,325 $/day | 325 ↑ |
| Mar | 26 | 13,443 $/day | 436 ↑ |
| Apr | 26 | 13,875 $/day | 250 ↑ |
| May | 26 | 13,932 $/day | 250 ↑ |
| Jun | 26 | 13,996 $/day | 300 ↑ |
| Q1 | 26 | 11,345 $/day | 316 ↑ |
| Q2 | 26 | 13,934 $/day | 266 ↑ |
| Q3 | 26 | 13,450 $/day | 182 ↑ |
| Q4 | 26 | 13,089 $/day | 171 ↑ |
BALTIC INDICES 13/01/2026
DRY INDEX: 1608 (- 51)
CAPESIZE INDEX: 2446 (- 128)
| PANAMAX | INDEX: | 1331 (- | 9) |
| SUPRAMAX | INDEX: | 952 (- | 8) |
| HANDYSIZE | INDEX: | 593 (- | 6) |
BCI 182 TC AVG $/DAY 22180 (- 1161) BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 11978 (- 80) BSI TC AVG $/DAY 12038 (- 96) BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 10675 (- 102)
TIMECHARTER
‘New Venture’ 2014 79415 dwt dely Jorf Lasfar trip via Kamsar redel Stade intention Bauxite $10,500 – ldendorff
‘AC Victory’ 2005 75804 dwt dely Fangcheng 15/18 Jan trip via Indonesia redel South Korea $10,000
‘Ever Success’ 2011 58086 dwt dely Qinzhou 15/17 Jan trip redel Bangladesh $13,500 – Titans
‘Cyta’ 2024 40442 dwt dely Amsterdam prompt trip redel Turkiye $13,350 – BAI
‘African Nightjar’ 2015 39758 dwt dely La Pallice prompt trip redel Dakar – Abidjan $13,900
‘Norvic Singapore’ 2023 39738 dwt dely Miss River prompt trip redel EC Mexico $15,500
‘Alamo’ 2019 39258 dwt dely Norfolk prompt trip redel Tunusia $18,000 – G2 Ocean
‘Green Gem’ 2018 38503 dwt dely SW Pass prompt trip redel WC Central America $15,500 – Swire
‘Gdynia’ 2012 37933 dwt dely Damietta prompt trip redel Brazil intention fertilisers $6,000 – Navision
‘Indian Bulker’ 2017 37717 dwt dely Nador prompt trip redel US Gulf $7,000 – Centurion
‘Zimrida’ 2008 37296 dwt dely Rouen prompt trip redel India $9,500 – Navision
‘Odysseas’ 2011 37138 dwt dely Miss River prompt trip redel EC Mexico $15,000 – PacNav
‘Densa Hawk’ 2013 36746 dwt dely Skaw prompt trip
via Odense redel Turkiye intention scrap $12,250 – Lauritzen
‘Devbulk Cansen’ 2014 36706 dwt dely Colombia prompt trip redel Continent $15,000 – Centurion
‘Vigorous’ 2013 36204 dwt dely Recalada prompt trip redel Algeria $17,000 – Baltnav
‘Maple Fortune’ 2010 32544 dwt dely Recalada
prompt trip redel Cilicap intention grains $14,000 – Cofco
‘Grampus Ace’ 2011 32456 dwt dely Thailand prompt trip redel Indonesia $9,000
‘Athos’ 2007 30618 dwt dely Puerto Drummond prompt trip redel EC South America $13,500 – Pioneer
‘Cape Doukato’ 2014 28230 dwt dely Casablanca prompt trip via Aratu redel ARAG $7,000 – Norden
‘PW Action’ 82168 2010 dwt dely Zhangzhou 12 Jan trip via Indonesia redel India intention coal $8,500 – Bainbridge
PERIOD
‘W-Star’ 2011 92842 dwt dely CJK 12 Jan 9/13 months redel worldwide $13,250 – Swissmarine
VOYAGES ORE
‘Jin Niu Star’ 2006 190000/10 Tubarao option West Africa/Qingdao 3/10 Feb $20.00 fio 3 days shinc/30000shinc –
Mercuria
‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 28/30 Jan $7.50 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto
‘TBN’ 75000/10 APCT-HPCT-DBCT/EC India 10/19
Feb $14.35 fio 40,000shinc/40,000shinc – SAIL
GRAIN
‘TBN’ 65000/10 Up River Necochea or Bahia Blanca/Koh Sichang 1/15 Feb $34.75 fio 8000sshex/15000shinc – Aditya Birla Global Trading
Baltic Exchange Index – 13 JANUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 2446 (- 128)
Route Description Value($) Change
| ====== | =================================== | === | ||
| C2 | 170000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam | 10.588 – 0.318 | ||
| C3 | 170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao | 20.327 – 0.459 | ||
| C5 | 160-170000 mt W Australia to Qingdao 7.515 – 0.195 | |||
| C7 | 160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 12.750 – 0.419 | |||
| C8_182 182000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 25,438 – | 1781 | |||
| C9_182 182000mt Cont/Med Trip China/Japan 45,722 – | 2306 | |||
| C10_182 182000mt China/Japan T/P RV 17,773 – | 750 | |||
| C14_182 182000mt China-Brazil or W.Africa RV 22,932 – 918 | ||||
| C16_182 182000mt Far East – Atlantic BH 5,561 – | 911 | |||
| C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 15.005 – | 0.230 | |||
| ========================================== | ==== | |||
| 5TC | Weighted Timecharter Average | 18,677 – | 1161 | |
5TC_182 Weighted Timecharter Average 22,180 – 1161
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 13 JANUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,331 (- 9)
Route Description Value ($) Change
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 11,773 – 136
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 18,164 – 6 P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 10,650 – 182 P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 7,479 – 31 P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 12,692 + 11
====== ================================= ======= =====
P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 11,978 – 80
The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ======================= ======== ====== P5_82 S. China Indo RV 9,863 – 100
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 47.787 + 0.102 P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 33.250 + 0.008
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 13 JANUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 952 (- 8)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ========================================= =====
S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 16,342 – 275 S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 19,929 + 15 BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 9,494 – 35
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 9,070 – 10 S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero *19,496 + 78 S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 10,186 – 93 BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 18,364 – 182 BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 9,907 – 129 BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 14,993 – 286 S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 7,628 – 122 S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 11,633 – 171
====== ========================================= ===
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 12,038 – 96 S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 10,004 – 96
Baltic Exchange Index – 13 JANUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 593 (- 6)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ========================================
HS1_38 Skaw-Pass trip Recalada – R.de Janeiro 7,129 – 121 HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 8,707 – 150 HS3_38 R.de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw-Pass 16,472 – 50 HS4_38 USG trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Pass 15,293-200 HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 9,988 – 48 HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn 9,388 -69 HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 8,500 – 129
====== ========================================
7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 10,675 – 102
(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd 2026
Marex Media
Mr Bansi Jaising
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