• Wishing you and all your loved one’s Merry Christmas and all the best for New Year 2026
• How Beijing Built Arms Industry to Rival the West
New jet engines show results of China’s military self-sufficiency push. In 2016, Beijing launched a new aerospace conglomerate called Aero Engine Corp. of China. It had a challenging mandate: to develop top-line aircraft engines, a technology China had long struggled to master.
Less than a decade later, Beijing’s newest stealth fighters are entering service with what officials call “Chinese hearts,” or indigenously made engines.
• U.S. Coast Guard Chasing Another Tanker Involved in Shipping Venezuela Oil
Operation comes as the administration carries out Trump’s order to blockade Venezuela’s oil shipments.
UK The U.S. Coast Guard is pursuing an oil tanker involved in transporting oil from Venezuela, according to three U.S. officials, part of an accelerating effort by the Trump administration to block ships from moving the country’s crude. The attempted interdiction comes a day after the U.S. apprehended an oil tanker that wasn’t on its sanctions list and after President Trump in a social-media post last Tuesday ordered a “total and complete blockade” of sanctioned tankers going into and out of Venezuela.
• UK Economy slowed to show 0.1% growth in third quarter. In the July to September quarter, Britains economy experienced a slight increase of 0.1%, consistent with earlier forecasts. However, previous growth rates were adjusted downward. Looking ahead, the Bank of England predicts stagnation in GDP growth for the upcoming October to December period, although a marginal underlying economic growth of approximately 0.2% each quarter is anticipated.
Britain’s current account deficit in the three months to end of September totalled 12.1 billion pounds, compared with a Reuters poll forecast of 21.1 billion pounds and equivalent to 1.6% of GDP, smaller than 2.8% in the second quarter.
• US State Dept confirms delays stretch up to a year as tougher screening hits Indian H-1B workers. US Visa appointments are facing significant delays with wait times reaching upto 12 months. New screening rules are causing these extended waits. Tech Giants like Google and Apple are warning H1B visa holders against International-travel. This situation affects many Indian workers seeking to re-enter the US. Expedited appointments are available, but capacity changes may affect schedules.
• China’s Sea Turtle strategy is playing out beautifully in open ground now.
Tencent has just hired somebody as their chief AI scientist and guess what this person is about
He had so far been one of the senior-most AI researchers at OpenAI. And now he is going to lead all the AI efforts at Tencent, which is one of China’s biggest tech giants
And this is not just about this one instance; it’s across the board. Look at BYD, it’s full of people who have previously worked and led efforts at the best of auto majors out there globally, at the best of battery majors globally who have come back home and taken those learnings to the next level.
The same goes for Alibaba. The same is true for Huawei, whose sizable staff, including senior leadership, is composed mainly of people who have worked extensively with European telecom majors. And it is all delivering results now.
This is the Sea Turtle strategy in play. It is about what? That basically you fund people’s strides in other countries and then bring them back under lucrative contracts and then have them build the tech that they were exposed to in those western countries at the home base now.
This is a strategy which has played out very very beautifully for the Chinese folks.
Now, the interesting part is that India too had a Sea Turtle. His name was Verghese Kurien.
He was chosen by the Govt of India back in those days
He was sent out of the country to learn everything that is there to know about agriculture, dairy and more
Then he was brought back to build Amul, and we all know the impact that he created
Now consider this.
After Chinese AI researchers, the next largest pool of AI researchers is Indian-origin people in the US.
What is stopping the government of India from going all out, literally all out, to bring those people back home? That is the question we should be asking.
• Donald Trump takes fresh measures in desperate for US to control Greenland
Donald Trump, the US President, has long wanted to take over Greenland, which is an autonomous territory in the Kingdom of Denmark, but his plans have sparked fury. Bullish Donald Trump has taken fresh steps in his desperate bid to take control of Greenland.
The US President has long insisted the move would help boost international security and, in March, he suggested it would be a simple process for his nation to acquire the territory. However, Mr Trump has since faced a fierce attack from Greenland with its defiant Prime Minister blasting the world leader for his bulling tactics. Yet now, Mr Trump, 79, has appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry to serve as the US special envoy to Greenland, a measure he believes will represent a huge advance in securing the island. Mr Trump said today: “Jeff understands how essential Greenland is to our national security, and will strongly advance our country’s Interests for the safety, security, and survival of our allies, and indeed, the world.”. Mr Trump, in the early months of his return to the White House, repeatedly called for US jurisdiction over Greenland, and has not ruled out military force to take control of the mineral-rich, strategically located Arctic-island.
Trump says US needs Greenland for security, taps envoy to ‘lead the charge’. President Donald Trump reasserted on Monday that the United States needs Greenland for its national security and said a special envoy he appointed to the Arctic island would “lead the charge.”
• How America and Iran Can Break the Nuclear Deadlock To End the Cycle of Hostility and Threats
In contemporary international relations, security is not just something countries seek for themselves. It is also a concept they use to justify controlling, constraining, and directing others’ behaviour. When political scientists speak of “securitization,” they refer to a process through which a particular issue is portrayed as an existential threat justifying extraordinary measures instead of something that governments can address through normal politics.
The Islamic Republic of Iran serves as a perfect illustration. Over the last two decades, Israel and the United States have tried to persuade the world to stop treating Iran as a normal country and to instead treat it like the international system’s leading danger. The result has been constant denunciations, crushing sanctions, threats of military action, and, most recently, military operations against its territory—carried out during diplomatic negotiations between Tehran and Washington. Iran, in response, has been forced to devote more resources and attention to defence. It also increased uranium enrichment in defiance, to show that it would not be pressured into submission. The external securitization of Iran has fed into a parallel dynamic at home, as the state adopted a stricter approach in dealing with domestic social challenges, responding to these challenges with tighter restrictions.
The result is a securitization cycle: a vicious spiral in which Iran and its adversaries feel compelled to adopt more hostile policies in response to each other’s behaviour. This phenomenon is somewhat like the security dilemma, in which one government’s decision to bolster its capabilities prompts others to do the same. But with the security dilemma, each side is reacting to material increases in the other’s capacity. This cycle begins with rhetoric. The target country is portrayed as a threat, and then is treated as a threat. And in response, it turns to activities—such as bolstering its missile capabilities or increasing enrichment—that can be used to corroborate the initial allegation. The cycle, in other words, produces a self-fulfilling prophecy. The securitized country gradually distances itself from independent agency and becomes trapped in a series of reactive behaviours.
Breaking this cycle will not be easy, and it will require that foreign powers respect Iran’s rights and dignity and stop constantly defaming, threatening, and coercing a millennia-old civilization-state. But there are steps that Tehran can take to help in breaking the vicious securitization cycle. It can start by shoring up domestic support through economic reforms, bolstering its hand in international negotiations. After all, Iranian people have proved to be Iran’s greatest asset in resisting and deterring foreign aggression. Tehran can also recalibrate its emphasis on material defensive power—an emphasis that often amplifies threat perceptions— and instead prioritize cooperation and coordination, particularly at the regional level. It can establish a frank dialogue with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to address mutual concerns and find a way to resume cooperation. And it can engage with the United States to manage their differences, starting with the nuclear issue and sanctions.
Over the past two decades, Iran has been the target of intense securitization by Israel and the United States. Together, the two have constructed and disseminated a narrative that portrays Iran as an existential threat not just to its region but also to the entire globe.
Benjamin Netanyahu, who called Iranian government “a messianic apocalyptic cult,” alleged in a speech before the Knesset in 1992 that “Iran is three to five years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon.” U.S. President Donald Trump, among his many insults, has called Iran “a very evil place.” The manifest absurdity of these claims hasn’t stopped either of the two from continuing to advance them and engage in increasingly belligerent behaviour. The United States has implemented extraordinary economic sanctions against Iran. Israel, aided by Washington, has bombed Iran’s infrastructure and killed its military leaders, scientists, and ordinary civilians.
As a result, Iran has been forced to react with defiant policies instead of pursuing its initial goal-oriented plans. In response to growing U.S. and Israeli pressure, it increased its uranium enrichment level to 60 percent and reduced its cooperation with the IAEA. Following the unprovoked joint U.S.-Israeli attacks, ordinary Iranians began debating whether Iran’s defence doctrine should change to include nuclear weapons. Calls for blocking the Strait of Hormuz have gained momentum. Had it not been for such aggression, Iran would have continued its unprecedented co-operation with the IAEA under the 2015 nuclear deal. It would have focused on regional cooperation, which it has championed since 1985.
Iran’s securitization has created a siege mentality, which often leads to the imposition of tighter social controls. These include restrictions on the Internet and social media and surveillance measures intended to root out spies and saboteurs. Such measures are certainly ineffective at addressing the sources of domestic discontent: economic hardship, the erosion of social capital, and a widening gap between the state and society. But they are what happens when a siege mentality is imposed on a country for decades. In Tehran’s case, the securitization began with Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein—who waged war on Iran for eight years— and with separatist violence and massive terrorist operations shortly after the country’s 1979 revolution. It has continued thanks to constant
U.S. and Israeli threats and coercion. Under these circumstances, any government would become consumed with real and perceived existential external threats to its dignity and independence.
And external threats are part of why Iran faces such hardship in the first place. Tehran, after all, has been forced to spend more on its military and less on development and welfare because Iraq, Israel, and the United States have attacked it. In addition, the economic warfare Washington has waged against Iran—via U.S. President Barack Obama’s crippling sanctions and then Trump’s maximum pressure campaign—has led to huge loss in the rial’s value, unbearable inflation, and rampant corruption to circumvent sanctions. Yet rather than see their own role in immiserating Iranians, outside powers have made politically charged, exaggerated, and selective portrayals of the Islamic Republic as a violator of human rights. This, in turn, has intensified the cycle of securitization and further reduced Iran’s capacity for independent agency in the global arena.
To build both a better Iran and a safer world, Tehran and its antagonists will need to find a way out of this spiral. What will not work is apparent. Pressure has not persuaded Iran to change its behaviour. Similarly, Iran’s defensive policies, such as increased nuclear enrichment, have never diminished perceived threats. Securitization operates in the realm of mental perceptions rather than material capability. As a result, defensive measures by the target often end up playing into the hands of hostile powers by strengthening their narratives. This is particularly true regarding provocative rhetoric, such as absurd statements in the 2010’s by irresponsible Iranian politicians that Iran controlled four Arab capitals—Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, and Sanaa—which were used by securitizing forces to justify their pressure against Iran.
That might make it seem as if Tehran is inextricably trapped. But history shows that, through careful diplomacy, it can find a way out. Iran was able to break the securitization cycle during the first half of the 2010’s by engaging in dialogue with the United States, culminating in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sought to ensure that, in return for economic normalization, Iran would never develop a nuclear weapon. The agreement changed Iran’s international environment (if only temporarily). The UN Security Council confirmed this reality in Resolution 2231, which declared “that the conclusion of the JCPOA marks a fundamental shift in its consideration of this issue” and expressed the entire body’s “desire to build a new relationship with Iran strengthened by the implementation of the JCPOA.”
Iran’s success in securing this agreement was primarily the result of high turnout in the 2013 presidential election, which dispelled illusions in the United States and Europe about the imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic—illusions that dated to Iran’s post-2009 election unrest. The 2013 election also provided domestic legitimacy to the incoming Rouhani administration, which sought to preserve and protect the rights of Iranian people through dialogue rather than defiance. Breaking the securitization cycle, in other words, began at home, by building a broad domestic consensus. Iran can create such a consensus again, but doing so will require establishing a national dialogue among political groups, social factions, and the general population. Thankfully, Iran already has online platforms, created by non-governmental organizations, that citizens can use to register complaints about policies and bureaucrats.
These platforms also keep track of how widespread such complaints are. The government should encourage this reporting, and it should require that state agencies take corrective measures in response to such complaints. This would increase the government’s social capital and thus lay the groundwork for implementing policies aimed at countering securitization.
The Iranian government can further reinforce public confidence by improving Iranians’ living conditions. Although the United States’ economic war on Iran precludes massive economic improvements in the immediate future, the government can still combat corruption, enhance transparency, and curb the rent-seeking behaviour that arises from sanctions circumvention. Doing so would reduce social and economic disparities, increase public satisfaction, and thus lessen the need for internal, securitized policies.
As it builds consensus at home, Tehran can begin working to improve its international reputation. Officials should prioritize confidence-building measures centered on improving dialogue with Iran’s neighbours. They might, for example, pursue former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s proposed Hormuz Peace Endeavor, which aimed at fostering co- operation and confidence building among countries neighbouring the strategic Strait of Hormuz. They could also create a Muslim West Asian Dialogue Association, which aims to replace enmity with amity through conversations among the eight Persian Gulf littoral states along with Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Or, they could establish a Middle East Network for Atomic Research and Advancement, which would create regional mechanisms for ensuring non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament while enhancing cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology among regional countries that reject nuclear weapons.
Iran has the region’s greatest aggregate power and human, natural, and geostrategic resources, so it makes sense for it to help lead these initiatives. Tehran should also realize that its power can make others uncomfortable, and therefore the country should pivot from a narrative of building a “strong Iran”—which can appear unilateral and threatening— to a narrative of building a “strong region.” Iranian officials, for example, can reframe the country’s scientific and cultural capacities as resources that can benefit all of West Asia rather than as proof of Iran’s sway.
But the region’s other states will need to play their own part in breaking the securitization cycle. To do so, they should focus on isolating the regional figure most responsible for securitizing Iran: Netanyahu. He and his allies have proved that they consider peace and tranquility to be an existential threat to their fortunes. This makes them unlike Iran, which—according to Article 2 of its constitution—was founded upon “rejection of all forms of oppression, submission to oppression, domination of others and submission to domination” and “utilization and further advancement of science, technology and advanced results of human experiences” that “bring about political, economic, social and cultural independence as well as equity, justice and national solidarity.”
Israel’s recent behaviour provides an opening for Iranian leaders. The horrific crimes in Gaza have resulted in a global outcry and awakened consciences across ideological barriers. But few governments have been more consistent in criticizing Israel and advocating for the Palestinians than Tehran. Iranian officials could thus work with international organizations and institutions—including the United Nations and the International Court of Justice—to foster global empathy and build a strong consensus against apartheid, genocide, and aggression. In doing so, Iran might be able to neutralize and possibly even reverse its securitization. It makes no sense for Iran to be securitized with accusations of nuclear proliferation when the leading proponent of those charges is a regime that possesses an illegal nuclear arsenal.
Iran’s priority in foreign policy will always be its own neighbourhood. Tehran, however, should also try to deepen its relationships elsewhere. That includes closely co-operating with Russia. Co-ordinating with China, which is a rising global powerhouse, is an absolute imperative. But Tehran could also benefit from improving relations with Europe and managing its differences with the United States. This would help ensure that Iran is a serious, equal, and long-term partner to China and Russia—and not just engaging with them out of imposed desperation. Managing and containing differences with the United States may also be necessary for breaking the cycle of securitization. Perhaps no government has done as much to try to isolate Iran as has Washington. (Although no one has done as much as Israel to persuade the United States to be hostile toward Iran and Iranians.) Tehran should thus consider the possibility of renewed direct dialogue with Washington, based on equal footing. Expectations must be managed, as the objective of talks cannot be to restore friendly links between the two countries. Iran and the United States have intractable differences rooted in identity and ideology that neither can realistically concede: for Washington, this includes the nature of Iran’s revolutionary political establishment and its stance on Israel; for Tehran, it includes Washington’s blind support for Israel and its global presence. But by agreeing to disagree on these ideological quarrels, negotiators could manage to find ways to prevent them from triggering un-necessary crises. They can also resolve many of their political disputes through a mutual give-and-take.
At the top of the list is Iran’s nuclear program and U.S. sanctions, the very nexus that the JCPOA was designed to address. The United States must realize that it cannot obliterate Iran’s substantial capabilities, as most are indigenous and can be rebuilt. But both countries can agree on two shared objectives: Iran should never build nuclear weapons, and the United States should never threaten or engage in military and economic war against Iran. To those ends, Iran could offer transparency, limits on enrichment, and a possible regional mechanism, such as an enrichment consortium. The United States, for its part, would have to lift its own sanctions and permit the lifting of UN sanctions.
Iran could foster an agreement by being more transparent about its nuclear program through appropriate co-operation with the IAEA. Iranian officials are justifiably worried that any information they provide to the IAEA will be used for military targeting, given their belief that classified information has leaked from the organization in the past. The IAEA director’s June remarks that Tehran had “not answered, or not provided technically credible answers to, the Agency’s questions” was also misused by Israel to justify that month’s bombing campaign. Iran thus has every right to demand that the IAEA be diligent in observing its own procedures and codes of conduct on impartiality, objectivity, confidentiality, and sensitivity to national security concerns in exchange for continued cooperation. But as long as they are managed, the risks of co-operation should be worth the payoffs. Transparency with the IAEA should halt the dissemination of unsubstantiated securitizing narratives around Iran and facilitate a political deal with the United States.
If Tehran and Washington do implement an updated nuclear agreement, the countries might also manage to address other difficult issues, such as regional security, arms control, and counter-terrorism. Iran, for example, might be asked to promise that it will not attack the United States or its allies in the region in return for a reciprocal guarantee by the United States and its partners. Tehran might also promise that it will not use its military capabilities other than in self-defence against prior armed attack, based on a reciprocal commitment. The United States, however, would have to deal with Iran’s security grievances, including its threatening presence around Iran and the unparalleled flooding of the region with sophisticated American weaponry. For all of Washington’s fretting about Iran’s defence procurement, Tehran spends only a fraction of what U.S. allies in the region do on military purchases in real, per capita, and GNP percentages.
Iran and the United States might also find that they have opportunities to actively aid each other. Iran, for example, boasts a strong network of universities; a large, well-educated population; and a thriving private sector, with long historical ties to global markets. In fact, it is one of the most untapped, stable, and lucrative economies anywhere. Together, Iran and the United States could thus cooperate on important scientific and technological issues.
Likewise, they might find areas of short-term foreign policy coordination. Tehran and Washington, despite their strategic differences, cooperated in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early years of this century and against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in more recent ones. Today, they again have mutual challenges in matters of extremism, as well as in threats to freedom of navigation. They could become avenues of at least short-term de-confliction, if not co-ordination. Iran and the United States would also benefit from some co-operation in the fight against international drug trafficking. Situated along the primary transit routes for narcotics originating in Afghanistan, Iran has borne a disproportionate share of the human and financial costs of counter-narcotics efforts, including thousands of casualties among its law enforcement personnel. Quiet coordination, whether through intelligence sharing, technical assistance, or support for regional interdiction mechanisms, would address a shared security threat without requiring political alignment on broader ideological disputes.
The securitization cycle has placed Iran, the region, and NATO countries, particularly the United States, in a complex and self- reinforcing predicament. Iran’s defensive and reactive measures, rather than reducing threats, have intensified securitized perceptions of Iran and helped advance the narrative that Tehran is dangerous. Breaking this cycle is a vital necessity for Tehran. The idea that Iran is an existential threat may be completely wrong. But this perception has created existential threats for Iranians—something the June attacks made painfully evident.
Escaping securitization requires a set of simultaneous, comprehensive, and coordinated strategies. It necessitates active and balanced regional and global diplomacy, internal reforms, domestic and international confidence-building measures, a pivot back to the ideational power of the Islamic Revolution, the non-provocative strengthening of the country’s defence capabilities, and a shift in strategic communications.
At the same time, breaking the securitization cycle is pivotal for the United States and Europe. They should start by engaging with Iran as a partner rather than a threat. They should remember that doing so will advance their own interests. By becoming ensnared in a belligerent, securitizing discourse against Iran, the United States and Europe have escalated regional and global tensions without achieving any of their stated objectives. They would be much better served respecting Iran’s independence, dignity, and legitimate rights while redirecting their focus onto the main cause of instability in the region: Israel’s unlawful and unconscionable behaviour.
Iran is a natural mediator. Its culture, history, and location mean it can facilitate dialogue and co-operation between Asia and Europe. It can serve as a hub for trade, particularly with the landlocked states of Central Asia. Its human capital means it can be a major partner in global technological innovation. Breaking Iran’s securitization cycle and allowing it to ascend to its rightful place will help yield peace, development, and stability for the decades.
• The End of China’s Old Guard
Why Party Elders Can’t Save the Country From Xi
For the past year, an increasing number of rumours about Chinese leader Xi Jinping have been swirling around Beijing. Some sources privately claim that Xi has lost real power and been sidelined. Others whisper that Xi’s health has deteriorated; the politician appearing in public, they say, is merely a lookalike, while a group of the party’s most venerable elder statesmen are actually calling the shots. Still other stories even imagine an alliance of unlikely bedfellows—once powerful liberal political reformers and conservative generals from the People’s Liberation Army, for instance—who are teaming up to admonish Xi.
• On the cusp of 2026
President Donald Trump describes the United States at the end of the first year of his second term as standing on the cusp of a “golden age” of economic boom times. But what if voters never feel it?
The White House has been trying to delay any reckoning of bad economic vibes for as long as possible. The president and allies argue that the full benefits of his “one big beautiful bill” won’t be felt until tax season and that by then, things like gas prices will continue to fall and tariff-driven spikes in some prices will level out.
But if the economic picture remains more complicated, how long can Trump defer responsibility to former President Joe Biden, to China, or to anyone but himself and the Republicans who control Washington? A dud of a tax season late spring, just months before the midterms, could be a disaster for the GOP.
A Capitol Hill Correspondent writes: 2026 is the last year Republicans are guaranteed to maintain control of the House, Senate and White House during Trump’s final term. Every decision made by lawmakers this coming year will be viewed through the lens of the looming midterms, making it even more difficult for GOP leaders to find consensus on government spending, health care, foreign policy and a wide range of other key issues.
Control of Congress will determine not only the future of Trump’s policy goals, but how much scrutiny the administration will face. If Democrats have a majority in either chamber, they would have subpoena power over Trump and his agencies, which could lead to confrontational hearings and document requests that pester the president as he attempts to build his legacy.
A big foreign policy trend to keep an eye on is the significant downgrading of America’s close transatlantic alliance with European allies that has promoted peace and mutual security since World War II. The Trump administration has instead defined its national interest as the Western Hemisphere, with a major focus on Venezuela.
The White House seems poised to keep escalating its military pressure after blockading sanctioned Venezuelan oil, which could also weaken Cuba and Iran — regimes that rely heavily on the country’s oil. At the same time, breaking the traditional U.S. bond with Europe helps Russian President Vladimir Putin accomplish a long-held goal of dividing America from its NATO allies, which may not bode well for Ukraine’s future.
• Support rate for Takaichi’s cabinet dips to 67.5%: poll
The approval rating for the cabinet of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has dipped to 67.5 percent, with a majority of respondents saying her remarks on a Taiwan contingency, which have strained ties with China, will impact Japan’s economy, a Kyodo News survey showed Sunday.
Even so, 57.0 percent of respondents said they did not consider her remarks to be careless, while 37.6 percent said they were, when asked for their views in light of how past Prime ministers had avoided commenting directly on the sensitive Taiwan issue.
The two-day telephone poll conducted from Saturday found that the cabinet’s approval rating fell from the previous months survey by 2.4percentage points while the disapproval rating edged up 3.9 points to 20.4 percent.
Meanwhile, 64.6 percent of respondents said they are increasingly worried over the nation’s fiscal health following the enactment on Tuesday of an 18.3 trillion yen ($116 billion) supplementary budget for the current fiscal year ending March.
The government plans to issue 11.7 trillion yen in new bonds to cover more than 60 percent of the total.
Regarding the government’s scheme to hand out “rice vouchers” under an inflation-relief program, 82.4 percent said they see the impact of this step as being small in combatting surging prices.
On the other hand, 64.1 percent had a good assessment of a recent agreement between Takaichi’s Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party for the People regarding the tax reform plan for fiscal 2026.yen.
Under their deal, the tax-free annual income threshold will be raised from the current 1.60 million yen to 1.78 million yen.
By political party, support stood at 31.1 percent for the LDP, 7.8 percent for the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, 7.8 percent for the Democratic Party for the People and 8.0 percent for the Japan Innovation Party.
Asked about having the DPP join the ruling coalition, 49.2 percent of respondents expressed their support, against 40.0 percent opposed it.
A total of 491 randomly selected households with eligible voters and 3,040 mobile phone numbers were called for the survey, yielding responses from 420 household members and 620 mobile phone users.
• VLCC rates fall like ‘lead balloon’ in steepest one-day plunge in over half-decade
Baltic Exchange’s TD3C index nosedives 20% or $22,357 per day on Monday vs Friday, the largest single-day nominal decline since May 1, 2020
Despite pullback, global VLCC rates still average $83,882 per day, the highest since tail end of spring 2020 floating storage boom, with the exception of 2H25 rally
Suezmax and aframax rates remain very strong; Monday’s suezmax assessment was highest since early September, aframax assessment was highest since January 2024
Crude tanker markets in general remain historically strong. That said, VLCC spot rates, specifically rates from the Middle East Gulf to China, suffered a particularly severe drop on Monday.
SPOT rates of very large crude carriers are extremely volatile. There can be massive daily swings to the upside or downside. That was on full display on Monday when a key VLCC index plunged.
The Baltic Exchange’s TD3C time-charter equivalent index, measuring spot rates on the Middle East Gulf-China route, sank 20% versus Friday, to $87,711 per day.
It was the lowest reading for the TD3C index since October 27 and the largest one-day fall in percentage terms since June 26, when upside from the Iran-Israel-US conflict evaporated.
Monday’s TD3C drop of $22,357 per day versus Friday was the steepest single-day nominal decline in over five-and-a-half years, since May 1, 2020 at the end of the Covid-era floating-storage boom.
“Not the start to the week that owners would have wanted, with TD3C dropping like a lead balloon this afternoon,” wrote brokerage Braemar on Monday.
“With four market quotes today, two of which collected 10-plus offers, and with lists opening up, this was likely to happen, but not many expected this much of a drop-off.”
Rogliano said on Monday, “Despite the expectations and hopes of a strong first decade of January, the MEG remained mostly quiet the whole of last week, which prompted the start of a downturn in rates as prompt available tonnage started to grow. As of today [Monday], it had fallen even further.
“Cargo counts are still low for the first decade, so many are questioning if all these cargoes have really been covered privately already or will at some point pop back up to steady the ship.”
The sinking TD3C pulled the Baltic’s global weighted average VLCC index down to $83,882 per day on Monday, its lowest point since October 16.
The Baltic’s TD15 West Africa-China VLCC TCE index was at $84,001 per day on Monday, down 11% versus Friday, with the TD22 US Gulf-China index at $79,935 per day, down 3% from Friday.
• VLCC TCE indexes by trade lane
“Large tankers will always be a volatile sector,” said DHT chief executive Svein Moxnes Harfjeld during a Capital Link crude tanker roundtable on December 16.
“When you are in a strong market like we have now, the volatility in nominal terms can be quite scary numbers — you can have things flipping $20,000 or $30,000 per day. But that should not be a reason to be worried.”
Frontline chief executive Lars Barstad said during the same panel, “I’m always afraid of jinxing things, but December is a short month because charterers and owners go on holiday too.
“The Baltic index doesn’t print between Christmas and New Year, so there is a chance that we can still have some hectic days as the January stems in the Middle East need to get covered, and that’s basically going to start happening any minute now.”
Barstad’s fear of “jinking things” proved prescient. The pre- Christmas boost for January stems he hoped for never happened.
But to put Monday’s drop in perspective, VLCC rates are still exceptionally profitable. Prior to the current rally that began in
September, the Baltic Exchange’s global average VLCC index had not been at Monday’s levels since April 30, 2020, at the end of the floating storage boom.
• VLCC global average TCE index: 2019-2025
Meanwhile, the broader strength of the crude tanker market remains intact. Suezmax and aframax rates have not declined.
The Baltic Exchange’s global weighted average suezmax index came in at an extremely strong $91,465 per day on Monday, the highest level since November 27.
The Suezmax index was $7,583 per day above the VLCC index on Monday. This is the highest premium of Suezmax rates to VLCC rates since September 4, at the very beginning of this year’s VLCC rate rally.
• Crude tanker TCE indexes
Aframax rates also remain very strong.
The Baltic’s global weighted average aframax index closed at $61,978 per day on Monday, the highest level in almost two years, since January 22, 2024.
• Aframax Global Average TCE Index: 2019-2025
• Shipping in 2026 and beyond: the future isn’t what it used to be
The disruptive forces that have allowed shipping markets to defy economic gravity thus far are not going to last forever.
Despite a potentially worrying orderbook and continuing disruption, for now at least, the pathologically optimistic shipping sector is still feeling pretty confident about prospects for 2026 and beyond.
• SHIPOWNERS don’t trust forecasts.
The more studious among them will pay through the nose for methodically researched supply and demand analysis, which they then disregard.
They will canvas opinion from the few they respect — and judge the actions of those they don’t — accordingly.
They will host lunches to ask the question, only to sigh in disappointment at yet another regurgitated consensus view.
Then they will ignore it all, because they know that sentiment and events overrule everything. Until they don’t.
On paper, 2026 certainly looks more challenging than recent years.
Longer distances have powered shipping markets since 2020, but even with more disruption fuelling those tonne-miles, there is limited upside left for the markets to rely on next year.
Meanwhile, a delivery bulge is nearing, and utilisation is set to slip as the fleet grows 5% against a 1.5% uptick in tonne-mile demand.
Swing factors like the re-opening of the Suez Canal, US lifting Russian sanctions, a further escalation of tariffs and trade war skirmishes could all affect markets, but the base-case backdrop for rates is turning tougher in 2026.
The problem with that reading of market dynamics is that shipping has become used to the fact that this is a business that thrives in periods of volatility and disruption, and nobody is predicting any shortage of that next year.
Shipping may have been weaponised, geopolitically speaking, but most maritime markets did just fine in 2025.
Amid wars, disintegrating multilateralism and trade being forced to reroute down geopolitical lines, this has been another hugely profitable year for many.
Sure, the disruptive forces that have allowed shipping markets to defy economic gravity thus far are not going to last forever, but unpredictability, crisis and luck continue to override any immediate concerns.
Black swans are, by definition, unpredictable, but the known disrupting factors continue to buoy the current positive mood.
A Red Sea return may change some calculations, but when Lloyd’s List polled the industry earlier this month, the consensus view points to 2027 — or possibly late 2026 — as the earliest return. A further 40% believe that it might be later, or may never return to previous levels.
• Shipping lenders partying like its 2007, experts warn
No repeat of financial crisis expected but red flags are there Market correction would have big consequences
Don’t relax over US-China trade tensions
Competition is eroding pricing differentials in favour of smaller Owners.
• World’s Biggest R & D Hub in India!
Swiss based Novartis builds it’s biggest R & D hub outside Switzerland in India, betting big on Indian talent and innovation, with over 9000 professionals across Hyderabad and Mumbai, the centre now plays a key role in research, clinical development, data analytics and regulatory support for global medicines. This move shows strong confidence in India’s scientific talent and innovation eco-system.
• Greenland and Denmark leaders tell Donald Trump ‘we expect respect’ in scathing statement.
• New Class of Warship to Be Named After Trump
The new vessels, which the president calls battleships, will be latest in what the White House envisions as a ‘Golden Fleet’
• President Trump said the Navy would build a new “Trump Class” battleship, which will be center piece of his vision for a new “Golden Fleet”. He also announced a new-class of aircraft carrier, but did not offer further details.
• How a String of Hacks Embarrassed Cyber Powerhouse Israel
Groups linked to Iran have used relatively simple techniques to leak internal emails and documents, experts say
Israel is known worldwide as a cyber powerhouse. Yet hackers linked to its biggest adversary, Iran, have managed to pull off a series of successful breaches by using known vulnerabilities to attack institutions that aren’t as well-defended as the country’s critical infrastructure.
Israel requires a high standard of cybersecurity for critical infrastructure, such as its electric utility, but not for less important bodies and institutions such as hospitals, which have fallen victim to some of the attacks linked to Iran. Some current and former Israeli cyber officials and experts say Israel could better protect itself if the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, passed a cyber law that would expand the rules beyond critical infrastructure.
• Hafnia signals Torm takeover intent to forge $5bn company with 300 tankers
Statement in US filing gives clearest indication yet of Andreas Sohmen-Pao’s intentions towards Danish rival
Andreas Sohmen-Pao-controlled Hafnia has given the biggest hint yet that a takeover of Danish product tanker rival Torm is on the cards.
Hafnia completed its $311m purchase of shares from Oaktree Capital Management on Monday, giving it a stake of 13.97% in US and Copenhagen-listed Torm.
• Insurance leaders lobby nations to prevent billion-dollar casualty claims
London Club CEO says the industry is concerned about future claims following the X-Press Pearl disaster.
Insurance leaders are lobbying coastal states to try to prevent a repeat of the $1bn compensation demand following the world’s worst marine plastic spill off Sri Lanka’s coast.
The country’s supreme court ordered the huge compensation payout in July, sending shockwaves through the insurance industry, which has moved to bolster its position amid fears of “copycat” rulings by other nations.
• Shipowner PascoGas steps up growth campaign with two fresh acquisitions
Istanbul-based LPG carrier firm steps on the gas with secondhand buys from Chinese seller. Turkish Owner PascoGas has increased the size of its fleet to 14 vessels in the water or under construction, with a pair of second-hand acqusitions from Chinese peer Unique Shipping.
The Istanbul-based company has emerged as new owner of two mid-sizes gas carrier sold by Unique recently, for a total estimated outlay of close to $45m.
• Fledgling Greek player Metis boosts bulker fleet after Norden resale
Low-profile company grows its footprint, possibly with the help of Japanese partners. Six months after making its debut with a modern kamsarmax pair, Greek company Metis Ship Management has expanded its fleet to three ships with an even younger vessel. The Athens-based company acknowledged in a social media post that the 64,200-dwt Metis Stellar (built 2025) has joined its fleet — a newbuilding delivered just a few weeks ago by Dalian Cosco KHI Ship Engineering (Dacks).
• Zim stock surges after ‘multiple’ takeover offers roll in CEO Eli Glickman and shipowner Rami Ungar have revised proposal rejected, while others signal their intentions. Israeli container line Zim revealed it has received “multiple” takeover offers as the pursuit of the company hots up.
The New York-listed operation said the proposals have been fielded “as part of the review of strategic alternatives that has been on-going during the past several months.”
• Japan’s MOL banks $1.6bn to fund takeover of tank terminals business and FSRU
Owner also moves ahead with financing for Singapore-chartered FSRU
Tokyo-listed Mitsui OSK Lines (MOL) has announced two financing deals that further its interests in regasification and tank terminals. The giant shipowner said it had agreed loans worth ¥250bn ($1.6bn) to buy LBC Tank Terminals in the Netherlands, a transaction completed in June.
• 30 Tankers stuck in Venezuela as owners avoid international waters
State oil company PDVSA has loaded a VLCC as exports have dwindled. The number of tankers stranded in Venezuela has continued to grow following US tankers seizures.
AXSMarine data indicated around 30 ships of different sizes anchored off the South American country.
• Tomini turns to Japanese tonnage provider in bulker fleet boosting move
Time charter deal is the latest Japanese tie-up for Dubai-based bulker player is it pursues asset-lite strategy. Tomini Shipping has chartered a brand-new handy bulk carrier for five years from Japanese tonnage provider Daido Kaiun, a first for the company.
The Dubai-based bulker player revealed the time charter of the 42,400-dwt Tomini Sakura (built 2025) via a social media post that did not disclose the rate.
• West Africa stowaway cases surging despite repeated shipboard checks
Shipowners warned of rising costs and risks from persistent port- side breaches. China Shipowners Mutual P&I Association, also known as China P&I Club, has flagged a renewed surge in stowaway cases involving member vessels.
The incidents were heavily concentrated at West African ports during 2025. In an alert published on 22 December, China P&I Club said it has handled multiple claims in the 2025 policy year, despite long-standing circulars and guidance issued since 2010 on stowaway prevention and response.
• Shearwater prepares new seismic campaign in Nigerian waters
Norwegian offshore seismic vessel player Shearwater Geoservices is preparing to send out one of its vessels for a new multi-client seismic project offshore Nigeria.
According to the company, the 3D survey is backed by significant industry funding and will be executed in partnership with Harvex Geosolutions and the Nigerian Upstream Petroleum Regulatory Commission.
The project is scheduled to commence at the end of 2025 and will be carried out by Shearwater’s high-end vessel SW Duchess over an expected two-month period.
The survey will provide high-resolution subsurface data across the Western Niger Delta Basin, supporting exploration decisions and future license rounds in one of West Africa’s most prospective oil and gas regions.
“By investing in high-quality seismic data, where we can both capture rapid returns and create longer-term value, we are enabling smarter decisions and helping to shape the future of energy security in West Africa and beyond,” said Irene Waage Basili, CEO of Shearwater.
• Barriers to entry, barriers to exit and disintermediation By Pierre Aury
The dry bulk and tanker markets are classic examples of commoditized, low-differentiation industries with hardly any barriers to entry. Vessels are more or less standardized assets. A newcomer can easily acquire a vessel and begin trading immediately, while at the same time, incumbents cannot use proprietary technology, brand, or network effects to defend their existing market positions. Chartering is executed mainly through brokers, where market information is reasonably transparent, meaning that even a first-time entrant can access the same cargo opportunities as a long-established owner, especially if the newcomer is 10 cents cheaper!
Financing is often mentioned as a barrier to entry, but in practice, it is still accessible: banks, leasing houses and alternative capital providers still actively seek shipping exposure and lend against vessels rather than the operator standing. Because operating costs vary only marginally across the industry, scale provides limited economic advantage. No owner can significantly undercut another on Opex. As a result dry bulk and tanker are competitive markets where profitability depends almost entirely on the global freight cycle rather than strategic entry barriers: buy low and sell high and try to make money or lose as little as possible in between! Price formation is solely dependent on supply and demand and not on cost plus margin, like in most other industries.
On the one hand, we have bigger and bigger shipowners with huge balance sheets operating in a highly cyclical market with no barrier to entry and on the other hand, we have IT vendors busy creating customer captivity through barriers to …exit with these big Owners!
There is now an established trend pushing shipowners and charterers to operate more efficiently in an environment with more regulations, which are changing all the time and improve transparency across every step of internal workflows. As a result, digitalization has moved from being a simple option to being an absolute necessity. Following that trend, a lot of shipowners and charterers are now using so called VMS. VMS stands for Voyage Management System, which is a tool designed to optimise, track, and evaluate the entire lifecycle of a maritime voyage. From planning and execution to post-voyage analysis, a VMS structures and automates commercial shipping. IT vendors are willing to help! But this help comes with strings attached.
An IT vendor will have its proprietary architecture and will use closed standards, ending up with unique workflows being embedded in the customer’s system that don’t translate well to alternatives. As a result, the customer will soon face high switching costs because migrating data or re-engineering integrations requires major efforts and costs and comes with big risks attached.
In addition typically a VMS will be deeply integrated into other business processes, some of them being mission-critical processes, through a high level of customization in order to align the VMS with the customer’s precise needs. De facto, the VMS becomes part of the operational backbone of the company, using it. Removing it or replacing it carries a serious risk to business continuity, discouraging change!
A barrier to exit is created mainly through switching fear due to the high level of risk associated with switching to another IT vendor. The main risks are operational downtime during migration, data loss or corruption, user resistance and unexpected incompatibilities.
This is putting IT vendors in a very strong position to increase their fees!
Last, how long will it take for some of these IT vendors to have the idea to connect the VMS of shipowners to the VMS of charterers through a ship/cargo matching solution, leading to massive disintermediation?
• Vintage tonnage remains in demand as MSC picks up panamax trio from Sinokor
World’s largest boxship operator has reportedly acquired four more secondhand containerships. They include three 2005-built panamax units with capacities of between 4,800 teu and 5,000 teu.
Latest deals bring MSC’s total secondhand acquisitions in 2025 to more than 60 boxships.
• Russian air attack on Ukraine kills three and sparks sweeping outages
Russian missile and drone attacks killed at least three Ukrainians including a child on Tuesday, triggering widespread emergency power cuts and prompting neighbouring Poland to scramble jets.
The attacks, days after another round of U.S.-led talks to end the nearly four-year-old war, hit energy facilities in western regions the hardest, Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko said.
Poland, a NATO member bordering western Ukraine, said Polish and allied aircraft were deployed to protect Polish airspace after Russian strikes targeted areas near the border.
• Exclusive: China likely loaded more than 100 ICBMs in silo fields, Pentagon report says
China is likely to have loaded more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles across its latest three silo fields and has no desire for arms control talks, according to a draft Pentagon report which highlighted Beijing’s growing military ambitions.
China is expanding and modernizing its weapons stockpile faster than any other nuclear-armed power, according to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, a Chicago-based non-profit. Beijing has described reports of a military buildup as efforts to “smear and defame China and deliberately mislead the international community.”
• China implies US hypocrisy over nuclear disarmament
China on Tuesday urged the United States to fulfil its nuclear disarmament responsibilities after a draft Pentagon report said China was likely to have loaded more than 100 intercontinental ballistic missiles in sites near the Mongolian border and showed no desire for arms control talks. “As a super nuclear power with the largest nuclear arsenal, the most urgent task for the U.S. is to earnestly fulfil the special and priority responsibility for nuclear disarmament,” Lin Jian, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, said at a regular press conference in Beijing.
• Australian state set to pass tougher gun, hate speech laws after Bondi attack
Australia’s most populous state is set to pass tougher gun laws, ban the display of terrorist symbols and curb protests in an emergency sitting following the Bondi mass shooting, as authorities stepped up their response to the antisemitic attack. Fifteen people were killed and dozens injured in the mass shooting at a Jewish Hanukkah celebration at Bondi on December 14, a shock attack that prompted calls for tougher gun laws and stronger action against antisemitism.
• Why the boss of a Russian defence factory set fire to himself on Red Square
Russia’s government threatens defence manufacturers with jail time if they don’t meet contractual obligations
Vladimir Arsenyev says his firm had to ramp up production at breakneck speed, deliver to tight deadlines set by defence ministry At least 34 people have faced criminal charges for disrupting
Russian defence orders since start of Ukraine war
Rostec denies any assertions of Russian defence industry degradation, calls them propaganda myths
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine opened a potential goldmine for Vladimir Arsenyev.
The 75-year-old scientist heads a Moscow firm that makes components for a communications device used by tank crews. As Russian tanks rumbled through Ukraine in 2022, his business was awash with defence orders.
But the orders he landed turned out to be a poisoned chalice, he recounted in a series of interviews with Reuters, the first time he has spoken publicly about his struggles. He had to ramp up production at breakneck speed and deliver to tight deadlines at prices set by the Russian defence ministry.
• Russia and US discussed ‘irritants’ in relationship, key issues unresolved, Interfax reports
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said on Tuesday that Russian and U.S. diplomats had held talks on removing “irritants” in relations between the two countries but the main issues remain unresolved, Russian news agency Interfax reported.
• For Historians who may be interested:
A Bus service that used to operate on the route London – Calcutta (as it was spelt then) – London. This route was part of the legendary Hippie Trail era, but it actually dates back even earlier – 1957, when a British company launched an overland bus journey covering around 20,000 miles (32,000kms) and crossing multiple countries between the UK and India.
The First trip was in April, 1957
Route: London-Belgium-Germany-Austria-Yugoslavia (as was called then) – Turkey or Turkiye – Iran – Afghanistan (before the Taliban-US war) – Pakistan (was 10 years old then not thousands as claimed for the purpose of winning a Noble Peace Prize) – India (Calcutta).
Distance: 32,000km round trip. Duration: About 12 weeks round trip.
Highlights: Passengers experienced diverse landscapes, cultures and landmarks during the Journey.
These journeys were very adventurous and attracted travellers seeking cultural exchange long before modern tourism and budget airlines were born.

• Renewed fighting along the Cambodia–Thailand border has once again drawn global concern after Thai military operations in the disputed frontier region seriously damaged an 11th-century Hindu temple dedicated to Shiva — Prasat Ta Khwai (also known as Ta Krabey).
The temple, built during the Angkor period, sits in a long-contested patch of land claimed by both nations and has become a flashpoint in ongoing hostilities between the two ASEAN neighbours.
A grainy video circulating online appears to show Thai forces — after securing control of the contested area — dismantling or damaging Hindu deity statues and temple structures at the site, sparking outrage among Cambodian authorities and heritage advocates.
Cambodian officials have formally condemned the actions, describing them as significant blows to cultural heritage and urging international oversight. Cambodia’s Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts said the temple suffered substantial damage during the clashes, calling the attacks “immoral.”
The confrontation is part of a broader escalation that began in early December 2025 after a ceasefire between the two militaries collapsed. Artillery exchanges, rocket fire and airstrikes have been reported along the border, especially around temple complexes and strategic hills that both sides seek to control.
The temple itself lies within an area of overlapping claims, with a long history of disputes fueled by differing interpretations of colonial- era maps and successive border agreements.
UNESCO and other cultural bodies have called for protection of endangered heritage sites amid the fighting. The agency has reminded both parties of their obligations under international law to safeguard cultural property in conflict zones.
The destruction at the temple has also intensified diplomatic activity in the region. China’s special envoy has urged both sides to resume a ceasefire and return to dialogue, while ASEAN foreign ministers met in Kuala Lumpur on December 22 to seek a negotiated end to the conflict.
• Thais bomb military targets and scam centers near Cambodian city of Poipet
China and EU among powers expressing public concern over escalating conflict. Thailand’s military said its F-16 fighter jets bombed scam centers and military targets near the Cambodian city of Poipet on Thursday, the first strike so close to a major city since cross-border clashes resumed 13 days ago.
• China Vanke bondholder vote
Property developer China Vanke faces a moment of truth in its rush to avoid default, as creditors have until Monday morning to vote on proposals that would push back payment on a 2 billion yuan ($284 million) bond. The embattled state-backed company has offered to pay 60 million yuan in interest the same day while seeking a one-year extension on the principal. It has also asked to extend a five-day grace period to 30 days. But 90% of bondholders have to give their consent to any proposal. If Vanke fails, this will be the second large Real- estate company after Ever Grande failed in China.
• Navi Mumbai Airport opens
Operations begin at the third airport serving Mumbai, India’s financial hub. The Navi Mumbai International Airport, being built by the Adani Group on the outskirts of the city, will be one of India’s largest airports once all phases of construction are completed. The opening comes at a moment of intense scrutiny of the Indian aviation sector, which saw the tragic crash of an Air India flight earlier this year and massive disruption this month due to a breakdown of services by the country’s largest airline, IndiGo.
• Agnikul foresees 100 launches a year for its reusable rocket.
Chennai based Agnikul Cosmos, one of India’s two private rocket startups, plans to launch 100 missions of its reusable rocket over next five years. Unlike, Elon Musk’s scale-first-model, the company says it can work closely with clients to make the program profitable within two years. We are readying our next launch, which will have commercial clients for next year, and by 2030, hope to see 100 launches per year or one launch every three days.
• Myanmar steps up campaign on scam centers, wary of US intervention
Military government highlights destruction of hubs as Washington announces strike force.
Myanmar’s military government is rushing to take down scam centres near its border with Thailand, boosting ties with neighbours like China while the U.S. starts to take action in the region.
The military government has launched a series of mop-up operations on KK Park and Shwe Kokko, two major scam centres located near the town of Myawaddy in eastern Kayin state. The area attracted international attention earlier this year when a
Chinese actor and a Japanese high school student who had been held captive by a scam group there were rescued.
According to military government announcements on Wednesday, 466 of the 635 buildings in KK Park that were being used for illegal activities like online fraud have been destroyed. Authorities are making daily announcements on the results of operations.
On Dec. 14, military government spokesperson Zaw Min Tun and other senior officials held a press conference in Yangon, the country’s largest city, to highlight the operations. Diplomatic representatives from China and other friendly countries were also invited to the event, which was broadcast live in an unusual move.
Demolition at KK Park accelerated in November. Images taken by U.S. satellite operator Planet Labs on Dec. 10 show the destruction of at least 15 buildings in the eastern part of the area. The remains of destroyed buildings could also be seen scattered across the western part.
• I’d like to turn your attention to wind farms and what they say about the Trump administration.
Without evidence
President Trump doesn’t like wind farms. Never has. He thinks they’re ugly. He calls them inefficient and expensive. Years ago, he failed to stop the construction of one that’s visible from one of his golf courses in Scotland. He was apoplectic about it. He told a Scottish politician on Twitter in 2014 that “the windmill hovering over hole 14 is disgusting & inappropriate.”
On his first day in office this year, Trump stopped new wind projects on public lands and waters. A judge called that order “arbitrary” and said it violated federal law. Still, Trump persevered. Yesterday his administration said it would halt leases for five wind farms under construction off the East Coast, virtually gutting the offshore wind industry in the United States. The projects were “expected to power more than 2.5 million homes and businesses,” my colleagues Maxine Joselow and Lisa Friedman report.
Perhaps in order not to appear arbitrary, Doug Burgum, the secretary of the interior, said that the decision “addresses emerging national security risks, including the rapid evolution of the relevant adversary technologies, and the vulnerabilities created by large-scale offshore wind projects with proximity near our East Coast population centers.”
Based on what evidence? The Pentagon has produced classified reports, Burgum said, and the Energy Department has found that wind farms could interfere with radar systems.
Is this true? Military studies have indeed shown that offshore wind turbines could disrupt radar, Lisa told me. But they concluded that the risk could be offset with planning. A spokesman for one of the wind farms said it had worked “in close coordination with the military.” He pointed out that his project’s two pilot turbines had been operating for five years with no impact on national security.
It is not the first time the administration has justified a new policy — one it wanted to impose quickly without fretting over legal and regulatory procedures — with a broad claim. It just asserts there’s a problem.
Trump has given many reasons to dislike wind farms, but so far none are backed by agreed-upon facts. Here’s a look at his views:
“If you have a windmill anywhere near your house, congratulations, your house just went down 75 percent in value,” he said in 2019. “And they say the noise causes cancer.”
“If you love birds, you’d never want to walk under a windmill because it’s a very sad, sad sight. It’s like a cemetery,” he continued. “In California, if you shoot a bald eagle, they put you in jail for five years. And yet the windmills, they wipe them all out.”
“The windmills are driving the whales crazy, obviously,” he said in January.
The rationales
In explaining a range of new policies, the President has pointed to grounds that don’t draw from evidence, or at least not evidence the public can see.
Wind farms: These need to be stopped because of radar “clutter.” See above.
Illegal immigrants: Some have been selected for deportation because the government has said they belong to a gang — without proving it.
Boat strikes: The administration says the nearly 100 boats destroyed off South America were running drugs to the United States. It hasn’t released any evidence for that claim.
National Guard deployments: Trump says protesters in a number of Democratic-led cities have threatened the safety of immigration agents and government facilities. Judges have chastised officials for not providing evidence for these assertions.
Alien Enemies Act: The administration says the presence of Venezuelan gang members in the United States constitutes an “invasion” by a “hybrid criminal state” that allows him to invoke this wartime law, reminds my colleague Mattathias Schwartz, who covers legal affairs. But U.S. intelligence agencies have said Venezuela is not directing gang activity.
Refugees: Trump has shut down most refugee admissions but is letting in white Afrikaners based on a claim of genocide against them that is not backed by evidence, says my colleague Zolan Kanno-Youngs, who covers the White House.
Liberal nonprofits: Vice President JD Vance and others say these groups support political violence — again without providing evidence.
It all adds up to what you might call a governance of assertion. That is: Trust, but don’t verify.
Now, let’s see what else is going on in the world.
THE LATEST NEWS
China : The Pentagon and American A.I. companies share a weakness: They both desperately need China’s batteries.
The Trump administration banned sales of foreign-made drones, including a popular brand from China.
A federal judge in Brooklyn declared a mistrial in the case of Linda Sun, a former aide to Democratic governors who was accused of working for China.
The Trump administration is considering giving nearly 800 acres of land in a wildlife refuge in Texas to SpaceX to expand its rocket launch and production site, documents show.
The Education Department will investigate safety standards at Brown University following a shooting there.
Diplomacy
Trump appointed a special envoy to Greenland, part of his efforts to take over the Danish territory. Officials in Denmark and Greenland were furious.
The Trump administration has ordered nearly 30 ambassadors to leave their posts by mid-January. The union representing career diplomats said such a mass recall had never happened before.
• Russia has become the second-largest LNG supplier to China, doubling its deliveries of super-chilled gas year-over-year in November to 1.6 million metric tonnes, according to Chinese customs data.

• China’s weak demand for LNG has been one of the most consistent downtrends this year, with 2025 arrivals totalling only 66 million tonnes, down 16% from a year ago when imports tallied up to 78 million tonnes.
• Most of the incremental Russian LNG supply came from Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 plant and customs data indicate they were about 10% below the average import price of $9.85 per MMBtu.
• Whilst Qatari LNG deals are oil-linked, Chinese buyers have kept these term volumes coming; however, higher Russian buying came at the expense of Australia, historically the largest exporter of LNG to China.
• China hasn’t imported US LNG since Trump came into office and signalled the first round of import tariffs in February, having bought 4.3 million tonnes in 2024.
  In pre-Christmas trading sessions, oil market participants have overwhelmingly become Venezuela watchers, predicting inevitable supply disruptions or calling Trump’s escalatory moves mere negotiation tactics depending on which side of the bullish/bearish fence they’re on. The suffocation of Venezuelan oil exports has pushed ICE Brent futures above $62 per barrel, further bolstered by an evident lack of diplomatic breakthroughs in Russia-Ukraine peace talks.
  Suez Canal Turns Navigable Again. Two container ships from CMA CGM, the world’s third-largest shipping line, have transited the Suez Canal in recent days, indicating that the more than two-year-long supply disruptions caused by the Israel-Gaza conflict might soon be over, easing freight costs.
  US Ratchets Up Pressure Against Caracas. The US Coast Guard has tried to intercept two Venezuela-bound tankers over the weekend – one sanctioned ship sailing empty to the port of Jose (Bella 1), the other unsanctioned and sailing towards China (Centuries) – raising heavy crude supply risks.
  Copper Prices Spiral Out of Control. Copper prices jumped to a new all-time high, with the 3-month LME contract hitting 11,996 in intraday trading on Monday as Chilean miner Antofagasta (LON:ANTO) and a Chinese smelter agreed to a zero-fee processing deal for 2026, underscoring supply tightness.
  Australia’s Domestic Use Rule to Stymie LNG. Australia, the world’s third-largest LNG exporter, has unveiled a new scheme that would force gas producers to allocate between 15% and 25% of their output for domestic use from 2027, as most regions in the east are faced with gas shortages.
  Indonesia Eyes End to Fuel Imports. Indonesia’s Subianto government stated that it plans to gradually stop fuel imports within the next four years – currently importing around 550,000 b/d of refined products – thanks to refining capacity expansions and higher palm oil blending mandates.
  Shale Is Running Out of Steam. According to an anticipated survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, US shale firms plan to keep capital spending flat to slightly lower in 2026, amidst worsening drilling economics as most small producers (output below 10,000 b/d) have already started cutting costs.
  Russia Boosts Pipeline Gas Flows to China. Pipeline gas exports of Russia’s Gazprom (MCX:GAZP) to China are expected to have increased by 25% in 2025, hitting 38.7 billion cubic metres and exceeding the nameplate capacity of Power of Siberia-1, with another 6 bcm of growth expected in 2026.
  Japan to Restart Giant Nuclear Plant. Japan’s Niigata prefecture has greenlighted the restart of the world’s largest nuclear power reactor – the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant – after a 15-year hiatus caused by the 2011 Fukushima disaster, with a 1.4 GW unit expected to brought back online next year.
  • Can Germany Afford to Be Europe’s Protector?
  A Stronger Military Requires a Stronger Economy
  Before Friedrich Merz won Germany’s parliamentary elections in February of this year, the country faced a money dilemma: Germany’s economic stagnation required significant reform and investment to revitalize industry, and the United States demanded more spending on collective defence. The budgetary dispute over how to simultaneously address these conflicting priorities had led to the collapse of Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s government. To avoid the same fate, lawmakers in Merz’s grand coalition, comprising the center-right Christian Democratic Union and the center-left Social Democratic Party, as well as the Greens, agreed to leverage debt to finance its dual obligations. Suddenly, Germany was flush with money.
  Seven months in, however, Merz’s government has still been unable to chart a course for economic reform and persuade voters that better days lie ahead. Merz’s bold moves on defence spending have confirmed Germany’s leadership role in Europe but at a cost to his domestic popularity. Merz’s expenditure of significant political capital at international summits to manage U.S. President Donald Trump and defend Ukraine has left him vulnerable to accusations that he is focusing too much on foreign policy and not enough on domestic issues. The right-wing, Russia-friendly Alternative for Germany party (AfD) is channelling economic anxiety to profit in the polls, criticizing Merz’s government for squandering German wealth to build a “war economy.” And although Merz’s efforts on defence have won him praise from the White House, the Trump administration is steadily undermining him by normalizing the AfD and—in the words of the newly released National Security Strategy—other “patriotic European parties.”
  Merz’s government does not have much time to hedge against growing discontent within the electorate. Failing to pursue reforms to revitalize and grow Germany’s economy could jeopardize public support for Merz’s centrist coalition. If the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats cede more ground to the AfD, they may also lose their ability to build viable future coalitions. If the grand coalition proves unable to pursue a path of economic reform and growth, it could break up the government prematurely and reverse Germany’s long-awaited leadership role in Europe, to the detriment of U.S. interests.
  Angela Merkel, Germany’s former leader and Merz’s chief rival, became chancellor in 2005 by sidelining Merz and other candidates. She then managed to stay in power for 16 years by avoiding potentially disruptive reforms. This is not a formula that Merz can afford to follow.
  • Supreme Court Refuses to Allow National Guard Deployment in Chicago
  Baltic Reports 23rd December, 2025
  BALTIC INDICES 23/12/2025
  DRY INDEX: 1889 (- 90)
  CAPESIZE INDEX: 3337 (- 222)
  PANAMAX INDEX: 1266 (- 16)
  SUPRAMAX INDEX: 1162 (- 31)
  HANDYSIZE INDEX: 728 (- 9)
  BCI TC AVG $/DAY 27676 (-1842)
  BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 11391 (-149)
  BSI TC AVG $/DAY 14687 (-396)
  BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 13112 (-149)
  TIMECHARTER
  ‘CSK Unity’ 2015 77105 dwt dely Hong Kong 23 Dec trip via EC Australia redel Japan $11,000
  ’21 Sunny’ 2012 38109 dwt dely Recalada prompt trip redel WC South America $23,750
  ‘Matrozos’ 2010 33002 dwt dely Costa Rica prompt via Venezuella redel Turkey $18,000
  PERIOD
  ‘Captain J. Neofotistos’ 2012 79501 dwt dely Gibraltar 18 Dec Via Kamsar min 90 days/max 120 days redel Kamsar $17,000 first 90 days $20,000 balance period – Norden
  VOYAGES
  ORE
  ‘TBN ‘ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 5 Jan onwards $9.55 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto
  ‘Great Perseus ‘ 2010 170000/10 Tubarao/Qingdao 15/21 Jan $23.50 fio 3days shinc/30000shinc – Mercuria
  ‘TBN ‘ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 11/13 Jan $8.55 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto
  COAL
  ‘Pan Ocean TBN’ 80000/10 NPLCT/Hadong 5/14 Jan $6.16 fio 25000satpmshexuu/21000shinc – Kepco
  ‘Woohyun Shipping tbn’ 80000/10 Balikpapan/Hadong 9/18 Jan $6.10 fio 25000satpmshexuu/21000shinc – Kepco
  GRAIN
  ‘Refined Success TBN’ 66000/10 US Gulf/China 1/28 Feb $46.00 fio 10000sshinc/8000sshinc – ADMI
  Baltic Exchange Index – 23 DECEMBER 2025
  Baltic Exchange Capesize 182 Index

Route Description Value Change

C8_182 182000mt Gib/Hamburg transatlantic RV 36,369 – 919
C9_182 182000mt Cont-Med trip China-Japan 54,167 – 944
C10_182 182000mt China-Japan transpacific RV 24,705 – 4936
314_182 182000mt China-Brazil round voyage 28,923 – 927

C16_182 182000mt Backhaul 15,889 – 283

C5TC 182 Weighted Timecharter Average 30,090 – 2250
Baltic Exchange Index – 23 DECEMBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 3337 (-222)
Route Description Value($) Change
====== ===================================
C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 13.663 – 0.543
C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 23.750 – 0.464
C5 160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao 8.745 – 1.050
C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 14.906 – 0.225
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 31,631 – 1000
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan 49,333 – 1084
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 22,120 – 4660
C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 26,195 – 1000
C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero 12,183 – 334

C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 17.150 – 0.365

5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 27,676 – 1842
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 23 DECEMBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,266 (- 16)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== =================================
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 12,564 – 277
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 18,339 – 295
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 9,252 – 176
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 7,303 – 121
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 11,243 + 19
====== =================================
P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 11,391 – 149
The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== =================================
P5_82 S. China Indo RV 7,394 – 467
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 48.221 – 0.200
P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 32.329 – 0.078
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82 Asia Index – 23 December 2025
Route Description Size (MT) Value($) Change
===== ====================== ======== ==
P5_82 S.China one Indo RV 7,394 -467
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 23 DECEMBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1162 (- 31)

Route Description Value ($) Change

S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 18,625 – 204
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 23,093 – 832
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 12,750 – 356
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 11,950 – 240
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero 22,861 – 1003
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 11,443 – 75
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 20,025 – 211
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 13,175 – 464
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 16,971 – 248
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 10,759 – 544

S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 13,700 – 421

S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 14,687 – 396
S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 12,653 – 396
Baltic Exchange Supramax Asia Index – 23 December 2025
Route Description Value($) Change
====== ===============================
S2_63 N.China one Austr or Pac RV 12,750 -356
S8_63 S.China via Indonesia/Ec India 13,175 -464
S10_63 S.China via Indo/S.China 10,759 -544
====== ===============================
S3TC Weighted Time Charter Average 12,296 -442

Baltic Exchange Index – 23 DECEMBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 728 (- 9)
Route Description Value ($) Change
========================================
HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 9,643 – 93
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 11,686 – 78
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 20,300 – 239
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Passero 20,550 – 286
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 11,038 – 125
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn 10,663 – 100
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 9,994 – 175
=========================================
7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 13,112 – 149
© Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd., 2025
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