IRAN V/S USA:
Iran has agreed to enter negotiations with the United States regarding its nuclear program. The decision to engage in talks, particularly at this stage, is seen as a response to the mounting pressure from the Trump administration, which has not shied away from threatening military action should Iran refuse to negotiate. While Iran’s government typically seeks to project an image of strength and independence, this concession represents a moment of vulnerability, one that acknowledges the untenable position in which the country finds itself.
The current economic crisis in Iran has undoubtedly played a major role in pushing the country into this difficult position.
Iran’s economy has been in a steady decline, exacerbated by US sanctions. Iran’s currency, the rial, plummeting to unprecedented low’s. As of April 2025, the rial has lost an alarming amount of value, trading at over 1,043,000 to the US dollar. The devaluation of the rial leads to higher inflation, skyrocketing prices, and an overall erosion of living standards for ordinary Iranians. These economic pressures are not merely abstract statistics; they are felt in the daily lives of Iranian’s, many of whom are struggling to make ends meet as the cost of basic goods continues to rise. This economic deterioration, coupled with the political isolation has left Iran with few options.
The maximum pressure policy, reinstated by US President Donald Trump, has proven to be a particularly damaging strategy for Iran. The policy includes sweeping sanctions aimed at curtailing Iran’s oil exports and restricting its access to global financial markets. As a result, Iran’s economic situation has become increasingly dire, making it clear that the status quo is
unsustainable. With the country’s economy in freefall, the leadership in Tehran has found itself facing an uncomfortable reality: they can either engage in negotiations with the US and hope to reach some form of agreement, or they can continue down the path of confrontation, risking further economic collapse and the potential for military escalation.
In addition to the economic pressures, Iran’s regional influence has also diminished significantly in recent years. At one time, Iran was considered a dominant player in the Middle East, wielding considerable influence through its network of proxy groups across the region. However, the changing dynamics of the Middle East have eroded much of Iran’s power. The Iranian- backed Assad regime in Syria, once a crucial ally, fell, leaving Iran without its key foothold in the Levant. This loss has further isolated Iran, diminishing its ability to project power and influence across the region. Furthermore, Iran’s proxies have been weakened as a result of the ongoing conflict with Israel.
The US has also intensified its military operations, notably targeting the Houthis in Yemen. As Iran’s regional allies and proxies are decimated or lost, it has become increasingly clear that the country is not the formidable regional power it once was. This loss of influence has left Iran vulnerable, further compounding the economic and political pressures it faces.
Despite these significant challenges, Iran remains wary of direct negotiations with the United States. For the Iranian government, any formal engagement with American officials risks a loss of face and legitimacy. The act of sitting down with the US in a direct negotiation would signify a retreat from its long-standing position of opposition, a blow to the ideological and political narrative that has underpinned the regime’s survival for decades. Concessions to the US would be viewed
as an admission of weakness, something that would be unacceptable to the Iranian leadership. This is especially true for a government that has built its legitimacy on defying US pressure and resistance to what it perceives as foreign interference. The Iranian leadership, particularly the Supreme Leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has long presented itself as a bulwark against Western imperialism, and direct talks with the US would undermine that image.
President Trump, however, remains confident that his administration can achieve its ultimate goal: the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program. Trump’s strategy hinges on the belief that by applying sufficient pressure, Iran will eventually concede to his demands and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure. The President’s view is that Iran’s nuclear program is its most critical strategic asset, and thus, if that can be neutralized, the regime will be forced into submission.
However, this belief is unlikely to align with the realities of Iran’s security calculus. For Iran, its nuclear program is not just a diplomatic bargaining chip; it is the cornerstone of its national security and regional power. The Iranian leadership views its nuclear ambitions as essential for its survival, both as a deterrent against external aggression and as a means of asserting its status as a regional power. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that Iran will fully capitulate to US demands and dismantle its nuclear program. The program is seen as vital to Iran’s sense of security and its long-term strategic goals, making it unlikely that Iran would relinquish this key asset without significant, irreversible concessions.
While the prospect of a complete de-nuclearization deal seems remote, Iran may still be willing to engage in negotiations as a
way to buy time. By entering talks with the US, Iran could seek to delay further escalation and avoid immediate military confrontation. The Iranian government might hope to outlast the Trump administration, assuming that a change in leadership could provide an opportunity to reframe the issue and negotiate a more favourable deal. However, Trump is unlikely to allow talks to drag on indefinitely without seeing concrete results. The President’s approach to diplomacy is often characterized by a sense of urgency and a desire for immediate outcomes. Iran’s strategy of buying time may be met with increasing frustration from the US, as the administration pushes for a resolution that could bring an end to the nuclear standoff.
Iran may also opt to agree to some of the US demands, but with the intention of complicating or delaying the implementation of any deal. This approach could allow Iran to maintain the appearance of compliance while ensuring that any concessions made are non-binding or subject to significant delays. By dragging its feet on the implementation of a deal, Iran could avoid making meaningful changes to its nuclear program while appearing to cooperate with US demands. This tactic would serve to buy Iran additional time, during which it could prepare for a potential shift in the geopolitical landscape or hope for a change in US leadership.
In conclusion, Iran’s decision to enter negotiations with the United States is largely a response to the intense pressures it is facing, both domestically and internationally. The country is grappling with a deteriorating economy, regional setbacks, and the looming threat of military action from the Trump administration. While the Trump administration may hope to force Iran into dismantling its nuclear program, the likelihood of
achieving this goal is low. Iran’s nuclear ambitions are deeply ingrained in its national security strategy and are unlikely to be fully abandoned, even under extreme pressure. The negotiations phase may offer some respite for both sides, but whether a lasting agreement can be reached remains uncertain. Iran’s ultimate goal is to secure its survival, and any negotiation will likely be framed by this overriding concern. As the situation unfolds, it is clear that the coming months will be critical in determining the future trajectory of US-Iran relations.
Five things to know about the US-Iran talks in Oman
As tension mounts between the US and Iran, an “indirect” meeting between envoys from Washington and Tehran is taking place in Oman on Saturday. It’s a rare diplomatic exchange between two countries that have been locked in a kind of cold war for almost half a century – and one that will unfold in the shadow of US President Donald Trump’s repeated threats of military force against the Islamic Republic.
Iran and the US have confirmed that “indirect” talks will take place between senior figures from Washington and Tehran
in Oman on Saturday, led by US President Donald Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff and Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi.
It’s an event that comes after weeks of diplomatic – and not so diplomatic – back-and-forth between the two countries against a backdrop of rising military tensions, with Iran closer than ever to developing nuclear weapons of its own. Could this meeting mark a turning point in the two countries’ fraught relationship?
Behind the scenes
With both countries having cut off diplomatic ties 45 years ago, this meeting has sparked hopes of a possible diplomatic resolution to the pressing question of Iran’s nuclear
programme. According to Tehran, representatives from the two countries won’t be meeting face-to-face – instead, mediators will relay each side’s statements to the other. But Trump contradicted this on Monday by saying that this “high-level” meeting would involve direct talks on Iran’s apparent pursuit of nuclear weapons.
Iran was quick to reject Trump’s statements, with Araghchi telling state media that the talks would have to be indirect in nature.
“We will not accept any other form of negotiation,” he said.
“There’s no negotiations,” state department spokeswoman Tammy Bruce hit back on Tuesday. “This is a dynamic where the President has made very clear and certainly the secretary has made very clear that Iran will never have a nuclear weapon,” she said. “It’s touching base, yes. Again, it’s not a negotiation. It’s a meeting.”
It won’t be the first time that Iran and the US have held discussions through mediators – indirect talks that can, and have, led to direct conversations behind the scenes. Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat who was a member of the team negotiating the 2015 nuclear agreement and is now living in the US, is no stranger to these workarounds.
Mousavian told French daily Le Monde that in 2014, as negotiations were taking place in Istanbul in the presence of the EU’s chief diplomat Catherine Ashton, Ashton “had left the room, allowing the Iranian and US negotiators to engage in direct dialogue”. The nuclear deal was signed a few months later.
Getting down to business
On the American side, “It’s not (Secretary of State) Marco Rubio, but Steve Witkoff who was chosen to go to Muscat – the personal envoy of Donald Trump,” said Institute of Strategic and International Relations associate researcher and Middle East expert David Rigoulet-Roze, stressing that the choice of Witkoff showed the importance of this meeting “at the highest level”.
A loyal follower of Trump, Witkoff comes not from the world of international diplomacy but US business, having made his fortune in real estate. It’s a fact that has not escaped Tehran, said Jonathan Piron, a specialist in Iranian history at the Etopia research centre in Brussels. He pointed to declarations by Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian on Wednesday that his country was open to US investment.
“There’s a willingness to perhaps flatter Witkoff, and through him Trump, by adopting a grammar that speaks to them and by dangling in front of them everything that a deal leading to the lifting of American sanctions on Iran could mean for the US,” he said.
“The stance of Donald Trump’s new administration’s entourage towards Iran is markedly different from that of the first Trump administration,” he added. Between 2016 and 2020, he said, “there was John Bolton, Mike Pompeo, and in a way Rudy Giuliani”.
Watch for more news on Saturday on this Conflict Zone.
- India and U.S. Trade Pact
US softens stance on digital trade, drops pulses in revised India fact sheet
Washington tones down language following pushback from New Delhi; experts warn of underlying pressure on India’s policy autonomy.
Following a quiet but firm pushback from New Delhi, the White House has revised its fact sheet on the India-US interim trade framework, dropping references to pulses and significantly softening language around digital trade commitments after the original version raised questions about potential encroachments on India’s policy autonomy.
Experts, however, warn that New Delhi should negotiate with caution as the fact sheet merely shows intent, not a legal document, and Washington has shown its hand on what it seeks to achieve.
According to the updated fact sheet, specific references to digital trade provisions, including the earlier assertion that India would remove digital services taxes (DST) and agree to rules prohibiting customs duties on electronic transmissions, have been removed.
The earlier version had also indicated that India would provide enhanced access for US pulses, a politically sensitive farm item, which triggered concerns given the crop’s importance to domestic farmers. The revised document omits the specific mention of pulses and also swaps the term “committed” to “intends” in reference of purchase of over $500 billion US products by India as part of the deal.
The deleted and changed content of the fact sheet was also not part of the joint statement on the India-US framework agreement issued last Friday.
“The changes in the US fact sheet do not materially alter the substance. Targeting of India’s agriculture tariffs was absent in the joint statement but reappeared in the fact sheet and remains in the revised version. Though specific digital provisions have been dropped, it still says India is committed to
negotiating bilateral digital trade rules addressing ‘discriminatory or burdensome practices’. The ambiguity raises concerns about what more the US may be seeking, as seen in cases like Malaysia and Cambodia,” said Biswajit Dhar, former professor at JNU.
India is not in favour of any commitments on removing DST and prohibiting customs duties on electronic transmissions because both issues touch core areas of tax sovereignty and would encroach on regulatory policy space as digital trade expands and shifts revenue away from physical goods to digital products.
Though the joint statement issued last week on the trade deal had made no mention of “certain pulses.” But Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal had mentioned “some lentils” in his press conference on February 7 when he was asked on which items India agreed to give concessions to the US.
Considering withdrawal
Officials have revealed that U.S. President Trump is secretly considering withdrawing from the United States-Mexico- Canada Agreement (USMCA), casting uncertainty over the agreement’s future. The president has asked his aides why the
U.S. should not withdraw, but has not yet explicitly indicated that he will. The White House has emphasized that discussions of withdrawal are merely speculation without an official announcement. The agreement is due for a mandatory review before it is extended on July 1. A U.S. withdrawal could inflict significant economic damage on Mexico and Canada.
Orders a major production cut:
The Indonesian government is expected to reduce the mining quota for the Wedda Bay nickel mine, one of the world’s largest, to 12 million tons, aiming to boost prices by curbing
supply. The mine is a joint venture between China’s Tsingshan Holding Group, France’s Eramet, and Indonesia’s Aneka Tambang, and production will be significantly reduced from 42 million tons last year. LME nickel futures rose following the announcement. The country controls mining companies’ production volumes through the issuance of annual permits.
The mining quota for thermal coal, the world’s largest export, is also expected to be reduced by about a quarter compared to last year.
The US House voted to end Donald Trump’s tariffs on Canada as six Republicans crossed the aisle. Read about an alleged multi-million euro insider trade. And Jim Ratcliffe says the UK is “colonized” by immigrants.
US President Donald Trump’s tariff agenda faced its biggest setback as the Republican-led House passed a bill targeting levies on Canadian imports. Though unlikely to survive a veto, the vote exposed GOP divisions and rising election-year anxiety over affordability and Trump’s weakening political grip.
· Russia crude ban would cost marine underwriters hundreds of millions of dollars
Ukraine peace deal could be in place before any new rules kick in. Existing price cap ‘a joke’ thanks to non-existent policing, lawyer frankly claims. Appetite to write varies from insurer to insurer.
Legal profession mulls scope for lawful workarounds, with illicit options open to more morally flexible shipowners
· Effect of geopolitics on shipping poised to escalate, so ‘buckle up’
More shadow tankers will serve Russian exports and more will be Russian-flagged. State actors like the US government don’t take shipping business nuances into account. Intersection of merchant traffic and maritime security concerns has mainly affected tankers, but container shipping may be at ‘tip of the iceberg’ versus what’s to come. There are so many geopolitical ‘black swans’ in shipping that they might as well be white.
Disruption is now the rule, not the exception. Speakers at the HACC-NACC conference in New York laid out the risks ahead.
GEOPOLITICS has played a role in shipping since cargo moved in barrels and sacks on sea galleons, but never at the scale it does today.
The global fleet has never been larger, the volume of ocean cargo has never been higher, the state actors have never been more intent on using shipping as a geopolitical lever.
The effect of geopolitics on shipping — already acute — is poised to escalate even further, according to speakers at the Hellenic American-Norwegian American Chambers of Commerce (HACC-NACC) conference in New York on Tuesday.
“This is not a spectator sport. The threat is real,” said Brian Green, vice president of maritime at International Registries Inc, which manages the Marshall Islands flag. “It has evolved dramatically, specifically for the maritime space, both from a conventional and non-conventional perspective.”
“What I would stress is that we’re just in the middle of the story,” said Joshua Tallis, advisor to the chief of naval operations at the Center for Naval Analyses. “We don’t know how the story will end.”
Escalating actions targeting maritime
“Every five minutes, it seems another hotspot is bubbling up,” said John Stratakis, partner at Poles Tublin Stratakis & Gonzalez.
Following the Houthi attacks on ships in the Red Sea in 2023- 2025, and attacks on vessels in the Black Sea by Russia starting in 2022 and Ukraine in 2025, the US has aggressively moved against shadow fleet* tankers serving Venezuela since December 2025.
The US has blocked exports of sanctioned Venezuelan cargoes, captured former Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro and seized eight tankers through this month (six in the Caribbean, one in the North Atlantic, one in the Indian Ocean).
“We’ve traditionally seen the US as the protector of the shipping lanes,” said Stratakis. “There’s now concern that some of the US actions may be threatening the free passage of ships around the world — the US, of course, sees it differently.”
Dane Inglis, principal of Rystad Energy, said, “We see an increasingly disparate world with the US no longer a custodian of global trade, as such.”
According to Green, “I would describe the Maduro capture as a true paradigm shift, from the standpoint of regional influence rebalancing in the Western Hemisphere as well as the sanctions landscape.”
“Policymakers in both the US and the EU have awoken to the reality that they can pull the maritime sanctions lever,” said Tallis, who was offering his personal views, not those of the Department of War.
“The US has been applying international sanctions in the banking and hydrocarbons space for decades, but it has only been in the last five years or so, particularly since the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, that policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have realised that they can leverage this resource, which has created an action-counteraction dynamic that we’re still in the middle of,” said Tallis.
Risks of further escalation
America’s aggressive move against Venezuela will have knock- on effects across the global shadow fleet network.
According to Tomer Raanan, maritime risk analyst at Lloyd’s List Intelligence, Venezuelan crude that previously went on shadow tankers, primarily to China, should now move on compliant tonnage. As a result, “the shadow fleet will be competing in a smaller market, really just Russia and Iran”.
The new EU and UK sanctions package under
consideration could effectively ban most mainstream tankers from the Russian trade. The general trend, said Claire Grunewald, co-founder of Clarity Compliance Consulting, is that “Russian oil is becoming untouchable” for Western shipping.
This increases demand for shadow tankers for Russian exports. “Luckily for Russia, there are all the ships that are no longer trading in Venezuela that could plug some of those gaps,” said Raanan.
Russia still has an ample outlet for its crude in China.
“Despite pressure from the US on India, what we see is that China has taken up the slack,” said Inglis. “China has proven very willing to take all of the volume that is un-investable to the rest of the world.”
Meanwhile, false-flagged (stateless) shadow tankers are proving vulnerable to seizures under UNCLOS Article 110. In addition to the US, false-flagged tankers have recently been seized by France and India.
This is driving a move towards more Russian flagging. “Before there was the flight to suspect registries or lax registries. Now we’re starting to see the movement to just registering with Russia,” said Tallis.
If Russian crude exports continue to flow to China, most of this volume goes on shadow tankers, and more of those ships are Russian-flagged, does that keep Russian flows in the clear from Western intervention, or does it raise the risk of a more serious geopolitical issue if there is a sustained Western intervention?
“My fear is that we end up in a circumstance eventually where you have a more bifurcated maritime system,” said Tallis. “There’s a Western system and there’s a system that’s more immune to Western sanctions.
“There are pros and cons to that. It insulates either system from its counterpart a bit more, but it may lower the threshold or barrier to action for either side.”
Different viewpoints add to uncertainty
Part of the shipping market volatility created by geopolitics is due to state actors like the US government not understanding the nuances of the commercial shipping market, and having goals that supersede commercial consequences.
Tallis explained, “The Navy spends day in, day out providing for the national prosperity of the United States by securing the international commons, but spends very little time at a strategic level understanding the pressures and demands of the commercial maritime economy.”
For example, US military strikes on the Houthis in 2025 did not bring commercial shipping back to the Red Sea, due in part to high insurance costs.
“From a Navy standpoint, the sort of kneejerk instinct was to say, ‘Well, we’re shooting down missiles, the odds on an individual ship getting hit are actually relatively low, so we’ve solved the problem, right?’ The US Navy doesn’t really have the domain expertise on the pressures from maritime insurance rates and war risk insurance,” he explained.
“They also didn’t understand the fact that longer routes were kind of a boon, because they solved the problem coming out of the overcapacity [of containerships] after Covid. These are not things on the US Navy’s mind.”
Iran is another potential geopolitical flashpoint for shipping that could be imminent.
Tallis said, “With scenarios like Iran, the Navy understands, at the top line, that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for the movement of oil. But from a narrower standpoint — is there a backup plan in the wings similar to the 1990s tanker wars?
— to me, that is a much less central part of how the Navy thinks of its primary mission, which is: in the event of a war, to win the war, not protect the folks in this room.
“It’s the same thing in for the contingency in the Indo-Pacific,”
he said, referring to the threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
“The number-one job of the US Navy as part of the joint forces is to win the war. I’m not entirely sure that our respective communities have had enough conversations where we all equally understand who’s doing what in those kinds of scenarios.”
· Venezuela’s re-opening could mean an Oil windfall for India
The reopening of Venezuela’s oil sector under US-led restructuring offers a major, potential, oil windfall for India, allowing for the resumption of discounted heavy crude imports—expected to reach up to 400,000 barrels per day and
aiding the recovery of nearly $1 billion in long-pending dues and stalled investment projects.
Key Implications for India (As of Feb 2026):
- Resumption of Imports: Reliance Industries has already secured cargoes of Venezuelan crude, with expectations for increased, steady supply as US sanctions ease, replacing some Russian imports.
- Energy Security & Cost: Venezuela’s heavy crude is ideal for Indian complex refineries (e.g., Jamnagar, Panipat), offering higher refining margins. This provides a strategic alternative to Middle Eastern, oil, reducing reliance on expensive, alternatives.
- Recovery of Dues: The potential, turnaround could help Indian state-run firms (like ONGC Videsh) recover nearly
$1 billion in stuck, dues and dividends from, previously, stalled projects.
- Geopolitical Rebalancing: As the US controls the, restructuring, it reduces China’s previous, stranglehold on Venezuelan oil, creating space for India to secure long- term, contracts.
While infrastructure decay in Venezuela poses risks, the U.S.- led overhaul could stabilize supply and significantly benefit Indian energy, companies.
· Concerns over possible US-China conflict
At previous shipping conferences, executives have dubbed a future armed conflict between the US and China over Taiwan as the proverbial “big one”.
There has already been some shipping market fallout, albeit limited, following the brief imposition of US port fees on Chinese ships and foreign-built car carriers in mid-October 2025 (which were suspended courtesy of the US-China trade détente on November 10).
Those US port fees were meant to raise money to support US shipbuilding, and in the case of car carriers, incentivise US yard orders. The US shipbuilding drive, in turn, is tied to future conflict risks in the Pacific and elsewhere.
According to Darrell Conner, government affairs counsellor at K&L Gates, “As commercial operators, we look through the lens of being a conveyance to transport something as cheaply and inexpensively as possible from point A to B.
“But the US government has a different objective in mind. It has a national security imperative. If you look at where we are today as a nation, and our ability to project overseas, we are woefully inadequate, whether that’s ships, seafarers or shipbuilding, and as a result, the US government comes at this from a very different perspective.
“We cannot, in the tyranny of distance between the US and the Pacific, protect our interests, and that is truly what is driving the conversation in the United States right now on policy with respect to shipbuilding, ships and manpower,” said Conner.
Tallis said, “If we went to war, we obviously don’t have the flag capacity we need to move goods to sustain a protracted conflict of a scale that may unfold. The challenge is that the market has voted with its feet: it is not cost-competitive right now, based on current conditions, for the United States to rapidly scale up its commercial maritime industrial base — and so, enter the need for concerted industrial policy.”
That nascent industrial policy led to the port fees, as well as mooted plans for cargo preference rules to support US shipbuilding.
Tallis also warned of another potential shipping impact related to US-China tensions.
“China, just over Christmas, unveiled its capacity to load
containerships with portable weapon systems. As we move
towards the containerisation of weapons systems, and we continue the conversation on dual-use maritime infrastructure, I think there’s actually much worse to come.
“Because right now, most of what we’ve seen has been isolated to the tanker space. With the rest of the commercial maritime system and the container apparatus, I think we’ve only seen the tip of the iceberg in terms of the intersection between merchant traffic and global maritime security concerns for the US and its allies and partners.”
According to Green, “There are Chinese commercial vessels now with missile launchers. That is significant. If you look at China’s strategic doctrine, it talks about China-affiliated vessels being subject to military requisition as well as being built to defence standards. This is significant.
“So, what I would say to everyone here about the next five
years is: buckle up and maintain due diligence, because
this is going to be a wild five years.”
· Structural shortage fuels latest wave of Suezmax and VLCC newbuilding orders
A surge in new orders for Suezmax and VLCC crude tankers is being driven primarily by a structural shortage of compliant tonnage, rather than near-term freight market strength. Since October 2025, owners have ordered 115 crude tankers, comprising 40 Suezmaxes and 75 VLCC’s, reflecting renewed confidence in the longer-term outlook for oil transportation.
Most new-buildings are speculative and are scheduled for delivery in 2028 and 2029.
- DP World investor halts deals amid Epstein links to CEO – Report by Lloyds List
Pension fund La Caisse has invested in several port projects around the world. Chairman of the ports and logistics giant, Bin Sulayem, appears multiple times in the Epstein files, which show he maintained a relationship with the disgraced financier long after his initial conviction. Appearance in the files themselves does not constitute evidence of criminal conduct.
· A reality check on the seafarer crisis
Henrik Jensen, the CEO of Danica Crewing Services, says we should avoid framing shipping as uniquely worse than other industries.
The recent warnings from the World Maritime University about a looming global seafarer crisis deserve serious attention.
Surveys suggesting that up to half of seafarers may leave the industry within five years cannot be ignored.
But we must also be careful not to create a narrative that unintentionally paints shipping as uniquely worse than any other industry.
When we read that women seafarers score low on happiness, or that job satisfaction “plummets” for the 16–25 age group, the immediate reaction is concern. Taken in isolation, this is worrying but how does it compare? Are young people ashore more satisfied in their jobs? Are women in shore-based industries significantly happier than those at sea? Without that context, we simply don’t know.
A recent survey in Germany showed that around 50% of employees are unhappy with their jobs. If half of German seafarers express dissatisfaction, that does not make the situation acceptable, but it does suggest they are not uniquely worse off. Context matters. Without it, we risk creating a distorted picture in which shipping appears fundamentally worse than working in other sectors.
This is not an argument for complacency. There is clearly a need for improvement. At the same time, it’s unrealistic to believe that any industry can create a perfect workplace for everyone. That has not been achieved ashore or at sea.
Despite this, there are many owners and employers who genuinely value their employees and invest in their wellbeing.
Another reason cited is that connectivity itself has become a problem. But suggesting that seafarers would be better off working in isolation is not the answer either. Stress from bad news, difficult conversations, and global uncertainty is part of modern life for everyone. Ship owners could address this by providing better staff support systems, stronger leadership, and a more understanding approach to mental health awareness.
What these surveys do show is that if even a small percentage of seafarers leave the industry, shipping faces serious issues. Many believe there are enough crew today. What is far less certain is whether there will be tomorrow. In my view, the shortage will soon become very real.
At Danica, we see crew shortage as a risk that must be managed and mitigated like any other operational or commercial risk. That means shipowners must develop long- term sourcing and recruitment strategies. It means widening recruitment beyond traditional labour pools and treating crewing not as a transactional function, but as a strategic one.
This is why we have built a strong international network in key seafaring hubs and expanded into new regions, most recently opening our office in Turkey and investing in crewing opportunities in Africa. Not simply to fill vacancies, but to help owners build resilient, diversified crewing pipelines for the future.
The maritime industry does need to address the challenges it
faces but this must be a balanced approach. It’s right to say
that conditions must improve and that poor practices must be addressed. I would add that retention and recruitment must also become strategic priorities.
Instead of reacting to alarming headlines that portray the shipping industry as being uniquely ‘bad’, the real challenge is not just recognising the problem but managing it with a realistic approach and longer-term thinking. The future crewing crisis will be addressed by treating seafarers not as commodities, statistics, or problems, but as the foundation on which the maritime industry is built.
· Sanctioned shipowner blasts back at Indian smuggling claims after tanker arrests
Dubai-based Jugwinder Singh Brar says two of his tankers were assisting a third of his that had run low on bunkers.
Dubai-based shipowner Jugwinder Singh Brar says three of his ships arrested by the Indian Coast Guard are innocent of oil smuggling.
The coastguard said this week that it had detained the 50,000- dwt Al Jafzia (built 1999), the 16,800-dwt Asphalt Star (built 2007) and the 6,200-dwt Stellar Ruby (built 2010) and taken them to Mumbai for investigation.
Dozens more tankers going dark as EU eyes Russian maritime services ban
UK broker says existing Russian-trading fleet can only handle 80% of its western exports.
· BW LPG boss eyes ‘significant’ upside for gas carrier giants
Kristian Sorensen says strong rates are set to support free cash flow.
BW LPG sees a robust underlying LPG market supporting
VLGC rates and delivering “significant free cash flow”.
Therefore, chief executive Kristian Sorensen wants to keep a large portion of the fleet open for hire in the spot market.
· Korean yards face foreign labour squeeze amid LNG and MRO boom
Visa policy rethink and wage gap threaten competitiveness against China.
South Korea’s shipbuilders are warning of labour disruption after the government signalled a phased reduction in skilled foreign worker visas.
The debate centres on E-7 skilled visas, with yards including HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, Hanwha Ocean and Samsung Heavy Industries heavily reliant on overseas welders and painters.
· Shipowner Evangelos Marinakis inks 11 VLCC new-buildings at Hengli
Capital Maritime has already ordered six of the crude carriers at the Dalian-based shipyard.
Greek shipowner Evangelos Marinakis has placed a potential
$1.4bn VLCC newbuilding wager amid strong rates for the ship type.
VLCC new-buildings are currently the preferred vessel type among shipping companies, driven by strong charter rates, an ageing global fleet and Sinokor Maritime’s huge raid on second-hand vessels in the sector.
Marinakis’ privately-owned Capital Maritime & Trading has
struck a deal with China’s Hengli Heavy Industry for 11 VLCCs.
· Offshore support vessel put on the auction block in Nigeria
Court notice indicates that a bargain could be had by anyone with a spare Caterpillar engine lying around.
The Federal High Court of Nigeria intends to auction a small
offshore support vessel on 2 March.
Going under the hammer that day is the 167-gt Miden Anabelle (built 2013), one of a handful of offshore vessels owned by Lagos-based Miden Systems.
Odfjell orders chemical tanker newbuilding duo as earnings dip
Shipowner and operator’s chief executive says 2025 earnings show strength of the company’s business.
Odfjell said it struck a deal to order two newbuilding chemical tankers on long-term charter as the shipowner revealed a dip in fourth-quarter earnings.
The Oslo-listed company said it signed up for a pair of 35,000- dwt super-segregator tankers. The company said it took the vessels on long-term deals with Japanese shipowners.
The charters lift its orders of this class of super-segregators —
tankers with a high number of stainless steel tanks — to six. The company has a total of 22 new-buildings on order.
· Reckless attitude blamed for bulker collision that killed five seafarers
UK probe finds watchkeepers on the Polesie and Verity were willing to cut passing distances too fine.
UK accident investigators have criticised attitudes to risk on two vessels that collided in the North Sea in 2023, killing five seafarers.
The crew members died when Faversham Ships’ 3,400-dwt general cargo ship Verity (built 2001) sank following the clash with Polsteam’s 38,100-dwt handy-size Polesie (built 2009) in the German Bight traffic separation.
The Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) said the incident took place on the morning of 24 October.
· Hahn & Co sells 10 VLCCs from SK Shipping to Pan Ocean
South Korean private equity giant Hahn & Company is selling 10 very large crude carriers operated by SK Shipping to Pan Ocean for KRW973.7bn ($694m). The deal, which transfers related long-term cargo contracts with major domestic shippers, is slated to close by April 11, 2027 and follows Hahn’s 2018 acquisition of a controlling stake in SK Shipping.
Last year, HMM, South Korea’s flagship carrier, looked at buying SK Shipping but a persistent valuation gap made the deal untenable.
The VLCC divestment marks another step in Hahn’s reshaping of SK Shipping’s fleet and commercial profile. Since the 2018 buyout, SK Shipping has shifted away from volatile spot exposures toward long-term contracts, helping operating profit climb from 73.3 billion won in 2018 to 395.7 billion won in 2024 and lifting EBITDA from 231.7 billion won to 640.9 billion won over the same period.
SK Shipping plans to redeploy proceeds from the sale into different shipping sectors.
The VLCC markets have been surging this year, largely down to the actions of another Korean player, Sinokor, which has
bought more than 50 VLCCs over the past couple of months as well as fixing many more on charter.
· Saltchuk snaps up Great Lakes Dredge & Dock in $1.5bn deal
Saltchuk Resources is expanding its US maritime footprint with a definitive agreement to acquire Great Lakes Dredge & Dock for $1.5bn in an all-cash transaction that takes the
Nasdaq-listed dredging giant private. Under the deal Great Lakes shareholders will receive $17.00 per share, a 25% premium to the company’s 90-day VWAP and a 5% premium to its all-time high closing price.
The board of Great Lakes unanimously approved the
transaction, which values the company’s equity at roughly
$1.2bn and is financed by fully committed lending from Bank of America, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank and PNC. The tender offer must meet customary conditions, including Hart-Scott-Rodino clearance, and is expected to close in Q2 2026. After completion Great Lakes will operate as a standalone business inside Saltchuk and its shares will be delisted.
Saltchuk’s chairman Mark Tabbutt framed the deal as a cultural fit: “We are honoured to begin our association with Great Lakes. Our goal is to provide a permanent home for great companies that serve their communities and Great Lakes is a
perfect match. We look forward to welcoming the roughly 1,200
Great Lakes employees joining the Saltchuk family.”
The acquisition deepens consolidation in US marine services, pairing Saltchuk’s diversified transport and energy platforms with Great Lakes’ 200-vessel dredging fleet and growing offshore energy activity. In 2024, Saltchuk bought out US tanker firm Overseas Shipholding Group (OSG).
· Fednav returns to Oshima for new handy- size series
Canadian dry bulk owner and operator Fednav is heading back to Japan for a new series of handy-size bulkers, marking its latest move in the newbuilding market.
The Montreal-based company has signed a letter of intent with Oshima Shipbuilding for four 35,000 dwt lakers, with deliveries scheduled by mid-2029.
President and chief executive Paul Pathy announced the deal, underlining the company’s continued focus on modern, fuel- efficient tonnage tailored for trades into the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway.
The deal adds to Fednav’s existing orderbook and strengthens its long-standing relationship with Japanese builders. In 2021, Canada’s largest dry bulk shipping group signed a deal with Sumisho Marine and Oshima to build 10 new 34,800 dwt ocean-going lakers.
With the latest letter of intent, Fednav’s forward orderbook — including long-term chartered vessels — rises to 11 ships across the Handy-size and Ultramax segments.
Fednav operates a fleet of around 120 bulk carriers, of which more than 60 are owned. The return to Oshima highlights the
company’s continued reliance on Japanese yards for specialised laker designs and signals steady fleet renewal for the Canadian operator as it positions itself for long-term demand in both inland and ocean-going bulk trades.
· Pan Ocean strikes for 10 VLCCs from SK Shipping in $700m deal
Hahn & Co, the owner of SK Shipping, has been seeking to sell the fleet since 2023.
South Korea’s Pan Ocean is acquiring 10 VLCC’s from a compatriot shipowner, accelerating a drive to grow its presence in the big tanker market.
Private equity firm Hahn & Co, which owns SK Shipping, is selling the shipowners’ vessels for KRW 973.7bn ($676m), according to local media reports.
· NYK bulker cuts emissions by two-thirds in world-first use of low-carbon methanol
Japanese Owner hails results from Ultramax chartered by BHP. Japanese giant NYK has claimed a massive reduction in emissions from what it called the first use of low-carbon methanol by an oceangoing bulker.
The 66,000-dwt Green Future was delivered in May last year for a charter to Australian miner BHP.
NYK Bulk & Projects Carriers said it had since achieved a 65% cut in greenhouse gases on a well-to-wake basis compared with conventional fuel.
Russian crude volumes to China hit all-time high, says IEA
Moscow’s revenues continue to decline despite the rapid
shift of its barrels from India to China.
Russian seaborne crude exports to China have hit an all-time high in the latest shift of trading patterns caused by sanctions.
The rise in Russian exports to China has been partially offset by a decline in exports to former top-buyer India, which has come under pressure from the US over its crude import strategy, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).
· Another idle Chinese shipyard springs back to life as capacity nears 2010’s peak
China Merchants to restart Wuhan Qingshan Shipyard in 2026 after eight-year hiatus. Revival part of broader wave of reactivations pushing Chinese capacity near early-2010’s peak.
Demand volatility and geopolitical risks are red flags in coming years. Strong demand and full berths at leading yards fuel wave of shipyard reactivations across China.
· Saudi Arabia’s Aramco Begins Production At $100B Jafurah Gas Project
Saudi Aramco has begun production of light oil (condensate) from its $100 billion Jafurah unconventional gas project, after the company completed Phase 1 construction of the 450- MMcf/D-capacity gas plant. This marks the first export of liquids from the massive field, which is primarily designed to produce natural gas.
Initial cargoes were sold to Asian buyers for delivery in late February or early March 2026. Aramco will initially sell 4 to 6 cargoes per month, with each cargo consisting of approximately 500,000 barrels. Condensate is a high-value, light oil produced alongside natural gas. Aramco is expected to ramp up production at Jafurah to 2 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas by 2030.
The Jafurah unconventional gas project is the largest liquid-rich shale gas play in the Middle East, holding 229 trillion scf of raw gas and 75 billion STB of condensate. The project is a key element of Saudi Arabia’s growth strategy, aimed at meeting rapidly growing domestic energy demand, shifting away from burning oil for electricity and driving industrial growth. By reducing domestic crude consumption for power, the Kingdom intends to free up this oil for export.
The project also supports Saudi Arabia’s net-zero 2060 targets by replacing more carbon-intensive fuels with natural gas. The giant project involves advanced hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, with a total investment value estimated to reach over $100 billion. In August 2025, a consortium led by BlackRock’s Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP) signed a 20-
year, $11 billion lease-and-lease-back deal with Aramco for the Jafurah gas field. Jafurah Midstream Gas Company (JMGC), newly established subsidiary, will hold the rights, with 51% owned by Aramco and 49% by the GIP-led consortium, which includes Hassana Investment Company and The Arab Energy Fund. The deal also aligns with Aramco’s objective to increase overall gas production capacity by 60% by 2030.
The Jafurah project also supports the country’s Vision 2030’s goal to shift away from oil dependency. The project is expected to contribute $20 billion annually to the Kingdom’s GDP and create significant local job opportunities.
Balance of Power
More than a century after a US naval strategist first coined the term “Middle East,” the region remains a high-stakes arena for great-power rivalry.
Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is making its presence as a player felt, developing ties with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Qatar and Egypt to slowly increase its influence from Syria to Somalia.
With a US armada sitting off Iran, Ankara is signalling to Washington that military action is unlikely to bring regime change in Tehran— and could instead undermine prospects for a deal to curb the Islamic Republic’s pursuit of weapons-grade uranium.
President Donald Trump appears determined to push ahead with talks despite deep reservations from Benjamin
Netanyahu. The Israeli premier has long argued that diplomacy alone cannot neutralize the threat, but appeared to come away with little from his White House meeting yesterday.
While a military strike remains a last resort, it is unclear whether a narrower agreement focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program would ease broader regional anxieties — including Tehran’s ballistic-missile arsenal and its network of proxy forces, both of which remain central to Middle East security calculations.
Erdoğan has cast himself as a mediator, with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan engaging regional and Western counterparts in an effort to prevent a wider conflict.
Rising tensions have pushed oil prices higher as investors weigh the risk of disruption amid reports the Pentagon has ordered a second aircraft-carrier strike group to prepare for possible deployment to the region.
The anxiety extends beyond Iran.
Turkey, already hosting nearly 3 million Syrian refugees — has updated contingency plans to prevent a potential new wave of displacement in the event of a major conflict.
A fresh influx could inflame domestic political tensions ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections expected within the next two years.
Even for Turkey’s longest-serving leader — widely seen positioning his son as a potential successor — that’s an unwelcome prospect.
Global Scene today
Trump’s tariff policies suffered their biggest political blow yet, with the Republican-led US House passing legislation aimed at ending his levies on Canadian imports just months before midterm elections that are expected to focus heavily on affordability.
The President is privately musing about exiting the North American trade pact, sources say, injecting further uncertainty about the deal’s future into pivotal renegotiations involving the US, Canada and Mexico.
French President Emmanuel Macron returned to his “Made in Europe” push on the eve of a key European Union meeting, putting him at odds with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz over how best to tackle regional economic woes.
Macron urged EU countries to prioritize local resources in strategic sectors like chemicals, chips and tech, while Merz wants preference rules for critical strategic industries and only as a last resort.
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Rachel Reeves took a swipe against plans for the law.
Prime Minister Keir Starmer risks a rebellion within his Labour Party over efforts to counter Nigel Farage’s Reform UK on immigration. Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood has made it tougher for people to claim permanent residency, a stance popular with many voters, but Labour lawmakers are wary of punishing families who have come to the nation legally and integrated well.
Global Trade Is Leaving the US Behind
Perhaps the most surprising trade policy development of 2025
wasn’t President Donald Trump’s tariffs but rather foreign
governments’ refusal to respond in-kind. Although such abstinence is economically optimal, politicians typically embrace tit-for-tat retaliation for political and strategic reasons. So, when only China and Canada followed Trump’s protectionist lead, the relative quiet was an unusual, albeit welcome, result.
It didn’t mean, however, that governments, companies, and even many individuals were standing still. Instead, they “retaliated” in a smarter way: reducing their future reliance on a US that has increasingly embraced protectionism since at least 2016 – protectionism that, ironically, might be helping the very country tariffs were supposed to contain.
America’s departure from the epicenter of global trade began years ago and has accelerated in recent months. According to the WTO, the US share of global merchandise trade (imports plus exports) in the third quarter was the lowest for that period of the year since 2014, and the drop from 2024 was larger than the cumulative loss between 2015 and 2024. Bloomberg News adds that inbound container volumes through North America — some 80% of which is the US — went “from a world leader to a laggard” last year. Boston Consulting Group projects the trend will continue in the years ahead, with the US’s share of world trade falling from 12% in 2024 to 9% by 2034 because of “policies pursued by the Trump administration.”
Even bigger moves are happening beneath the surface, especially regarding China. When Trump fired his opening tariff salvo in 2018, the US absorbed roughly 19% of Chinese exports, but the share tumbled to 11% by the end of last year.
China’s total exports and trade surplus have nevertheless continued to grow because exporters there targeted other markets, notably in Southeast Asia (Asean) but also in Africa, Europe and Latin America – a move trade economists have dubbed “the great re-allocation”.
Malaysia: In the country of 1MDB, where billions of dollars were looted from a state fund and spent on a luxury yacht and Hollywood movies, the attempted takeover of a $12 million company sounds like no big deal. But when it’s carried out by a man brandishing a gun, and allegedly backed by the government agency that’s supposed to prevent graft, it shows that corruption persists in Malaysia — often upending people’s lives.
· America and China at the Edge of Ruin – A last chance to step back from the Brink.
“Since the early 2010’s, the relationship between Beijing and Washington has steadily shifted from cautious engagement to tense rivalry,” Two of the foreign journalists experts on these countries wrote. If China and the United States continue down this path, they could lock themselves—and the rest of the world “into a condition of managed hostility, diminished prosperity, and chronic insecurity.”
Baltic Indices 12th February, 2026
BALTIC FORWARD ASSESSMENTS – THURSDAY 12 FEBRUARY 2026 BFA CAPESIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Feb | 26 | 24,814$/day | 325↑ |
| Mar | 26 | 29,289$/day | -32↓ |
| Apr | 26 | 29,489$/day | -647↓ |
| May | 26 | 29,632$/day | -654↓ |
| Jun | 26 | 29,804$/day | -582↓ |
| Jul | 26 | 29,746$/day | -425↓ |
| Q1 | 26 | 25,176$/day | 98↑ |
| Q2 | 26 | 29,642$/day | -627↓ |
| Q3 | 26 | 29,629$/day | -557↓ |
| Q4 | 26 | 29,721$/day | -483↓ |
| Q1 | 27 | 20,689$/day | -118↓ |
| Q2 | 27 | 25,596$/day | -168↓ |
| Cal | 27 | 25,807$/day | -393↓ |
| Cal | 28 | 23,761$/day | -268↓ |
| Cal | 29 | 21,793$/day | -107↓ |
| Cal | 30 | 20,704$/day | -32↓ |
| Cal | 31 | 19,625$/day | -14↓ |
| Cal | 32 | 19,029$/day | -25↓ |
| Cal | 33 | 18,896$/day | -25↓ |
BFA PANAMAX 82
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Feb | 26 15,800$/day | -261↓ |
| Mar | 26 17,718$/day | -639↓ |
| Apr | 26 18,261$/day | -503↓ |
| May | 26 18,346$/day | -390↓ |
| Jun | 26 17,632$/day | -157↓ |
| Jul | 26 | 16,807$/day | -136↓ |
| Q1 | 26 | 15,608$/day | -300↓ |
| Q2 | 26 | 18,080$/day | -350↓ |
| Q3 | 26 | 16,411$/day | -271↓ |
| Q4 | 26 | 15,511$/day | -218↓ |
| Q1 | 27 | 13,350$/day | -118↓ |
| Q2 | 27 | 14,925$/day | -136↓ |
| Cal | 27 | 14,355$/day | -163↓ |
| Cal | 28 | 13,693$/day | -111↓ |
| Cal | 29 | 13,400$/day | -75↓ |
| Cal | 30 | 13,093$/day | -7↓ |
| Cal | 31 | 12,904$/day | -10↓ |
| Cal | 32 | 12,914$/day | 7↑ |
| Cal | 33 | 12,839$/day | -4↓ |
BFA SUPRAMAX 63
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Feb | 26 | 14,730$/day | -54 |
| Mar | 26 | 17,448$/day | -372 |
| Apr | 26 | 18,352$/day | -436 |
| May | 26 | 18,173$/day | -357 |
| Jun | 26 | 17,838$/day | -364 |
| Jul | 26 | 17,155$/day | -197 |
| Q1 | 26 | 14,961$/day | -142 |
| Q2 | 26 | 18,121$/day | -386 |
| Q3 | 26 | 16,898$/day | -304 |
| Q4 | 26 | 16,030$/day | -222 |
| Q1 | 27 | 14,145$/day | -114 |
| Q2 | 27 | 15,523$/day | -75 |
| Cal | 27 | 14,805$/day | -100 |
| Cal | 28 | 14,416$/day | -79 |
| Cal | 29 | 14,291$/day | -7 |
| Cal | 30 | 13,980$/day | -22 |
| Cal | 31 | 13,923$/day | -22 |
| Cal | 32 | 13,730$/day | 3 |
| Cal | 33 | 13,702$/day | 0 |
BFA SUPRAMAX 58
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Feb | 26 12,696$/day | -54↓ |
| Mar | 26 15,414$/day | -372↓ |
| Apr | 26 16,318$/day | -436↓ |
| May | 26 16,139$/day | -357↓ |
| Jun | 26 15,804$/day | -364↓ |
| Jul | 26 15,121$/day | -197↓ |
| Q1 | 26 12,927$/day | -142↓ |
| Q2 | 26 | 16,087$/day | -386↓ |
| Q3 | 26 | 14,864$/day | -304↓ |
| Q4 | 26 | 13,996$/day | -222↓ |
| Q1 | 27 | 12,111$/day | -114↓ |
| Q2 | 27 | 13,489$/day | -75↓ |
| Cal | 27 | 12,771$/day | -100↓ |
| Cal | 28 | 12,382$/day | -79↓ |
| Cal | 29 | 12,257$/day | -7↓ |
| Cal | 30 | 11,946$/day | -22↓ |
| Cal | 31 | 11,889$/day | -22↓ |
| Cal | 32 | 11,696$/day | 3↑ |
| Cal | 33 | 11,668$/day | 0→ |
BFA HANDYSIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
| Feb | 26 | 11,855$/day | 15↑ |
| Mar | 26 | 14,010$/day | -120↓ |
| Apr | 26 | 14,325$/day | -100↓ |
| May | 26 | 14,130$/day | -80↓ |
| Jun | 26 | 13,860$/day | -80↓ |
| Jul | 26 | 13,650$/day | -15↓ |
| Q1 | 26 | 12,279$/day | -35↓ |
| Q2 | 26 | 14,105$/day | -86↓ |
| Q3 | 26 | 13,230$/day | -60↓ |
| Q4 | 26 | 12,690$/day | -20↓ |
| Q1 | 27 | 11,580$/day | 10↑ |
| Q2 | 27 | 12,250$/day | 0→ |
| Cal | 27 | 12,215$/day | -10↓ |
| Cal | 28 | 11,670$/day | 30↑ |
| Cal | 29 | 11,430$/day | 10↑ |
| Cal | 30 | 11,330$/day | -10↓ |
| Cal | 31 | 11,295$/day | 0→ |
| Cal | 32 | 11,315$/day | 0→ |
| Cal | 33 | 11,270$/day | 0→ |
BALTIC INDICES 12/02/2026
DRY INDEX: 2095 (+137)
CAPESIZE INDEX: 3241 (+327)
PANAMAX INDEX: 1766 (+31)
SUPRAMAX INDEX: 1165 (+25)
HANDYSIZE INDEX: 670 (+113)
BCI 182 TC AVG $/DAY 29396 (+2964)
BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 15897 (+282)
BSI TC AVG $/DAY 14725 (+313)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 12056 (+238)
TIMECHARTER
‘Venus Heritage’ 2010 95650 dwt dely Kwangyang 20 Feb trip via EC Aussie redel South Korea intention coal
$16,500 – Hanaro Shipping
‘Protector’ 2022 82506 dwt dely Mizushima 27 Feb trip via NoPac redel Singapore-Japan $16,500
‘Billy Jim’ 2014 82134 dwt dely Singapore 12 Feb trip
via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan $18,000 – Cofco
‘Greek Friendship’ 2019 82017 dwt dely Singapore 2 Feb trip via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan intention grains $17,750
‘Alba’ 2019 82010 dwt dely Busan 21 Feb trip via NoPac redel Singapore-Japan $16,000 – Pan Ocean
‘Nora Schulte’ 2023 81957 dwt dely Singapore 11 Feb trip via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan intention grains $19,000 – Norden
‘Atlantic Affinity’ 2018 81828 dwt dely Chiba 23/28 Feb trip via EC Australia redel South China intention coal $14,000
‘Kynouria’ 2012 81354 dwt dely Gibraltar trip via US
Gulf redel Skaw-Gibraltar intention coal $16,800 – Ultrabulk
‘BLC First’ 2019 81188 dwt dely EC South America 3 Mar trip redel Singapore-Japan $17,750+$775,000bb – Cofco
‘Sarah’ 2018 81082 dwt dely Yosu 12/25 Feb trip via NoPac redel Singapore-Japan $15,500 – Cargill
‘Thames Trader’ 2011 79445 dwt dely EC South America 8 Mar trip redelivery Skaw-Mediterranean $20,000 – Classic
‘Celina’ 2014 79107 dwt dely EC South America 25/27 Mar trip redel Skaw-Gibraltar $23,000 – Cargill
‘Silvermine’ 2014 77230 dwt dely Taichung 16 Feb trip via Indonesia redel India intention coal $14,500
‘Guo Yuan 32’ 2013 75854 dwt dely New Mangalore 21/22 Feb trip
via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan intention grains
$17,500
‘Atlantic Star’ 2011 75003 dwt dely Kakinada 6 Feb trip via EC South America redel PMO $12,750
‘Pacific Star’ 2013 74138 dwt dely Goa 13 Feb trip via
EC South America redel Singapore-Japan $14,400 – Cargill
‘Young Spirit’ 2015 63567 dwt dely Mina Saqr mid Feb trip redel Bangladesh $16,000 – Teambulk
‘Bahri Seta’ 2018 62350 dwt dely EC South America prompt trip redel Arabian Gulf $17,000 + $700,000bb – Pacific Basin
‘Zhong Chang 258’ 2011 57122 dwt dely Belawan prompt trip via Indonesia redel Thailand $11,500 – Intergis
PERIOD
‘M Explorer’ 2010 82094 dwt dely CJK 14/15 Feb trip via NoPac redel Singapore-Japan $16,000 – ADMI
‘Alpha Discovery’ 2016 82057 dwt dely Zhoushan 14 Feb 6/8 months redel worldwide $16,750 – Klaveness
‘Jera’ 2012 57111 dwt dely Mediterranean prompt 5/7 months redel worldwide $14,500
‘Bunun Youth’ 2023 39703 dwt dely Far East prompt Apr-Jun ’26 3 years redel worldwide 120.5 % BHSI
‘Marem’ 2012 34148 dwt dely Houston prompt 3 to 5 months redel Atlantic $16,750
‘Poavosa Wisdom III’ 2011 28323 dwt dely China prompt 1 year redel worldwide $9,400
VOYAGES ORE
‘Oldendorff TBN ‘ 180000/10 S.Islands/Rotterdam 10/19 Mar $14.10 fio
‘Falcon Confidence’ 2007 170000/10 Tubarao/Qingdao 8/14 Mar $22.90 fio 3days 70000shinc/40000shinc – Rogesa
‘TBN ‘ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 1/3 Mar $9.25 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto
‘Star Shibumi ‘ 2021 170000/10 Saldanha Bay/Qingdao 21/26 Feb
$17.90 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – IMR
‘Shandong De Yun ‘ 2020 160000/10 Narvik/Rotterdam 25 Feb/6 Mar
$6.15 fio 6 days ttl – TKS
COAL
‘Five Ocean TBN’ 77500/10 Roberts Bank/Samcheonpo 5/14 Mar
$16.45 fio 35000 satpmshexuu/21500LT shinc – Kepco
‘TBN’ 75000/10 HPCT-DBCT-NQXT/EC India 5/14 Mar
$17.75 fio 40000shinc/40000shinc – NSL
Baltic Exchange Index – 12 FEBRUARY 2025 Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 3241 (+ 327)
Route Description Value($) Change
====== =================================== ========
| C2 | 170000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam | 12.044 + 0.463 |
| C3 | 170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao | 24.209 + 1.345 |
| C5 | 160-170000 mt W Australia to Qingdao | 9.378 + 0.961 |
| C7 | 160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam | 15.944 + 0.538 |
| C8_182 182000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV | 35,031 + 1750 | |
| C9_182 182000mt Cont/Med Trip China/Japan | 55,722 + 1666 | |
| C10_182 182000mt China/Japan T/P RV | 25,695 + 4845 | |
| C14_182 182000mt China-Brazil or W.Africa RV | 28,705 + 2628 | |
| C16_182 182000mt Far East – Atlantic BH | 8,056 + 1128 | |
| C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao | 17.662 + 0.812 | |
========================================== ========
5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 25,893 + 2964 5TC_182 Weighted Timecharter Average 29,396 + 2964
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 12 FEBRUARY 2025 Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,766 (+ 31)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ================================= ======== P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 15,277 + 122
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 22,439 + 145 P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 15,640 + 596 P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 9,224 + 133 P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 16,670 + 249
====== ================================= =======
P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 15,897 + 282
The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ================================= ======== P5_82 S. China Indo RV 11,850 + 644
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 52.986 + 0.111 P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 41.071 + 0.479
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 12 FEBRUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1165 (+ 25)
Route Description Value ($) Change
| ====== | ========================================= ========= | |
| S1B_63 | Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea | 16,571 + 242 |
| S1C_63 | US Gulf trip to China-South Japan | 30,300 + 1914 |
| BS2_63 | North China one Australian or Pacific RV | 11,775 – 96 |
| BS3_63 | North China trip to West Africa | 10,490 + 40 |
| S4A_63 | US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero | 32,057 + 1989 |
| S4B_63 | Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf | 11,189 + 260 |
| BS5_63 | West Africa trip via ECSA to North China | 20,057 + 188 |
| BS8_63 | South China trip via Indo to EC.India | 11,329 – 64 |
| BS9_63 | W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero | 16,818 + 382 |
| S10_63 | S.China trip via Indonesia to South China | 8,763 – 23 |
| S15_63 | Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East | 12,450 + 87 |
====== ========================================= =========
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 14,725 + 313 S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 12,691 + 313
Baltic Exchange Index – 12 FEBRUARY 2026 Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 670 (+ 13)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ======================================== =========
HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 7,564 + 121 HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 9,129 + 100 HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 21,278 + 639 HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Passero 22,157 + 1264 HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 9,269 – 88
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn 9,163 – 37 HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 8,531 – 26
====== ======================================== =========
7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 12,056 + 238
(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd., 2026
Marex Media
The Author
Bansi Jaising – photo you have
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