- Denmark buys Hellfire Missiles from “Pentagon” to “Defend Greenland” from the United States. The Arctic crisis has officially crossed the line in total absurdity. In a move that defies all traditional geopolitical logic, Denmark has finalized a purchase of advanced Helfire Missiles from the US Pentagon – while explicitly stating that the purpose of these weapons is to “defend Greenland” from a potential takeover by the United States.
This transaction highlights the bizarre reality of the modern military-industrial complex; the US Government is selling weapons to an ally who intends to use them to deter a US invasion. It suggests that the Pentagon’s arms sales division operates completely independently of the White House’s foreign policy, or that the administration simply doesn’t believe Denmark would actually pull the trigger.
· Trump touts ‘total access’ Greenland deal as NATO asks allies to step up
NATO to enhance Arctic presence under US framework deal.
Trump’s Greenland ambitions strain transatlantic ties
EU leaders wary of US reliability post-Greenland episode European markets rebound.
- DAVOS, Switzerland/COPENHAGEN, (Reuters)
– President Donald Trump said on Thursday he had secured total and permanent U.S. access to Greenland in a deal with NATO, whose head said allies would have to step up their commitment to Arctic security to ward off threats from Russia and China.
News of a framework deal came as Trump backed off tariff threats and ruled out taking Greenland by force, bringing a degree of respite in what was brewing to be the biggest rupture in transatlantic ties in decades.
But the details of any agreement were unclear and Denmark insisted its sovereignty over the island was not up for discussion. Denmark’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Trump’s latest comments.
Trump’s U-turn had triggered a rebound in European markets but also raised questions about how much damage had already been done to transatlantic ties and business confidence.
“It’s really being negotiated now, the details of it. But essentially it’s total access. It’s – there’s no end, there’s no time limit,” Trump told Fox Business Network in an interview from Davos, where he is attending the World Economic Forum.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte told Reuters in an interview in Davos that it was now up to NATO’s senior commanders to work through the details of extra security requirements. “I have no doubt we can do this quite fast. Certainly, I would hope for 2026, I hope even early in 2026,” he said.
· DENMARK SAYS SITUATION REMAINS DIFFICULT
Trump’s ambition to wrest sovereignty over Greenland from fellow NATO member Denmark has threatened to blow apart the alliance that underpinned Western security since the end of World War Two, and re-ignite a trade war with Europe.
Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen said no negotiations had been held with NATO regarding the sovereignty of Greenland, a semi-autonomous territory of Denmark.
“It is still a difficult and serious situation, but progress has also been made in the sense that we have now got things where they need to be. Namely that we can discuss how we promote common security in the Arctic region,” Frederiksen said.
· Global Economy and Business
Amid heightening tensions over Greenland’s future came the chill wind of Donald Trump’s latest tariff threat. The businessman president has reached for a trade solution to a territorial matter – from February, the eight European countries in his sights face an initial 10% tariff, rising to 25% in the summertime. This tariff will remain in place until such time as the sale of Greenland to the U.S. is complete.
It’s a serious – and delicate – situation for the European states. China, at the height of its latest trade war with Trump, was able to hit back hard with measures that hurt. Europe and the U.K. have no such might, while also having strong security ties to Trump. In short, it’s a bit of a mess.
So if trade sanctions won’t work, what else can the eight countries try? Jun Du and Oleksandr Shepotylo of Aston University have identified five possible options, although none of them is very appealing. They offer a mix of pain, risk and disruption with few guarantees. But this new threat from Trump requires a new kind of response.
· Europe has five options for responding to Trump’s Greenland threats. None of them look good
Have US tariffs failed to bite? China’s trade surplus hits a record US$1.2 trillion.
The numbers are in, and they paint a picture that defies the conventional wisdom of Washington’s trade hawks. In 2025, China’s trade surplus surged to a record high of
US$1.2 trillion (£900 billion). In December alone, the surplus reached US$114 billion, driven by a higher-than- expected 6.6% growth in exports and 5.7% growth in imports.
The trade surplus refers to the amount by which Chinese exports outnumber its imports. And far from being strangled by external pressure – in particular from the US under Donald Trump – China’s export engine is running hotter than ever.
This creates a paradox for the ordinary observer. For several years, the narrative has been that the US is locked in a divisive trade war with China. This has brought sweeping tariffs intended to decouple the two economies and reduce American reliance on Chinese manufacturing.
Wrangling following Trump’s liberation day tariff announcement on April 2 2025 was apparently settled in November. This left the average tariff imposed on Chinese goods being imported to the US at 47%, down from 145%.
So if the world’s largest economy is shutting the door on Chinese goods, how can Beijing be posting its best export numbers in history? The answer suggests that the US has not won the trade war, and that China’s economy has proven far more adaptable than anticipated.
What happened in 2025 reveals a massive pivot in global trade flows. The tariffs did bite where they were intended: China’s direct exports to the US plummeted by 20% last year, and imports into China from the US fell by 14.6%.
But while the front door to the American market was closing, China found other routes.
In 2025, exports to Africa continued to grow strongly by 26%, shipments to countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) grew by 13%, and trade with Latin America climbed by 7%. Even exports to the EU
managed an 8% rise, despite growing friction over European concerns about unfair competition from Chinese state-supported industries. So, the 20% loss in the US market was mathematically overwhelmed by double-digit gains in the developing regions and emerging markets.
- Trump’s Year of Anarchy
The Unconstrained Presidency and the End of American Primacy.
or most Americans and Europeans alive today, a world of anarchy probably never felt quite real. Since 1945, the United States and its allies crafted and maintained an order that while neither fully liberal nor fully international, established rules that kept the peace among the great powers, promoted a world of relatively open trade, and facilitated international cooperation. In the decades that followed, the world became more stable and prosperous.
Before that long great-power peace, however, anarchy was far from an abstraction in the developed world. The first half of the twentieth century alone featured two world wars, a global depression, and a deadly pandemic. With weak global rules and weaker enforcement mechanisms, most states had little choice but to fend for themselves, often resorting to military force. But there were still limits to what sovereign states might do in a conflict. Countries were only just beginning to project military power beyond their borders, and information, goods, and people travelled less rapidly. Even during periods of international disorder, states could do only so much to one another without risking their own demise.
Today, the most powerful country is leading the world into a different kind of anarchy. Although U.S. President Donald Trump did not single-handedly bring about the decline of the post-1945 order, he has, in his first year since returning to office, accelerated and even embraced its demise. Trump’s appetite for territorial expansion eviscerates the most powerful post-1945 norm: that borders cannot be redrawn through the force of arms. And his disregard for domestic institutions has allowed him to run roughshod over any attempts at home to check those foreign expansionist dreams.
The anarchy that is emerging under Trump, in other words, is more chaotic. It is closer to the more primitive anarchy of the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes—a world of “all against all,” where sovereign power cannot be challenged domestically or internationally. In this Hobbesian order, driven by a leader who rejects any constraints on his ability to act and who is emboldened by technology to move at a whirlwind pace, anything goes. Order may well eventually emerge from this anarchy, but that order is unlikely to be led by—or to benefit— the United States.
· The ‘great reallocation’
Is this something completely new? No – China has been balancing its trade network continuously over the past decade, utilising its belt and road initiative. This is its strategy to boost trade through investment in new land and sea routes, which covers the historic Silk Road trade route.
In this way, China is seeking to reduce its dependence on western consumers. But there is a deeper layer to this success that explains why the trade war hasn’t reduced China’s global footprint.
Research has documented something called a “great reallocation” in supply chains, observed both in the first trade war – which began in 2018 when the US and China hit each other with tariffs in a struggle for trade dominance – and the current one. While direct US-China trade has decreased since 2018, the US has significantly increased imports from countries such as Vietnam and Mexico. And these “third-party countries” have simultaneously increased their imports of intermediate parts from China.
In 2025, this trend accelerated. Chinese firms are not just exporting final goods – they are shipping components to factories in south-east Asia and Mexico, which are then being assembled and shipped to the US at very low or zero tariffs, under respective bilateral trade agreements with the US.
This means the US is still effectively buying Chinese goods. It’s just paying a middleman to dodge the tariffs.
The implications of this ballooning surplus are different from previous eras. When China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, the world worried about it “dumping” cheap textiles and toys.
Today, the friction is over high-value industries. China’s 2025 export boom was driven by cars plus mechanical and electrical products – specifically, the “new three”: electric vehicles, lithium batteries and solar panels.
China is no longer just the world’s factory floor. It is becoming a hi-tech supplier and often a competitor to advanced economies’ own suppliers – which is where the ongoing tension arises from.
However, this export reliance also signals a domestic weakness. With China’s housing market still subdued and domestic investment declining, Chinese firms are eager to find demands elsewhere to keep their factories humming.
In 2026, this momentum shows little sign of slowing. The Global PMI (purchasing managers’ index, an indicator that assesses global market conditions) showed five consecutive months of expansion in 2025. This suggests the global economy is picking up some speed, which is good news for Chinese exporters.
However, in the long run, China running a trade surplus with more than 170 countries creates a structural imbalance that may become politically unsustainable. The challenge in Beijing, Washington and beyond is to find an equilibrium before this “winner-takes-all” dynamic forces even more drastic protectionist responses.
Interest rate decisions, the cost of living and the global scam economy all have impacts on business we need to be aware of.
- Recently it was Venezuela, then came Greenland, be prepared if something happens in next few days in Iran to bring about a regime change. Nations who have a hand or more into such changes, have a history. So wait and watch. May be Greenland is only a cover to divert the minds of something big that will happen??
· How the Iranian Regime Breaks
Elite Fracture Will Come Gradually and Then Suddenly
Over the last few weeks, the Iranian regime has faced remarkable challenges—and displayed remarkable unity. Hundreds of thousands of Iranians have taken to the streets to protest the Islamic Republic in what has become the most significant internal challenge the state has faced in its 47-year history. But the elite has not yet fractured.
Instead of squabbling over how to handle the demonstrations, Iran’s reformist and hardline leaders have worked together to suppress them. To date, none of the regime’s elites objected to the killings of thousands of innocent civilians by security forces. In fact, figures from across the political spectrum have all outwardly (and falsely) blamed the violence on foreign infiltrators.
But behind the scenes, the picture is undoubtedly more tense. Unless they exclusively watch state television and believe their own false narratives, Iranian officials understand that the domestic system is under existential stress. They are aware that U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to attack Tehran and topple the government. And most of them probably know that the forces driving the protests—including an economic crisis and decades of corruption—cannot be fixed by the country’s obstinate, reactionary leadership. As a result, Iranian officials who want to save themselves have an incentive to remove Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei from power.
If Iran’s elites do move on Khamenei, they will likely act quickly. There will be no sign to outsiders that a coup is coming. And if they succeed, a range of outcomes are possible. The Iranian apparatus has a stark divide between its older and younger generation, and so the character of the next government would depend on which cohort ends up leading it. If the old guard is behind a successful coup, Iran’s next regime will probably remain theocratic at home but become less ambitious abroad. If younger officials take over, Iran will likely grow less religious at home but remain assertive internationally.
Neither camp is likely to bring about democracy. The reason that either group would depose Khamenei, after all, is to preserve its influence. An internal move against the supreme leader would still evince the further erosion of the Islamic Republic. But the uncomfortable truth is that democracy and freedom in Iran will require either external support or that factions inside the ruling system, backed by a segment of the armed forces, join with the Iranian people. Short of that, any political change in Tehran is more likely to be about preserving aspects of the status quo.
· France boards second tanker as pressure to tackle stateless vessels mounts
French Navy has now boarded two shadow fleet tankers laden with Russian oil.
The Aframax, Grinch, is falsely flagged with Comoros Interception marks the second direct action by the EU this month. Sanctioned Aframax, last tracked off Spain, has not transmitted AIS data for several hours
THE French Navy has boarded a false flagged sanctioned Aframax laden with Russian crude, says President Emmanuel Macron in a post on X.
Lloyd’s List Intelligence vessel-tracking data shows Grinch (IMO: 9288851), which is falsely flagged with Comoros, stopped transmitting AIS data at 1027 hrs UTC while sailing off the coast of Spain towards the Mediterranean.
Macron’s statement indicates the ship was boarded on the high seas with support of allies, and “carried out in strict compliance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea”.
A judicial investigation into Grinch has been opened and the vessel diverted.
At the time it was intercepted Grinch was signalling its destination as “for orders” having loaded crude at Russia’s arctic port of Murmansk.
The tanker’s suffered third-party Automatic Identification System interference at the time of calling, but a four-day gap in AIS transmissions suggests it deliberately loaded “dark”.
· Russia continues to add shadow fleet tankers to its flag
After a brief pause Russia has continued to add sanctioned tankers to its flag. Russia’s ship register has increased in size by 40% since the invasion of Ukraine. Shift towards Russia’s flag comes as US and EU is adding pressure on ship registers and seeking to board vessels.
- Russia’s willingness to directly flag ships operating in sanctioned trades has not been affected by the recent US seizure of a Russian-flagged tanker.
· France boards second tanker as pressure to tackle stateless vessels mounts
French Navy has now boarded two shadow fleet tankers laden with Russian oil. The aframax, Grinch, is falsely flagged with Comoros. Interception marks the second direct action by the EU this month.
· Wait-and-see is the real result from NZF delay
Regulators don’t see green risk as finance risk, so lenders won’t offer carrots for greener shipping. Perks of doing nothing easier to quantify than risks. Long-term trend is still toward greener shipping, Marine Money told
· Don’t write off coal just yet
Suggestions that seaborne coal trade has peaked could be premature. Second half of 2025 showed that coal still has a role to play in driving dry bulk rates. There are still regions where energy demand could grow immensely.
Last year marked the beginning of the end for coal, according to some, but Chinese policy combined with potentially huge Indian demand could extend the commodity’s peak.
· Survey permits signal renewed momentum for Vietnam’s offshore wind
Vietnamese authorities have assigned sea areas to Vietnam Electricity (EVN) and Petrovietnam for offshore wind survey.
EVN has been granted 240 sq km of sea area offshore the Long Chau archipelago and Bach Long Vi Island to conduct surveys for the Bac Bo 1.3 and Bac Bo offshore wind projects.
Petrovietnam has been assigned over 398 km off Lam Dong to conduct surveys for the Nam Trung Bo 1 project. The sea areas were awarded without fees for a survey period of 36 months.
The allocation for surveys is considered the starting point for offshore wind power development. The surveys will provide the regulatory body with more control over marine space while reducing overlaps with other exploitation uses.
In February 2025, the country’s Ministry of Industry and Trade proposed delaying the development of offshore wind power until after 2030, instead of the original target of 6GW in the next five years. The proposal was due to the investment costs of around $60–70bn.
However, the government opted not to delay the development schedule for these initiatives. Vietnam is now looking to reach 6GW of offshore wind power by 2030 and about 17GW by 2035. By 2050, capacity is projected to reach between 113GW and 139GW.
· ADNOC hands McDermott offshore EPCI deal worth up to $1bn
Houston-based offshore contractor McDermott has been awarded a contract by ADNOC for EPCI services on the Nasr-115 Expansion Project, located approximately 130 km off Abu Dhabi.
The Nasr-115 Expansion Project is a critical component of the overall Nasr Phase II field development project expected to increase oil production capacity to 115,000 bpd by 2027.
Under the contract scope, McDermott will provide comprehensive EPCI services for two topside structures, one new manifold tower, one jacket, one bridge and all associated pipelines, cables and brownfield modifications.
“McDermott shares ADNOC’s commitment to increase offshore production capacity and will do its part with safe, efficient delivery of the project to the highest quality standards,” said Mike Sutherland, McDermott’s SVP of offshore Middle East.
The company did not provide precise financial details of the contract. However, it described the contract as major, placing it in the $750m to $1bn range.
The Nasr field is a major offshore oil field in the UAE, operated by ADNOC through its subsidiary ADMA-OPCO. It was discovered in 1971.
· Container lines cast their net to 2027 as charter market dries up
A shortage of larger boxships means forward fixing is the only means to accrue tonnage. A dearth of prompt vessel’s has resulted in a pick-up in container ships being fixed for charter in 2027.
· Zodiac tanker rescues race competitor after rogue waves make World’s Toughest Row too tough
- VLCC diverted for 12 hours to save stricken solo rower off Puerto Rico.
· LNG carrier newbuilding ordering becoming a risky business
GasLog CFO says chartering discussions have picked up, with tendering proving very competitive.
Ordering LNG carrier newbuildings is laden with risk in the current environment where new money is flooding into the market, according to one shipowner.
Speaking at the Marine Money London Ship Finance Forum, GasLog chief financial officer Achilleas Tasioulas said LNG newbuildings are significantly more expensive and take longer to build, with little clarity on the useful life of vessels ordered today.
“This makes it a riskier investment,” he said, and more difficult to price.
· Fire at Kazakhstan’s largest oilfield puts Black Sea tanker loadings in peril
Just as the CPC terminal gets back on track, a fresh threat to crude volumes emerges. Tanker loadings could remain restricted at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal near Novorossiysk, Russia, despite maintenance work nearing completion.
A force majeure has been declared at Kazakhstan’s largest oilfield, Tengiz, following a fire.
CPC handles about 1.5% of the global oil supply and 80% of Kazakhstan’s crude shipments.
· Japan’s lower house dissolved, snap election set for Feb. 8
PM Takaichi frames vote as referendum as key opposition parties unite in response
· Japan steel output falls to 56-year low on influx of cheap China imports
Steelmakers in Japan look for growth in US, India amid lackluster domestic market
Japan’s crude steel production in 2025 fell to its lowest level since 1969, sliding 4% on the year to 80.67 million metric tons, according to data released Thursday by the Japan Iron and Steel Federation (JISF).
With China’s steel exports remaining near record highs, a slumping market is becoming the norm. Major Japanese steelmakers are speeding up their shift toward growth markets such as India and the U.S. to keep production at a scale that will let them maintain their industrial strength.
Japan’s crude steel production last year fell short of even the 2020 level, when production dropped 16% on the year to 83.18 million tons due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. surpassed Japan in crude steel production for January-November 2025, according to the World Steel Association. Japan’s output for the full year is likely to move it down to fourth place, after China, India and the U.S. This would mark the first time the U.S. has topped Japan’s production volume since 1999.
Construction demand has declined amid project delays caused by labour shortages, contributing to stagnant steel demand. The ongoing contraction in domestic new automobile sales has underpinned weaker steel demand as well, while China has also been a major factor.
Although China’s crude steel production is now on a downward trend, the country’s slumping real estate sector and general economic slowdown have left it with cheap steel originally meant for such uses as construction. China has instead exported that extra steel, worsening global market conditions.
- China’s domestic crude steel production fell 2.9% to 746 million tons in January-September 2025, according to a Chinese industry body. The country’s domestic steel demand — as indicated by apparent steel consumption converted to crude steel — dropped 5.7% to 649 million tons, further widening the gap between supply and demand.
China’s steel exports for January-September 2025 rose 9.2% on the year to 87.96 million tons according to JISF figures, the highest ever for that period. Preliminary trade statistics released Thursday show steel imports to Japan from China growing 1.5% in 2025, adding to the influx of cheap steel.
Protectionism has become more widespread globally, especially in the U.S. Since around 2024, more countries have imposed high tariffs on steel in an effort to keep the market downturn sparked by China from affecting their domestic markets.
Japan has also been impacted by anti-dumping measures that shut imports out of destinations such as South Korea and the European Union. Although around 40% of Japan’s steel products are exported, preliminary trade statistics indicate that shipments were down 4.2% to 30.08 million tons in 2025, declining for the second consecutive year.
“The steel industry, with its high proportion of exports, will continue to face tough conditions in 2026 as well,”
said Tadashi Imai, Nippon Steel’s president and chief operating officer. Given last year’s weak demand for both domestic steel and exports, this sentiment is shared by many.
Major steelmakers have been working to consolidate and streamline production facilities in recent years in response to the situation. Nippon Steel began restructuring efforts around 2020, cutting its number of blast furnaces from 15 to 10. JFE Holdings suspended operations at one blast furnace in 2023 and plans to halt operations at another in fiscal 2027.
Major players in the industry do not foresee growth in the domestic market, and are therefore looking for new opportunities overseas.
Nippon Steel acquired U.S. Steel in 2025, and plans to make the U.S. market a pillar of future growth. The company is also building a new-steelworks in India in pursuit of its goal to produce 100 million tons of crude steel annually in 10 years by expanding capacity outside Japan. It produced 58 million tons in 2024, including U.S. Steel production.
JFE announced last month that it will invest 270 billion yen in a subsidiary of major Indian steelmaker JSW Steel. The subsidiary operates one blast furnace, meaning the investment has given JFE an integrated steelworks that will allow it to supply steel to meet demand there locally.
JFE is also weighing building an additional blast furnace in India.
“We will not be able to maintain or develop our technology unless we produce large quantities of steel,” said Eiji Hashimoto, chairman and CEO of Nippon Steel. “Scale is essential.”
· KUSHNER’S GAZA PLAN IGNORES THIS TRUTH: NO ISRAELI CONTROL, NO GAZA REBUILD
The latest glossy reconstruction vision for Gaza reads like a coastal real-estate brochure crossed with a Davos panel: luxury towers along the Mediterranean, data centers in the interior, industrial zones, rail lines, ports, airports—the works. The promise is seductive: rebuild Gaza, neutralize extremism through prosperity, and turn a war zone into a Middle Eastern Riviera.
It is also detached from reality.
The problem with the plan is not engineering. It’s power.
The first hole: security is treated as a footnote Every version of the plan assumes a post-conflict Gaza that is already pacified, demilitarized, and governable.
That Gaza does not exist. No serious investor, insurer, or operator builds ports, airports, rail hubs, or data centers in territory where armed factions can reconstitute underground, extort contractors, or restart a war on a political timetable.
This isn’t theoretical. Gaza has already demonstrated— repeatedly—that infrastructure becomes dual-use. Ports become smuggling hubs. Cement becomes tunnels.
Towers become sniper positions. Without continuous, coercive security control, reconstruction doesn’t neutralize conflict; it prepares the terrain for the next round.
Why One Big Ship Buyer Wants Shadow Fleet Tankers
GMS seeks a U.S. license to legally pay cash for sanctioned ‘floating rust buckets’.
Report by Wall Street Journal
The world’s largest cash buyer of ships for scrap is setting its sights on the shadowy tankers that ferry illicit oil from Iran, Russia and Venezuela.
GMS filed a request this month with the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control for a license to buy sanctioned ships.
The company’s founder and chief executive, Anil Sharma, says if OFAC grants the license it will help the U.S. slash the size of the so-called shadow or dark fleet by allowing sanctioned vessel owners to exit the industry.
The U.S., European Union and U.K. have stepped up actions to identify and impose sanctions on owners and operators of shadow vessels and to seize ships.
The U.S., which recently deposed Venezuelan strongman Nicolás Maduro, has ratcheted up pressure on illicit oil traders by seizing seven tankers—a fraction of the more than 2,000 vessels maritime intelligence firm Windward estimates is engaged in dark fleet activities.
“The U.S. cannot seize all these vessels,” Sharma said. Sanctioned shipowners can’t easily dispose of vessels. People and companies under U.S. sanctions are barred from doing business with American citizens and firms. They are also shut out of international financial systems that support dollar-denominated transactions.
GMS, which is incorporated in Maryland and headquartered in Dubai, argues that a legal mechanism for sanctioned owners to scrap ships would benefit the U.S. because it reduces the number of vessels that can carry illicit cargoes and provides revenue for U.S. banks and related industries.
“A lot of them are little more than floating rust buckets,” said Michelle Wiese Bockmann, a senior maritime intelligence analyst at Windward, who noted that shadow vessels that do carry insurance often sail under a false flag, invalidating coverage. “The dark fleet is an accident waiting to happen.” Scrap dealers like GMS act as middlemen. They buy and transport ships to specialist yards in Turkey, Bangladesh,
Pakistan and India where the vessel is stripped of its fixtures and fittings and its steel is melted or reused. Sharma says GMS is the only firm with the financing, experience and reputation to be trusted to take 100 or more dark fleet ships a year off the water.
“With all humility and modesty, I am the only guy who is capable of doing this because of the scale we have, number one,” Sharma said. “Number two, the U.S. background, and number three, the track record.”
Clarksons Research says 936 tankers are under sanction today, more than double the number at the beginning of last year and the equivalent of 16% of global tanker fleet capacity. The ships are, on average, more than 21 years old, seven years older than the average tanker on the ocean.
The Trump administration has shown no desire to help dark fleet operators. Claire O’Neill McCleskey, who until recently led OFAC’s compliance division, said it was unlikely the Trump administration would authorize a mechanism that provides payments to sanctioned shipowners.
Sharma said he knows multiple sanctioned shipowners who would like to scrap ships but continue in the shadow trades because they can’t sell the vessels and can’t afford to keep them idle. He suggested the U.S. could devise a scrapping system whereby shadow fleet operators pay a penalty to the U.S. government and the government puts conditions on the use of funds from the sale.
Sharma said GMS’s suggestions for a scrapping mechanism have been “well received” by OFAC officials. A treasury representative said the department doesn’t comment on license applications, but added: “To safeguard maritime safety, we are committed to responsible solutions to get these designated vessels off the water.”
Matthew Thomas, a lawyer at Blank Rome in Washington, D.C., who represents GMS, said the OFAC process usually takes months, “but GMS is urging policymakers to expedite their review due to the dangerous glut of dark fleet vessels.”
Baltic Shipping News 22nd January, 2026
BALTIC FORWARD ASSESSMENTS – THURSDAY 22 JANUARY 2026
BFA CAPESIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Jan 26 20,189 $/day -422
Feb 26 19,654 $/day -807
Mar 26 24,479 $/day -585
Apr 26 26,189 $/day 64
May 26 27,229 $/day -17
Jun 26 27,714 $/day 39
Q1 26 21,441 $/day -604
Q2 26 27,044 $/day 29
Q3 26 28,089 $/day -7
Q4 26 28,518 $/day 64
Q1 27 18,854 $/day 100
Q2 27 24,293 $/day 50
Cal 27 25,125 $/day 114
Cal 28 22,914 $/day 21
Cal 29 21,393 $/day -43
Cal 30 20,114 $/day -11
Cal 31 19,321 $/day 21
BFA PANAMAX 82
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Jan 26 13,132 $/day 25
Feb 26 14,707 $/day 21
Mar 26 16,839 $/day 43
Apr 26 17,089 $/day 13
May 26 16,736 $/day 65
Jun 26 16,396 $/day 103
Q1 26 14,893 $/day 30
Q2 26 16,740 $/day 60
Q3 26 15,439 $/day 18
Q4 26 14,711 $/day -28
Q1 27 12,926 $/day 15
Q2 27 14,355 $/day 82
Cal 27 13,946 $/day -25
Cal 28 13,579 $/day -35
Cal 29 13,328 $/day -14
Cal 30 13,105 $/day 0
Cal 31 12,902 $/day 4
BFA SUPRAMAX 63
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Cal 26 12,748 $/day 89
Feb 26 14,434 $/day 486
Mar 26 16,838 $/day 165
Apr 26 17,138 $/day 168
May 26 16,938 $/day 211
Jun 26 16,741 $/day 178
Q1 26 14,673 $/day 246
Q2 26 16,939 $/day 186
Q3 26 16,034 $/day 154
Q4 26 15,541 $/day 64
Q1 27 13,663 $/day 22
Q2 27 14,713 $/day 15
Cal 27 14,420 $/day -35
Cal 28 14,284 $/day -11
Cal 29 14,077 $/day -3
Cal 30 13,805 $/day 0
Cal 31 13,780 $/day 0
BFA SUPRAMAX 58
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Jan 26 10,714 $/day 89
Feb 26 12,400 $/day 486
Mar 26 14,804 $/day 165
Apr 26 15,104 $/day 168
May 26 14,904 $/day 211
Jun 26 14,707 $/day 178
Q1 26 12,639 $/day 246
Q2 26 14,905 $/day 186
Q3 26 14,000 $/day 154
Q4 26 13,507 $/day 64
Q1 27 11,629 $/day 22
Q2 27 12,679 $/day 15
Cal 27 12,386 $/day -35
Cal 28 12,250 $/day -11
Cal 29 12,043 $/day -3
Cal 30 11,771 $/day 0
Cal 31 11,746 $/day 0
BFA HANDYSIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Jan 26 10,975 $/day -5
Feb 26 10,880 $/day 70
Mar 26 13,560 $/day -90
Apr 26 13,370 $/day 90
May 26 13,110 $/day 30
Jun 26 12,860 $/day 20
Q1 26 11,805 $/day -8
Q2 26 13,113 $/day 46
Q3 26 12,800 $/day 20
Q4 26 12,440 $/day 0
Q1 27 11,250 $/day 0
Q2 27 12,000 $/day 0
Cal 27 11,900 $/day 0
Cal 28 11,530 $/day -10
Cal 29 11,300 $/day 0
Cal 30 11,245 $/day 0
Cal 31 11,239 $/day 0
BALTIC INDICES 22/01/2026
DRY INDEX: 1761 (- 42)
CAPESIZE INDEX: 2589 (- 143)
PANAMAX INDEX: 1614 (+8)
SUPRAMAX INDEX: 1019 (+23)
HANDYSIZE INDEX: 598 (+ 4)
BCI 182 TC AVG $/DAY 23479 (-1303)
BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 14525 (+67)
BSI TC AVG $/DAY 12885 (+292)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 10760 (+62)
TIMECHARTER
‘Lowlands Amber’ 2021 100309 dwt dely PMO 23/24 Jan trip via South Africa redel Singapore-Japan $19,500
‘Kydonia’ 2012 92828 dwt dely Singapore 20 Jan trip via EC South America redel SE Asia $16,350 – Cargill
‘Star Amethyst’ 2009 82123 dwt dely Sunda Straight 4 Jan trip via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan $15,500
‘Navios Herakles I’ 2019 82036 dwt dely EC South America 14 Jan trip redel Singapore-Japan $18,250+$825,000bb – Raffles
‘CCS Orchid’ 2017 81966 dwt dely Zhu Hai 24/25 Jan trip via Australia redel Singapore-Japan intention coal $19,500
‘Tan Yang Lun’ 2001 74329 dwt dely Hong Kong 22 Jan trip via Indo redel South China $8,500
‘Top Fortune’ 2017 61447 dwt dely Nueva Palmira 25
Jan trip redel South Korea $15,000 plus $500,000bb – Classic
‘Genco Bourgogne’ 2010 58018 dwt dely Norfolk 6/12 Feb trip redel EC Central America $15,000 – Drydel
‘Iskandar’ 2010 35774 dwt dely Nemrut Bay 16/17 Jan trip via Yesilovacik redel Port Everglades intention cement $7,750 plus
$150,000 gbb – Centurion
PERIOD
‘Florentia’ 2016 63340 dwt dely Abidjan 27/30 Jan 7/10 months redel worldwide $17,100 – Oldendorff
VOYAGES ORE
‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 5/7 Feb $7.73 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto
‘TBN’ 170000/10 Sudeste/Qingdao 11/17 Feb $22.50 fio 60000shinc/30000 shinc – Usiminas
COAL
‘TBN’ 75000/10 APCT-HPCT-DBCT/EC India 19/28
Feb $15.75 fio 40000shinc/40000shinc – SAIL
‘TBN’ 75000/10 Nacala/EC India 19/28 Feb $14.30 fio 33000sshex/40000shinc – SAIL
‘TBN’ 74000/10 Nacala/Vietnam 1/5 Feb $15.50 fio 30000shinc/8000shinc – Jindal Bulkers:
Fresh for Sale:
Cape “ENS GLORY” (173k dwt 2006 Bohai)
- Can give prompt C/Free delivery in West Africa – China range
Offers/Negos:
Coal Carrier “JP CARETTA” (88k dwt 2008 Imabari – Scrubber Fitted)
- Offers are invited by 17:00hrs (JST) on the 27th January 2026
Sales/Rumours:
Pmax “KT BIRDIE” (74k dwt 2011 Sasebo)
- Invited offers on the 21st of January, and we now understand that she has been sold at USD 16.5 mill to Greek interests.
Tankers:
Fresh for Sale:
LR1 “INF LIGHT” (72k dwt 2006 Dalian, Epoxy)
- Trading CPP in AG-WCI range
Offers/Negos:
MR1 “CHEMWAY ARROW” (38k dwt 2007 Shin Kurushima, Zinc – IMO II/III)
- Offers are invited by the 29th January 2026
MR2 “TOP GRAND” (50k dwt 2006 ShinA) – SSY DIRECT
- Inviting offers via a sealed bid auction held by the High Court of Malaysia. Offers must be submitted by 17:00hrs (Malaysia Time) on the
31st January 2026
Gas:
Offers/Negos:
LNGC “GRACE BARLERIA” (147k cbm 2007 HHI – ICE 1C)
- Offers are invited by 17:00hrs (JST) on the 26th January 2026
Baltic Wet Time Charter Averages ($ p/d)
VLCC 102,368 (+60)
Suezmax 90,896 (-4,254)
Aframax 78,232 (+3,298)
MR Atlantic 22,301 (-4,321)
Demo Prices
Bulkers – Delivery India LDT: 9001 – 20000 US$/LDT: 403.000 Tankers – Delivery India LDT: 15001 – 30000 US$/LDT: 413.000 Bunker Prices
Singapore VLSFO / MGO / IFO 380 – 450.00 / 628.50 / 384.50 Rotterdam VLSFO / MGO / IFO 380 – 429.00/ 660.00 / 371.50
Note of The Day:
Chinese Iron Ore Imports by Origin
In 2025, Chinese iron ore imports climbed 22.6 Mt on the year to 1,259.5 Mt, following increased shipments from Australia (+16.6 Mt to 759.5 Mt), Brazil (+4.3 Mt to 277.6 Mt) and South Africa (+3.9 Mt to 42.1 Mt), customs data show. In contrast, imports from Peru fell 5.2 Mt year-on- year to 17.2 Mt.
Chinese Bauxite Imports
Chinese bauxite imports eased 0.3 Mt year-on-year to 14.7 Mt in December, although total 2025 shipments stood 42.0 Mt above the prior year at 200.8 Mt, customs data show. In 2025, imports from Guinea and
Turkey rose 38.9 Mt and 0.6 Mt to a respective 149.2 Mt and 3.1 Mt. Conversely, shipments from Australia dipped 2.5 Mt to 37.3 Mt.
Oil Fundamental
China’s Clean Oil Product Imports Fall to Ten-Month Low
China’s clean oil product imports dropped by 130K b/d m-o-m to 380K b/d in December, the lowest level since February, according to China customs data. Despite the monthly decline, this is a 130K b/d y-o-y rise. Arrivals from the FSU and the Middle East decreased by 50K b/d m-o-m to 50K b/d and by 50K b/d m-o-m to 140K b/d respectively.
Meanwhile, volumes from Europe increased by 20K b/d m-o-m to 60K b/d.
Arrivals from the Subcontinent were also up by 20K b/d m-o-m to 60K b/d.
(all details given in good faith but without guarantee)
Baltic Exchange Index – 22 JANUARY 2026
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 2589 (+ 143)
Route Description Value($) Change
====== =================================== ========
C2 170000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 10.431 – 0.044
C3 170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 21.886 – 0.064
C5 160-170000 mt W Australia to Qingdao 7.780 – 0.845
C7 160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 13.588 + 0.019
C8_182 182000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 26,875 – 156
C9_182 182000mt Cont/Med Trip China/Japan 47,331 + 164
C10_182 182000mt China/Japan T/P RV 18,836 – 3541
C14_182 182000mt China-Brazil or W.Africa RV 25,523 – 238
C16_182 182000mt Far East – Atlantic BH 4,461 – 11
C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 15.630 – 0.034
========================================== ========
5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 19,976 – 1303
5TC_182 Weighted Timecharter Average 23,479 – 1303
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 22 JANUARY 2026
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,614 (+ 8)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ================================= ========
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 14,050 + 77
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 21,914 + 75
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 13,155 + 256
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 8,313 + 91
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 15,669 – 111
====== ================================= =======
P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 14,525 + 67
The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ================================= ========
P5_82 S. China Indo RV 10,784 + 84
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 51.943 + 0.036
P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 38.107 + 0.072
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 22 JANUARY 2026
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1019 (+ 23)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ========================================= ===
S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 16,158 – 242
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 22,129 – 135
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 11,625 + 1406
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 9,740 + 240
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero 22,943 – 36
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 10,579 + 65
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 18,236 0
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 10,286 + 222
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 14,621 – 11
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 7,938 + 232
S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 11,567 + 159
====== ========================================= =====
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 12,885 + 292
S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 10,267 + 292
Baltic Exchange Index – 22 JANUARY 2026
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 598 (+ 4)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== ======================================== ======
HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 6,907 + 36
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 8,421 + 42
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 17,189 + 83
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Passero 15,921 + 285
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 10,006 + 12
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn 9,325 + 12
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 8,388 + 13
====== ======================================== ======
7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 10,760 + 62
(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd., 2026
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