India’s US Crude Imports for October highest since 2022

November Shipments likely 4/450,000 Barrels Per Day (BPD) from average 300,000 BPD.

India’s oil imports from the U.S. have risen to their highest level since 2022 in October, under-lining bargain hunting by Indian Refiners rather than a structural shift against the Tariffs for India over purchase of discount from Russia. Kpler, the global data and analytics provider, shows US crude imports rising to 540,000 bpd and likely to close the month at about 575,000 bpd. A strong arbitrage, wider spread between Brent and WTI (West Texas Intermediary, a US Benchmark crude), as well as lack of Chinese demand made American shipments competitive for Indian refiners on delivered basis.

After Reliance Industries, Indian Oil says it will comply with curbs on Russian Oil. Indian Oil posted a profit of Rs. 7,610Cr in the July- September quarter, as against Rs.180Cr a year ago.

Union Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari called for an “innovatively simple, viable, efficient, and credible financial model to raise Capital for Shipbuilding and develop an independent shipping network capable of attracting global investors. He said, a robust capital-building strategy is crucial for India to emerge among the top five maritime powers globally. Endorsing Gadkari’s vision, the Union Shipping Minister Sarbananda Sonowal said, “We pay $70-75 billion annually to foreign countries because we lack sufficient vessels. In the backdrop of persistent high logistics costs, the failure of previous water taxi contracts in Mumbai, the withdrawal of Cruise ship services by the private operators. The Transport – Minister said “The country’s development hinges on logistics. Indian logistics costs are 16% of GDP, compared to 8% for China and 12% for Europe.

Can the world break China’s rare earth grip?

In recent weeks, the US has signed multiple deals to source rare-earth minerals. India, too has been active like many other nations. China is the dominating country in the world for supply of the Rare Earths.

Last week, the US signed an agreement with Australia, a country keen to become a major supplier to the world. In his belligerent tyle Trump claimed that in one year there will be so much of critical minerals and rare earths that the world will not know what with it. Trump signed similar deals with Thailand and Malaysia to diversify the supply chain, too dependent on China. Breaking China’s grip in the supply of rare earth minerals will take lot of time. Australia will take a decade to become a long-term supplier. The earliest a strong and transparent market for rare earths can emerge only in 2030.

India, does not have enough domestic supply of these minerals. It has been looking for them in South America and Africa. The Government has proposed a Rs.7,350 Cr scheme to boost domestic manufacturing.

China’s restriction of transfer of technology is a big stumbling block. Japan and Germany have the machinery but they are too pricy.

China’s biggest advantage is the cost of production. It will therefore stifle any other Government’s attempts to compete.

China’s Growth Gap declined to 4.8% in July-September, below the 5% target for the first time in four quarters, owing to trade tensions with the US and continuing problems in their property market. The nominal growth paints a picture of slow growth momentum. China has faced deflation for several months now, reflecting weak consumer demand and industrial over capacity. Prices are falling in China does not bode well for investment intentions and wage growth, both of which are currently being overshadowed by the fiscal stimulus, announced last year.

Deflation is particularly worrying as it allows China to dump cheaper goods into other markets, potentially hurting competitiveness.

Europe’s imports of diesel and jet fuel are-on-course for a record- breaking month as traders gear up for the winter and a clampdown on petroleum products made with Russian crude.

Everyone agrees that the US and China can hurt each other a lot. Markets also appear to believe that neither can win. It’s wise to brace for this pattern to continue as each side works out whether it has the better cards.

China is also guided by Xi Jinping’s strategic imperative to be self- reliant and may well be overconfident. As one Chinese expert recently put it, when asked about the risk of losing access to US consumers: “We don’t care. China has been here for 5,000 years. Most of the time, there was no United States, and we survived.”

The outlines of the deal appear to be that China will buy more US soybeans and also place an order for planes with Boeing Co.

• concessions that experts suggested would cost the country very little
• while the US abandons its plan for an extra tariff of 100% on Chinese goods. None of this affects the heart of the issue, and it remains unclear exactly how far China will relent on its plans to control exports of rare earths, vital for a range of technologies, more tightly. There’s still much to learn.

Last week, President Trump demolished the East Wing of the White House, acknowledged demanding hundreds of millions of dollars from his own government and extended a campaign of blowing up boats in foreign waters that legal specialists describe as unlawful.

This morning, somewhere between Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo, he returned to a different, norm-busting leitmotif of a presidency intended to maximize his personal power: teasing the idea of running for a constitutionally prohibited third term.

“I would love to do it,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One.

He added, not entirely convincingly, that he hadn’t really thought about it

• although his allies certainly have.

It’s unclear whether Trump, who survived two assassination attempts last year and would be the oldest president in history by the time he leaves office, is serious. The 22nd Amendment plainly states that no one can be elected president more than twice. Legally speaking, the discussion — and this newsletter — could end right here.

Who will win the War Between the U.S. and China?

China is winning the trade war against America by effectively retaliating against tariffs and restrictions, developing new global trading norms, and strengthening its position as a techno-industrial superpower. Despite facing challenges like a struggling property market and overcapacity, China’s ability to withstand American pressure and its growing influence in global trade are solidifying its position. The trade war has ultimately made both countries weaker, as the retreat from open commerce harms everyone. @The Economist

China is breathing more easily than America, for three reasons. First, it has proved able to withstand American coercion and deft at retaliating, achieving what is known in the jargon as “escalatory dominance”. Some of Mr Trump’s critics attribute this to taco (Trump Always Chickens Out). It also reflects China’s underlying power, preparation and skill. The “Liberation Day” tariffs imposed by Mr Trump on China in April were reversed after Wall Street slumped.

Recently, after China imposed limits on exports of the rare earths used in high-tech manufacturing, Mr Trump threatened 100% tariffs, only to back down again. His threats to cripple China through a near-total embargo are not credible because doing so would damage America, too. Those who assert that China is in crisis should note that this year its Stock Market has risen by 34% in dollar terms, double the rise for the S&P 500 index.

For decades, India’s export engine has been powered by oil and petroleum products. Now, electronics is moving in fast, and could soon take its place as the second-largest export category. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce & Industry, in the first six months of FY26 electronics exports surged 42% to about $22.2 billion from $15.6 billion a year earlier, the fastest-growing among the top 30 export categories.

By contrast, petroleum product exports fell 16.4% to $30.6 billion from $36.6 billion. Engineering products led overall exports at $59.3 billion (up 5.3%) in the same period.

The gap between electronics and petroleum is shrinking, and if the pace holds, electronics could take second place after engineering within a few years.

What this really means is: India’s export DNA is shifting.

·        The U.S. LNG Boom Could Make

Energy More Expensive for Americans

U.S. LNG export capacity is set to double by 2029, diverting more gas from domestic markets to higher-paying foreign buyers.

Rising demand from power plants, manufacturers, and households is tightening supply and pushing prices upward.

Analysts warn that if production plateaus, America could face a domestic energy crunch—and possible political backlash over exports.

China and ASEAN sign upgraded free trade

pact to counter impact of Trump tariffs

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China on Tuesday signed an upgraded version of their FTA during the summit in Kaula Lumpur, Malaysia. The deal, which expands co-operation into new sectors, comes as countries seek to mitigate the effects of global trade tensions, particularly with the U.S.

What does the FTA upgrade entail?

The newly signed ASEAN-China FTA modernises the existing framework, which originally came into force in 2010. Negotiations for the upgrade began in November 2022 and concluded in May this year, shortly after Donald Trump imposed sweeping tariffs on major US trading partners.

The upgraded pact features new sections covering the digital economy, green economy and other emerging industries China had previously indicated that the agreement would improve the market in sectors such as agriculture, the digital economy and pharmaceuticals between China and ASEAN.

With the ASEAN countries careful not to pick sides between the US and China despite being mauled by the Trump tariffs, Prime Minister Narendra Modi told the region’s leaders Sunday that the India-ASEAN partnership, representing nearly one-fourth of the world’s population, is “emerging as a robust foundation for global stability and development” in “this era of uncertainties”.

And with China in mind, he declared 2026 as the ‘ASEAN-India Year of Maritime Cooperation’. Beijing’s assertions in regional waters and the Indo-Pacific have unsettled many in ASEAN although China remains the grouping’s largest trading partner.

Addressing the ASEAN-India leaders’ summit in Kuala Lumpur via virtual mode, Modi said, “The 21st century is our century, the century of India and ASEAN. I am confident that the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and the goal of Viksit Bharat 2047 will build a bright future for all of humanity. Alongside all of you, India is committed to working shoulder to shoulder in this direction.”

The New Eurasian Order

America Must Link Its Atlantic and Pacific Strategies

On October 28, 2024, a group of South Korean intelligence officials briefed NATO members and the alliance’s three other Indo-Pacific partners—Australia, Japan, and New Zealand—on a shocking development in the war in Ukraine: North Korea’s deployment of thousands of its troops to Russia’s Kursk region to aid Moscow’s war effort. The fact that Seoul sent its top intelligence analysts to Brussels for the briefing was nearly as stunning as North Korea’s decision to enter the war in Ukraine.

Both developments reflected a new reality. The United States’ adversaries are coordinating with one another in unprecedented ways, creating a more unified theater of competition in Eurasia. In response, U.S. allies are coalescing. For a few years, the United States led that effort. In 2021, it formed AUKUS, a security arrangement with Australia and the United Kingdom. In 2022, NATO began inviting Asian countries to participate in its annual summits. And in 2024, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and the EU created a coalition to loosen China’s grip over pharmaceutical supply chains.

Today, however, the United States appears to be dispensing with a transregional approach to great-power competition. In May, Elbridge Colby, the undersecretary of defence for policy, dissuaded British officials from sending an aircraft carrier on a scheduled deployment to the Indo-Pacific. The gist of Colby’s position, according to an anonymous source quoted by Politico, was simple: “We don’t want you there.” He urged them to focus instead on threats closer to home—namely, Russia.

Washington is now encouraging its Asian and European allies to stick to their neighbourhoods—a throwback foreign policy that is ill suited to the current moment. China and Russia are synchronizing their transgressions and sharing weapons and know-how. Together,

they pose a threat more formidable than any the United States has faced in decades. The lines between Asia and Europe are blurring, and crises on one continent have spillover effects in the other. The United States should try to influence the new networks its allies are crafting, not resist them. Otherwise, Washington may find itself on the fringes of a new global order.

Japan, US agree to shipbuilding cooperation as China builds capacity

Allies sign MOU during Trump’s visit with eye on investment in American industry

Japan and the U.S. on Tuesday signed a MOU to co-operate on expanding shipbuilding capacity and making related investment in the U.S., amid share concern about China’s growing footprint in a field closely linked to economic security.

One of the most closely watched meetings on the margins of APEC is likely to be a Trump face-off with China’s Xi. The White House has said they will meet Thursday morning, although the Chinese side has yet to confirm this. Negotiators from both countries spent last weekend hammering out a “framework” for the leaders to discuss.

Trade, rare-earth minerals and TikTok are among the topics Trump and Xi are expected to talk about. Speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One during the short flight from Japan to South Korea, Trump touched on another: Taiwan.

Some observers have raised concerns that the U.S. president, with his penchant for dealmaking, could bend on Taiwan, such as by saying he “opposes” its independence. Beijing claims Taiwan as its own, and such language would be considered a meaningful change from Washington’s boilerplate position that it “does not support” independence.

“I don’t know that we’ll even speak about Taiwan,” Trump said, according to NBC News. “I’m not sure. I mean, he may want to ask about it. There’s not that much to ask about it. Taiwan is Taiwan.”

·        Nakilat locks in South Korean financing for its incoming wave of LNG newbuildings

Company approaches ‘pivotal’ 2026 as it inches up quarterly returns
Qatari gas shipowning giant Nakilat has secured a financing agreement for 25 LNG carrier newbuildings which are scheduled to start delivering from next year.

Reporting third quarter results, Doha-listed Nakilat said it has improved its financial flexibility through a financing agreement with the ExiM Bank of Korea for the delivery of the vessels.

The only way for capesize earnings is up in 2026

China’s demand for iron ore is shifting from construction to vehicles

Robust global demand for iron ore will continue to strengthen capesize earnings going into 2026, analysts say.

Why? China.

Vale iron ore production ramps up to pre-dam disaster levels

Disaster has had a years-long impact on Brazilian miner Iron ore production by Brazilian mining giant Vale has risen to the highest level since before the 2019 dam disaster.

The Brumadinho dam collapse, which killed 270 people, has had a years-long impact on the company’s production capacity, as well as substantial environmental and economic impacts.

Iron ore production rose 4% during the third quarter of this year to 94.4m tonnes.

Jinhui clears out another ageing supramax

Oslo-listed Jinhui Shipping and Transportation has sold another of its older supramax bulk carriers as part of its ongoing fleet renewal drive.

The Hong Kong-based owner said it agreed to dispose of a 2012-built, 56,469-dwt Jin Mao for $13.2m to China’s New Unite Marine. The vessel, built at Jiangsu Hantong Ship Heavy Industry, will be delivered free of charter, the company said.

Jinhui acquired the ship in 2022 from South Korea’s Kmarin for about $16.5m, when it was named Pacific Crown. The vessel’s unaudited net book value as of end-September stood at $13.39m, meaning the company will book a small loss of around $0.2m on the disposal.

The company said proceeds from the sale will be used to repay short- term debt, settle payables, and bolster liquidity reserves, helping to reduce interest costs and improve its balance sheet.

The sale continues Jinhui’s drive to streamline its fleet and cut exposure to older tonnage. The company has been steadily reshaping its portfolio over the year, offloading several older supramaxes after adding modern eco-design tonnage. Most recently, Jinhui also signalled a clear focus on fleet renewal, committing about $99m for three ultramax newbuildings at Jiangmen Nanyang Ship Engineering.

The company currently controls a fleet of 29 vessels, comprising 21 owned ships and eight chartered-in units with a combined capacity of about 2.2m dwt. Two of the company’s owned ships are under sale and leaseback deals, and one has been reclassified as held for sale.

Port fees: from temporary problem to structural risk to trade?

Sagitta Marine managing director Thomas Zaidman on what happens if fair and unimpeded port access becomes a tool of trade policy.

After decades lying in the long grass, geopolitical forces have re- emerged as a key operational risk. This is not to say that politicians especially target shipping and vessel operators as a policy tool; most have only a very limited idea of its size, scale and importance to the global economy.

True, sanctions hit shipping, but until recently, the impact has been a secondary effect, focusing mostly on the companies carrying specific cargoes and the personnel who lead them. The regional conflicts of the last three years have changed all that, with financial penalties hitting tonnage operators as well as commodity producers and importers.

Away from the real battlefield, the ongoing trade tensions between the US and China and others also have their weapons, targets and victims.

The USTR port fees levied by the US on China-built or controlled ships – and their tit-for-tat counterparts – are viewed with typical industry pragmatism as a short-term problem to be navigated; a cost to be passed on or swallowed.

One doesn’t have to be the most pessimistic voice in the room to observe that it is possible to see the fees as the first shot in a bigger war, a potential precursor to broader weaponisation of the maritime sector.

The industry’s unique approach to global regulation has long given it a pass where the impacts on the ability to trade are concerned. As a somewhat ‘extra-jurisdictional’ business, it has preferred to get on with things without much attention to the risk of disruption.

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the new trade war is how resilient shipping supply chains have been, but there is no guarantee that this will continue to be the case.

If fair and unimpeded port access becomes a tool of trade policy rather than supply and demand, the implications are far more serious than some additional costs. If a portion of the fleet – and a large one if we consider China-built hulls – faces discrimination in terms of berth availability, then the impact, if prolonged, would be severe.

This need not only be in primary or mainlane trades. If selective port access becomes policy rather than market-driven, the result would be a systemic shock — if not a crisis, then something uncomfortably close.

In a worst-case scenario, the effect on global fleet liquidity would be effectively to put a section of the global fleet beyond use, out of the market and forced to seek layup for lack of opportunity. That change in fleet dynamics could have a seismic impact not just on capacity but on ship values, finance and the insurance markets too.

This underlines the importance of incorporating geopolitical premiums into fleet allocation and chartering strategies. On a more prosaic level, the tens of thousands of vendors and suppliers which owe their existence to the global fleet could see their customer base shrink and perhaps disappear.

It has become a maxim of this new world order that disruption is a commonplace and that the costs, not of compliance but of navigating change, will continue to rise. Whether it makes for a good headline depends largely on the location from which you are reading it.

As the rules-based trading environment changes, perhaps forever, the maritime industry must adapt its risk frameworks rather than wait for political clarity.

Shipping has successfully navigated all manner of risk over the last 80 years, but a more direct impact on its day-to-day operations it would make the economic reversals and fragmentation of that period look like small beer by comparison to what comes next.

Does this have to happen? Of course not: the ability to change course is always at hand, even in congested waters.

Perhaps it will prove the impetus for the industry to become much more vocal, more participatory and more assertive in advocating more effectively for its operational integrity and the safety of its people, rather than relying on governments, whose priorities have changed for good.

• Is proposed Panama LPG pipeline a ‘solution in search of a problem’?

US LPG exports continue to rise but neopanamax canal locks have capacity limits and transits are increasingly weighted towards containerships.

Panama Canal Authority believes pipeline will allow US exporters to reduce forward vessel requirements and hedge against future droughts.

Sceptics argue that the economics of the project will be difficult and customers prefer to keep cargo on a single vessel between origin and destination.

China Plus One strategy hangs in the balance amid US-Vietnam tariff discussions

New trade deal expected between the US and Vietnam.

20% tariffs on Vietnam could challenge strong growth in exports to the US. But some goods could be exempted from tariffs.

Meanwhile, China finds a new home in Europe to offset lost exports to the US.

Top shipping organisations reaffirm support for IMO as global regulator

In light of this month’s surprise move by member states to put the Net- Zero Framework (NZF) on ice, the world’s leading shipping organisations have reaffirmed their support to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as the global regulator for international shipping.

The Tripartite Forum of shipbuilders, shipowners and classification societies, which features the likes of BIMCO, INTERCARGO, INTERTANKO, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) among others, convened recently for their annual conference in Busan, South Korea, during which they all came out in support of the beleaguered IMO, which has endured one of its toughest months.

Delegates at the Marine Environment Protection Committee’s (MEPC) extraordinary session in London voted on October 18 to adjourn NZF discussions for 12 months after failing to reach consensus or call a vote on the draft amendments to MARPOL Annex VI, which include the key elements of the framework. How each country voted is carried below.

The decision pushes any adoption of the IMO Net-Zero Framework into late 2026 at the earliest, complicating the timeline for meeting the organisation’s greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction strategy agreed in 2023.

Arsenio Dominguez, the IMO’s secretary-general, told delegates at the end of the MEPC gathering: “My plea to you is not to repeat the way we have negotiated this week, does not happen again. It does not help yourselves, and it does not help the organisation.”

A statement from the Sustainable Shipping Initiative (SSI) suggested the vote highlights some of the vulnerabilities of the IMO, the growing politicisation of decision-making and fragmented consensus between regions.

“We anticipate wider impacts from how national administrations respond, the evolution of regional regulations and the signals this sends out to the financial markets who are looking for long-term clarity,” SSI warned.

• Lessons in fleet flexibility: How GESCO is preparing for net zero

The Great Eastern Shipping Company (GESCO) is staying agile on the path to net zero.

In a time of evolving regulatory frameworks and fuel options, GESCO is taking a pragmatic approach to decarbonization. From biofuel trials to energy-saving retrofits and digital platforms, GESCO’s strategy offers valuable insights for shipowners facing similar challenges.

Baltic News 28^th October 2025

BALTIC INDICES 28/10/2025

DRY        INDEX:     1950 (-26)

CAPESIZE  INDEX:     2784 (-54)

PANAMAX   INDEX:     1904 (-17)

SUPRAMAX  INDEX:     1350 (-11)

HANDYSIZE INDEX:     870 (-4)

BCI    TC AVG $/DAY 23089 (- 445)
BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 17138 (- 154)
BSI    TC AVG $/DAY 17069 (- 139)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 15669 (-67)

TIMECHARTER

‘Yangze 18’ 2018 81783 dwt dely Hong Kong 27 Oct trip via Australia redel India $18,500 – Tata NYK

‘Mario’ 2020 81606 dwt dely PMO 2/3 Nov trip via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan $17,000 – Bunge

‘Odysseas I’ 2013 81540 dwt dely Maengbang 27 Oct trip via Nopac redel Japan intention petcoke $19,000 – Daiichi

VOYAGES
ORE

‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 12/14 Nov $9.25 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto

‘Mercuria TBN ‘ 170000/10 Seven Islands/Qingdao 15/24 Nov $29.00 fio 60000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto

‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 12/14 Nov $9.25 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Panocean

‘TBN’ 160000/10 Port Hedland/Qingdao 12/14 Nov

$9.25 fio 80000shinc/30000 shinc – BHP

COAL

‘GNS Seoul TBN’ 80000/10 Samarinda/Hosan 6/12 Nov $10.15 fio 12000satpmshex/15000shinc – Kepco tender

BALTIC FORWARD ASSESSMENTS – TUESDAY 28 OCTOBER 2025
BFA CAPESIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Oct 25 16,245 $/day -22 ↓
Nov 25 16,395 $/day -264 ↓
Dec 25 15,774 $/day -75 ↓
Jan 26 13,492 $/day 14 ↑
Feb 26 12,184 $/day 68 ↑
Mar 26 13,991 $/day 15 ↑
Q4 25 16,138 $/day -120 ↓
Q1 26 13,222 $/day 32 ↑
Q2 26 14,770 $/day -47 ↓
Q3 26 14,142 $/day -39 ↓
Q4 26 13,609 $/day 42 ↑
Q1 27 11,804 $/day -23 ↓
Cal 26 13,936 $/day -3 ↓
Cal 27 12,729 $/day -29 ↓
Cal 28 12,729 $/day 10 ↑
Cal 29 12,659 $/day -4 ↓
Cal 30 12,656 $/day -1 ↓
Cal 31 12,681 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 32 12,701 $/day 7 ↑

FA SUPRAMAX 63
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Oct 25 17,716 $/day -21 ↓
Nov 25 16,184 $/day -57 ↓
Dec 25 15,855 $/day -36 ↓
Jan 26 13,602 $/day 107 ↑
Feb 26 11,991 $/day 136 ↑
Mar 26 13,930 $/day 146 ↑
Q4 25 16,585 $/day -38 ↓
Q1 26 13,174 $/day 129 ↑
Q2 26 15,055 $/day -11 ↓
Q3 26 15,020 $/day -18 ↓
Q4 26 14,463 $/day -14 ↓
Q1 27 12,359 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 26 14,428 $/day 22 ↑
Cal 27 13,405 $/day -11 ↓
Cal 28 13,477 $/day 0 →
Cal 29 13,427 $/day 11 ↑
Cal 30 13,488 $/day 8 ↑
Cal 31 13,605 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 32 13,498 $/day 7 ↑

BFA SUPRAMAX 58
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Oct 25 15,682 $/day -21 ↓
Nov 25 14,150 $/day -57 ↓
Dec 25 13,821 $/day -36
Jan 26 11,568 $/day 107 ↑
Feb 26 9,957 $/day 136 ↑
Mar 26 11,896 $/day 146 ↑
Q4 25 14,551 $/day -38 ↓
Q1 26 11,140 $/day 129 ↑
Q2 26 13,021 $/day -11 ↓
Q3 26 12,986 $/day -18 ↓
Q4 26 12,429 $/day -14 ↓
Q1 27 10,325 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 26 12,394 $/day 22 ↑
Cal 27 11,371 $/day -11 ↓
Cal 28 11,443 $/day 0 →
Cal 29 11,393 $/day 11 ↑
Cal 30 11,454 $/day 8 ↑
Cal 31 11,571 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 32 11,464 $/day 7 ↑

BFA HANDYSIZE
PERIOD VALUE CHANGE
Oct 25 15,670 $/day 0 →
Nov 25 14,570 $/day 50 ↑
Dec 25 14,180 $/day 40 ↑
Jan 26 11,190 $/day 10 ↑
Feb 26 9,960 $/day 0 →
Mar 26 11,470 $/day 10 ↑
Q4 25 14,807 $/day 30 ↑
Q1 26 10,873 $/day 6 ↑
Q2 26 12,580 $/day 10 ↑
Q3 26 12,340 $/day 10 ↑
Q4 26 11,870 $/day 0 →
Q1 27 10,180 $/day 0 →
Cal 26 11,916 $/day 7 ↑
Cal 27 11,120 $/day 0 →
Cal 28 10,935 $/day 0 →
Cal 29 10,960 $/day 0 →
Cal 30 11,060 $/day 0 →
Cal 31 11,170 $/day 0 →
Cal 32 11,260 $/day 0 →

CAPESIZE

The market continued to ease today in the Pacific despite two miners re- entering the market and brokers noting generally healthy volumes.

Freight levels on C5 slipped further, with fixtures reported around $9.25, leading the index down by 0.278 to $9.347. From South Brazil and West Africa to China, conditions remained muted, with sentiment described as slightly softer amid limited fresh activity. The C3 index declined by 0.287 to $22.477. In contrast, the North Atlantic showed a touch more positivity, with reports of a trans-Atlantic fixture concluded at levels above the C8 index. A fronthaul fixture from Seven Islands to China also surfaced at improved rates, lifting the C9 index by $914. Despite these isolated gains, overall market sentiment remained subdued, with the BCI 5TC slipping by $445 to close at $23,089.

Atlantic

Rio Tinto is reported to have fixed a Mercuria TBN, linked to Flag Seaman (176,460 2013) for 170,000/10 Seven Islands to Qingdao 15/24 November at $29.00. CSN is reported to have fixed last night the H Line controlled HL Gladstone (179,851 2011) for 170,000/10 Itaguai to Qingdao 30 November/2 December, further details have not come to light.

Asia

Rio Tinto fixed a TBN for 170,000/10 Dampier to Qingdao 12/14

November at $9.25, and BHP fixed a TBN for 160,000/10 Port Hedland to Qingdao 12/14 November at $9.25, lacking further details.

PANAMAX

A further subdued day for the Panamax market with most routes experiencing sizeable losses, a national holiday in Greece impacting too. In the Atlantic, cheap voyage rates were muted for trans-Atlantic business equating to below index timecharter equivalents, accordingly with weak fundamentals in Charterers favour, the limited bids available on timecharter trips were vastly reduced in turn testing the resolve of most owners. South America remained muted, with little support from the FFA market despite yesterday’s positive push. Asia continued under pressure with limited fresh demand now negatively playing out against an ever-increasing build up for the tonnage count, the immediate outlooks bearish. Accordingly, the BPI timecharter index yielded a further correction of $154 to close at $17,138 on publishing.

Atlantic

Activity in the basin remained scarce but included reports of the scrubber fitted Mario (81,606 2020) PMO 2/3 November fixed for a trip via EC South America redelivery Singapore-Japan at $17,000 with Bunge whilst the Star Atlas (81,136 2021) sailed Tieshan 22 September eta EC South America 28 October was rumoured fixed for a South America round trip, but further details were lacking.

Asia

In the North Messrs NYK were linked to the scrubber fitted Bright Venture (81,487 2020) Yantai 26 October for a trip via North China redelivery Japan however further details had yet to come to light. Ex Australia the Yangze 23 (82,367 2022) CJK 29/31 October fixed for a trip via Australia redelivery North China at an unspecified rate in the upper $18,000’s, whilst conflicting rates of $20,000 and $21,000 were mentioned on the Guang Bo (82,245 2023) Qinzhou 29 October for a trip via WC Australia redelivery Singapore-Japan.

SUPRAMAX

The general pattern for the sector remained unchanged today as both the Atlantic and Asian arenas continued to lose ground. The US Gulf remained under strong downward pressure as demand lacked fresh impetus. The Continent-Mediterranean also had a rather limited approach with limited fresh activity surfacing. The South Atlantic similarly was also a rather muted, brokers saying limited fresh enquiry was not helping the growing number of units open. The collecting mode from both sides continued today in Asia, although some felt demand remained from the NoPac and Australasia very little fresh information surfaced, and the south remained rather negative. The 11TC average fell a further $139 to finish at $17,069.

HANDYSIZE

A rather lacklustre affair today for the sector, in the Atlantic Greek holidays somewhat slowed activity and the general mood was rather negative. The only bright spark seemed to be continued demand for scrap from the Continent although that showed signs of a plateau being reached. Both the US Gulf and South America lost further ground with limited fresh enquiry and a slight increase in prompt tonnage availability. A rather missed bag from Asia, again little fresh information was seen but the areas generally remained finely balanced with no clear direction becoming apparent. The 7TC average finished the day down $67 at $15,669.

Baltic Exchange Index – 28 OCTOBER 2025 Baltic Exchange Capesize 182 Index
Route Description Value Change
C8_182 182000mt Gib/Hamburg transatlantic RV 24,456 – 125
C9_182 182000mt Cont-Med trip China-Japan 47,806 – 862
C10_182 182000mt China-Japan transpacific RV 26,723 – 1450
314_182 182000mt China-Brazil round voyage 26,182 – 795
C16_182 182000mt Backhaul 9,383 – 117

C5TC 182 Weighted Timecharter Average 26,716 – 631

Baltic Exchange Index – 28 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index  2784 (- 54)
Route Description Value($) Change
C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 11.100 – 0.063
C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 22.477 – 0.287
C5 160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao 9.347 – 0.278
C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 12.365 + 0.027
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 21,363 + 69
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan 44,000 + 917
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 23,479 – 1512
C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 22,650 – 732
C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero 5,728 – 128
C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 17.189 – 0.139

5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 23,089 – 445

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 28 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,904 (-17)
Route Description Value ($) Change
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 18,245 – 378
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 25,032 +90
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 17,398 – 167
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 10,200 – 81
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 15,680 – 61

P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 17,138 – 154

The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
P5_82 S. China Indo RV 17,631 – 119
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 55.357 – 0.093
P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 38.686 – 0.078

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82 Asia Index – 28 October 2025
Route Description Size (MT) Value($) Change

P5_82 S.China one Indo RV 17,631 -119

Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 28 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1350 (-11)
Route Description Value ($) Change

S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 22,679 – 38
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 26,368 – 321
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 15,764 + 35
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 13,900 – 150
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero 25,146 – 618
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 14,354 – 64
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 21,396 – 118
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 17,375 – 92
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 17,275 – 421
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 12,889 – 18
S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 14,538 – 29
====== ========================================= =======
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 17,069 – 139
S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 15,035 – 139

Baltic Exchange Supramax Asia Index – 28 October 2025
Route Description Value($) Change

S2_63 N.China one Austr or Pac RV 15,764 +35
S8_63 S.China via Indonesia/Ec India 17,375 -92
S10_63 S.China via Indo/S.China 12,889 -18
S3TC Weighted Time Charter Average 15,397 -18

Baltic Exchange Index – 28 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 870 (- 4)
Route Description Value ($) Change

HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 11,957 – 29
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 14,793 – 136
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 22,156 – 172
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Passero22,300 – 150
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 14,371 – 15
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jp 13,069 – 12
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 12,800 – 13

7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 15,669 – 67

(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd 2025

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