What China is now doing with the zinc industry could pull the rug from under everyone.

And India’s Vedanta Group, specifically Hindustan Zinc, is right in the crosshairs.

See, China single-handedly dominates the world of Zinc.

They account for over 50% of global production AND consumption. This means any shift in their domestic market sends tidal waves across the globe.

The primary use for zinc? Galvanising steel. Making it strong and corrosion-resistant

For years, China’s insatiable real estate boom devoured this galvanised steel

But that boom is now a bust. A 5yr long collapse that has been DEVASTATING. With empty cities and bankrupt developers, the demand for steel, and therefore zinc, simply evaporated.

The fallout was predictable.

Several Chinese zinc smelters shut down. Many others that stayed open were forced to operate at a fraction of their capacity.

They were trapped. Global zinc prices were too subdued to justify exporting, and domestic demand was dead.

But since April of this year, the script completely flipped

Global zinc prices have been on an absolute tear, surging to new highs

This has been a phenomenal party for global producers.

Hindustan Zinc in India has been a massive beneficiary.

Everyone was making money. But this price spike also served as a dinner bell for China.

You see, those high global prices have created a HUGE cost arbitrage for Chinese smelters.

They can fire up their idle or underutilised factories and export their zinc at a massive profit. The timing is perfect for them.

Global demand for zinc is currently very strong.

There’s a massive infrastructure renewal wave underway in Europe, India and the Middle East.

So you have a perfect scenario for China: high global prices, strong external demand, and a mountain of unused domestic capacity ready to be unleashed.

The conclusion is almost inevitable.

Chinese producers have begun to aggressively tap export markets.

More supply almost always means one thing: lower prices. This alone is enough to negatively impact the earnings of every producer, including Hindustan Zinc.

But what if it gets worse?

What if China decides to use India as a dumping ground for its surplus zinc at a lower price?

We have seen them do this for years with steel and various other metals, crippling local industries

If that happens, it’s not just a price correction for Hindustan Zinc. It becomes a bigger problem

Thus, will be very important to track how aggressive Chinese players go here.

Anyhow, did you know this?

China’s rare-earth miners flying high as export rules tighten

Prices, profits and shares trend upward amid high-stakes US negotiations

Beijing’s tighter controls on rare-earth exports are buoying miner’s shares, at a time when high prices for sought after metals have already pushed up industry profits.

· Trump to meet Putin in Budapest to discuss War in Ukraine, after a phone call between the two leaders.

The cumulative exports (merchandise & services) during April- September 2025 is estimated at US$ 413.30 Billion, as compared to US$ 395.71 Billion in April-September 2024, an estimated growth of 4.45%.

The cumulative value of merchandise exports during April-September 2025 was US$ 220.12 Billion, as compared to US$ 213.68 Billion during April-September 2024, registering a positive growth of 3.02%.

The cumulative Non-Petroleum exports in April-September 2025 valued at US$ 189.49 Billion registered an increase of 7.04% as compared to US$ 177.03 Billion in April-September 2024.

Major drivers of merchandise exports growth in September 2025 include Electronic Goods, Petroleum Products, Engineering Goods, Rice, Marine Products and Drugs & Pharmaceuticals.

Petroleum Products exports increased by 15.22 % from US$ 4.30 Billion in September 2024 to US$ 4.96 Billion in September 2025.

Rice exports increased by 33.18 % from US$ 0.69 Billion in September 2024 to US$ 0.92 Billion in September 2025.

Marine Products exports increased by 23.44 % from US$ 0.63 Billion in September 2024 to US$ 0.78 Billion in September 2025.

· Ukraine plunges into darkness as Russia strikes energy facilities ahead of Zelensky- Trump meet

Russia launched a major assault on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure using drones and missiles, causing widespread power outages.

Meanwhile, Zelensky was set to meet with Trump at the White House to request additional US-supplied air defense systems and long-range missiles. Emergency blackouts in “All Regions” of Ukraine’ State energy company says outages will continue through tomorrow. All those Russian drone strikes starting to take their toll.

· 500% tariffs on China soon? Bessent says 85 US senators ready to give Trump

authority over Beijing’s Russian oil imports

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said 85 senators are prepared to authorize President Donald Trump to impose tariffs of up to 500% on China for buying Russian oil. He warned that China’s energy purchases fund Moscow’s war machine and urged US allies to join in coordinated action.

· Israel pushes for return of all hostage

bodies, Hamas says can’t find them: ‘Need special machinery’

A day earlier, Hamas’ military wing claimed it had released all the bodies it could – 9 of the 28 reportedly in its custody – stating that “extensive efforts and special equipment” are required to recover the rest.

· Putin cautions Trump against arming Ukraine with Tomahawks, calls move a threat to peace & US-Russia relations: Kremlin

Russian President Vladimir Putin cautioned US President Donald Trump during a phone call that providing Ukraine with long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles would jeopardize the peace process and strain relations between Washington and Moscow, according to Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov.

“The delivery of Tomahawks would not change the battlefield situation but would harm US-Russia ties and the peace process,” Ushakov told reporters, summarizing the Kremlin’s view.

Putin initiated the nearly 2.5-hour call, Ushakov said, adding that the discussion covered Ukraine’s military actions, including attacks on Russian energy infrastructure.

According to Ushakov, the two leaders agreed that a new Putin–Trump summit in Budapest will be preceded by a call between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the coming days.

· Public shipping companies wane in importance vs private owners

Scorpio Tankers President Robert Bugbee believes shipping is ‘potentially in crisis’ in terms of its relationship with capital markets.

Short-term holdings of shipping stocks are limited by heightened pressure on hedge funds, while long-only funds remain concerned about sustainable dividends.

Private owners have an easier time weathering shipping cycles because their fleets often span multiple segments; public owners face valuation headwinds when doing so.

Will the US-listed shipping sector ever be more than ‘an attractive little niche that is fun to invest in when the market goes up’? If current dynamics persist, the answer is: probably not

· Konstantakopoulos boosts control of Costamare as precaution against China port hit

Containership and dry bulk companies issue new preferred shares to minimise clout of any US persons

Moves come as US-listed companies manoeuvre to escape being caught in tit-for-tat port fees

· Yang Ming’s dry bulk arm readies four newbuilds in fleet renewal push

Kuang Ming Shipping, the dry bulk subsidiary of Taiwan’s Yang Ming Marine Transport, is returning to the newbuilding market with plans approved to order four vessels.

The newbuilds, sized between 45,000 and 69,999 dwt, will be capable of transporting major bulks such as coal and grain, along with smaller cargoes including bauxite, fertilizer, cement, steel, and agricultural products.

Yang Ming said the move reflects Kuang Ming’s plan to modernise its fleet through high-efficiency vessel designs that support fuel savings and lower greenhouse gas emissions, in line with the IMO’s decarbonisation requirements, adding that the newbuilds will also help replace older tonnage and strengthen the company’s position in the charter market.

Founded in 1990, Kuang Ming initially acted as a booking agent for Yang Ming’s container business before moving into dry bulk shipping in 2008 as part of the group’s diversification strategy. The company currently operates 11 bulkers—10 owned ships ranging from ultramax to kamsarmax vessels, and one chartered capesize unit.

The latest announcement marks Kuang Ming’s first newbuilding move in nearly a decade. The last campaign saw four ultramaxes ordered from Japan’s Iwagi Zosen between 2014 and 2015, delivered between 2016 and 2018.

· Navigating nation-state trade wars

In the escalating trade conflict between the United States, China, and their respective allies, a troubling paradox has emerged:

Nation-states wage economic warfare while the business sector— their primary weapon—bears the consequences. Like arrows fired from a bow, tariffs and trade restrictions fly between capitals, but the bow itself—the network of companies, supply chains, and commercial relationships painstakingly built over decades—strains under forces it never anticipated and cannot control.

The trade war that began in earnest during Trump’s first term has roared back to life in 2025 with renewed intensity. In recent months alone, the United States has imposed tariffs reaching up to 245% on Chinese imports along with penal port fees for Chinese controlled and owned vessels calling US ports, while China has retaliated with export restrictions on critical rare earth minerals and its own retaliatory port tariffs for US controlled ships calling China. The U.S. suspended some reciprocal tariffs temporarily in May 2025, maintaining a baseline 10% levy, but by October had threatened an additional 100% tariff in response to China’s rare earth controls. This tit-for-tat escalation has created a volatile environment where the rules of international commerce shift not quarterly, but weekly, many times even on a daily basis.

· The Arsenal

Modern trade wars employ an increasingly sophisticated arsenal. Beyond traditional tariffs, governments now deploy export controls, investment restrictions, technology transfer limitations, and strategic resource embargoes. The United States has targeted Chinese technology companies with sanctions while simultaneously restricting exports of critical software. China has responded by controlling exports of rare earth elements essential to everything from smartphones to electric vehicles to military systems.

These measures share a common characteristic: they transform private commercial relationships into instruments of foreign policy. A semiconductor manufacturer in Taiwan, an automotive parts supplier in Germany, or a rare earth processor in Vietnam suddenly finds itself navigating not just market conditions but geopolitical fault lines. The bow—these businesses and their intricate web of relationships—becomes both weapon and casualty.

· The precarious tightrope

For multinational corporations, the challenge is existential. Companies that spent decades optimizing global supply chains for efficiency now face the impossible task of simultaneously optimizing for geopolitical resilience, national security considerations, and regulatory compliance across hostile jurisdictions. The tightrope they walk is suspended over an abyss of contradictory demands.

Consider Apple, which relies heavily on Chinese manufacturing but serves markets worldwide. Or automotive manufacturers with components sourced from dozens of countries, suddenly facing cascading tariff exposures. In early 2025, global supply chain anxiety reached what analysts described as “near breaking point” before a temporary U.S.-China tariff pause in May. Major retailers warned of empty shelves and unsustainable business models under the tariff regime.

The practical challenges are staggering. Companies must maintain detailed country-of-origin documentation for every component, anticipate regulatory changes that arrive with little warning, and make billion-dollar manufacturing location decisions based on political calculations rather than economic fundamentals. A factory that made perfect sense in 2023 becomes a liability in 2025. A supplier relationship cultivated over twenty years becomes untenable overnight.

This also applies to the maritime industry, which thrives on globalisation and international exposure. An average ship owner domiciled or controlled by US or Chinese or EU interests has customers in all these countries and more. So if its country’s foreign minister calls for tougher sanctions on another country, in which the owner has customers, this will eventually have a negative impact on business for sure, irrespective of market economics and competitiveness. The mix of customers, suppliers, tonnage providers and vendors will be shaken up in due course.

· The human cost

Beyond balance sheets and supply chain diagrams lie human relationships. Business partnerships between American and Chinese firms, forged through years of collaboration, face unprecedented strain. Executives who built careers on cross-border commerce find themselves explaining to boards why political risks now trump commercial logic. Engineers and managers who’ve worked as colleagues across continents watch as their organizations are forced to “de-risk” and “decouple.”

The vocabulary itself reveals the transformation. What was once simply “business” is now “geopolitical exposure.” “Partnerships” become “dependencies.” “Efficiency” gives way to “resilience.” This linguistic shift reflects a deeper reality: commercial relationships are being reconstructed through the lens of national security and great power competition.

· The impossible calculations

Companies now face calculations that defy traditional business analysis. How do you balance the 30% cost advantage of Chinese manufacturing against the risk of 245% tariffs? How do you invest in Vietnam when it faces 46% U.S. tariffs as part of broader reciprocal trade measures? How do you plan when the regulatory landscape shifts faster than construction timelines?

Some organisations are attempting to diversify supply chains, a process called “China Plus One” or nearshoring. Others are regionalising operations, creating separate supply chains for different trading blocs. Still others are lobbying furiously for exemptions—a strategy that has yielded mixed results, as seen when the Trump administration issued electronics exemptions after imposing massive tariffs.

None of these strategies is truly satisfactory. Diversification is expensive and time-consuming. Regionalisation sacrifices economies of scale. Lobbying for exemptions creates uncertainty and competitive advantages based on political access rather than business merit. Every option involves accepting significant costs or risks that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

· Fragmentation

What emerges from this chaos is not a temporary disruption but a fundamental restructuring of global commerce. The integrated global supply chains that defined the late 20th and early 21st centuries are fracturing into competing economic spheres.

Companies are being forced to choose sides or maintain parallel operations at enormous cost.

This fragmentation extends beyond supply chains to research and development, technology standards, and even talent acquisition.

Chinese and American engineers increasingly work on diverging technology platforms. European companies try to position themselves as neutral but find that impossible in practice when forced to choose between compliance regimes. The seamless flow of goods, services, capital, and talent that characterised globalisation is being replaced by a world of borders, restrictions, and strategic competition.

It will also create challenges for the set maritime business plans but open up new opportunities. Recent examples are Seaspan and Pacific Basin shifting their registered offices from Hong Kong to Singapore. It is important that China should see this as a pure economic decision rather than a political one and it must not strain the Singapore-China relations in any manner. If it does that, this can have huge ramifications for entire maritime Singapore and the industry ecosystems.

· The policy disconnect

Perhaps most frustratingly for businesses, the architects of these trade wars—government officials and policymakers—often seem disconnected from the operational realities their decisions create. A tariff announcement takes minutes; restructuring a supply chain takes years. An export restriction can be implemented immediately; finding alternative sources of rare earth elements or advanced semiconductors may be impossible at any price.

Policymakers speak of “bringing manufacturing home” or “securing supply chains” without fully grappling with the interdependencies that make modern production possible. A semiconductor requires dozens of specialised inputs from multiple countries. An electric vehicle contains thousands of components with complex supply chains. You cannot simply “reshore” these industries—they exist as global networks or not at all.

· Walking forward on the tightrope

For companies, there is no good path forward, only varying degrees of difficult compromise. The most sophisticated organisations are developing scenario planning capabilities, maintaining flexibility to pivot as political winds shift, and building in redundancy despite the cost. They’re investing in government

affairs functions and geopolitical risk analysis. They’re learning to factor political risk into every decision at a level once reserved for operating in obviously unstable regions.

Some are finding creative solutions: dual sourcing from approved and restricted regions, final assembly in neutral countries, or technology licensing arrangements that satisfy conflicting requirements. But these solutions are expensive, inefficient, and fundamentally defensive. They represent risk management, not value creation.

· The broader cost

The trade war’s toll extends beyond individual companies to innovation, consumer welfare, and global economic growth. Research collaborations are terminated. Joint ventures dissolve. The free exchange of ideas that drives technological progress is constrained. Consumers face higher prices. Developing nations lose access to markets and investment. The specialisation and efficiency gains from comparative advantage are surrendered to the logic of strategic autonomy.

Nations may claim victory when they successfully “protect” industries or “reshore” manufacturing, but these victories often come at costs that dwarf the benefits. The resources devoted to maintaining duplicate supply chains, the innovations not pursued due to restricted collaboration, the efficiency losses from forced localisation—these represent an enormous deadweight loss to the global economy.

· The bow that cannot be unstrung

The metaphor of arrows fired from the bow of business reveals a fundamental problem: the bow was never designed to be a weapon of state conflict. The business sector evolved to optimise for efficiency, innovation, and mutual benefit through exchange. Commercial relationships were built on trust, complementary capabilities, and shared incentives to create value.

Nation-states have now conscripted this system for geopolitical purposes it was never meant to serve. The bow strains under the tension, threatening to break rather than launch arrows.

Companies walk their precarious tightrope, trying to maintain relationships and operations across a fragmenting world, serving

conflicting masters who view their success or failure purely through the lens of national interest.

Until governments recognise that weaponising commerce destroys the very instrument they hope to wield, companies will continue this impossible balancing act. They will do their best to navigate contradictory demands, maintain operations across hostile divides, and preserve what relationships they can.

But make no mistake: with each escalation, each new tariff, each additional restriction, the bow weakens. And when it finally breaks, everyone—businesses, consumers, and the nations themselves—will bear the cost.

· Danica flags rise in falsified records in tanker crew CVs amid wage surge

Internal screening by crewing specialists Danica has revealed that between 5% and 10% of job applications for tanker vessels contain false information, due to a strong demand for experienced crew pushing wages upwards.

According to the company, the discrepancies range from exaggerated sea service and incorrect vessel types to forged or altered certificates.

“The tanker sector is paying a premium for qualified officers, and that financial incentive is tempting some applicants to falsify their records to appear suitable for higher-paying roles,” said Henrik Jensen, CEO of Danica Crewing Specialists.

He added that experience on other vessel types was being presented as tanker experience, and that some even presented counterfeit documentation.

“This poses real risks to vessel safety, the environment, and the reputation of shipowners,” Jensen stated.

While most seafarers are honest professionals, he warned that even a small number of fraudulent applications can have serious implications.

“The tanker market operates under strict safety and compliance regimes, and any lapse in crew competence can lead to operational incidents or failed vetting inspections. The cost of hiring the wrong person far outweighs the effort of proper screening,” Jensen said.

He also warned that submitting false information or documentation is a criminal act and that it should be treated as such.

“The industry needs stronger cross-checking systems to identify offenders and protect professional integrity,” the Danica CEO claimed.

The rise in falsified applications sheds light on the growing competition for experienced officers in the tanker market. Shipowners are urged to partner only with reputable crewing agencies that carry out thorough vetting.

“Our advice to shipowners is simple: take your time, verify carefully, and work with trusted partners. Safety and reputation depend on it,” Jensen warned.

· Lloyd’s Register issues first roadmap for nuclear-powered shipping

British class society Lloyd’s Register (LR) has published new guidance on the use of nuclear energy in commercial shipping, offering what it calls the first comprehensive roadmap for the safe and responsible integration of nuclear power into the maritime sector.

The document, Navigating Nuclear Energy in Maritime, was developed in partnership with Global Nuclear Security Partners (GNSP) and marine insurer NorthStandard. It outlines how shipowners, operators and regulators can approach nuclear propulsion — from regulatory approval and technical design to insurance and crew training.

As the industry looks for long-term zero-carbon solutions, LR said nuclear technology — including small modular reactors (SMRs) — could play a role in decarbonising deep-sea transport. But it noted

that the sector still lacks a unified international framework for regulation, safety, and liability.

The guidance discusses the roles of the IMO and IAEA, stressing the need to align maritime and nuclear standards. It covers safety classification, environmental assessments, structural integrity, and nuclear safety case development, as well as physical and cyber security measures.

Operational and financial considerations are also addressed, including qualifications for onboard personnel, emergency response plans, and insurance structures. NorthStandard contributed to the section on insurance and liability, noting the current limitations of P&I pooling for nuclear-related risks.

Mark Tipping, LR’s global power to X director, said nuclear energy could become a “scalable and zero-carbon” option for shipping, provided there is close collaboration between regulators, operators, insurers and society.

LR added the new framework builds on its earlier Fuel for Thought: Nuclear research and is designed to help early movers navigate the technical, safety and financial hurdles of adopting nuclear propulsion.

· DH Shipbuilding returns to container ships with $211m order

Japan’s Doun Kisen is being named as company that ordered two 8,800-teu container ships.

DH Shipbuilding, is a midsize shipyard in South Korea and is known for building Aframax and Suezmax Tankers. South Korea’s DH Shipbuilding has signed a rare newbuilding contract for container ships worth about KRW 330bn ($211m). The Haenam-based shipbuilder, which last

ordered boxships three years ago, said it has struck a newbuilding deal with a Panama-based shipping company for two container ships of 8,800 teu.

· Global Ship Lease casts doubt on market data on US ownership amid Chinese port fees

Ship lessor says shareholders are dispersed, and their citizenship is hard to identify

Global Ship Lease has cast doubt on market data that shows significant US ownership that would have exposed it to Chinese port fees.

The Athens-headquartered container ship lessor said that its shareholders are widely dispersed and there is limited information on where they are from.

TradeWinds reported on 10 October that Bloomberg data showed 73.3% US ownership for the New York-listed company.

· China ‘shockwave’ amplifies bullish sentiment in tanker S&P market, say brokers

Shortage of modern sales candidates keeps ‘firm floor’ under values Chaos caused by new Chinese port fees on US-linked ships is further boosting a sellers’ market for secondhand tankers, brokers believe.

As vessels are rerouted or delayed due to owners assessing their options, and rates rise, new sales candidates remain scarce.

· Theodore Angelopoulos-led Metrostar eyes asset play with modern tanker pair

Athens-based outfit will be a pure-play product tanker player if it sheds its only two crude carriers. Metrostar Management Corp, an Athens- based outfit with a long history of profitable secondhand and newbuilding deals, is said to be lining up another. Greek brokers say the Theodore Angelopoulos-led firm is in the process of selling a modern suezmax sister ship pair: the 156,800-dwt Crude Levante and Crude Zephyrus (both built 2021) for about $77.5m each.

· 200 years, eight generations and a game- changing plane crash: Ben Line’s journey of success and tragedy

Company has changed course many times over its long history, but all under ownership of the same family.

The general cargo ship Benweyvis was one of the several vessels built by the US Government during the dark days of World War that Ben Line acquired to rebuild its fleet after the war.

The Ben Line Group celebrates its 200th anniversary this month — a rare milestone for any shipping company.

Even more remarkable, it remains owned by the founders’ eighth- generation descendants.

For most of its history, Ben Line was one of Scotland’s largest shipowners. It no longer owns ships — today it is an agency company headquartered in Singapore — but throughout its two centuries, it has never shied away from reinventing itself to remain relevant in an often- unforgiving industry.

· Could hedging model answer shipping’s questions over offtake deals

Shipping and fuel suppliers have differing approach to offtake contract risk.

One of the most often cited hurdles in the growth of low-carbon fuels is the disconnect between fuel producers and the shipping companies.

This supply-demand dislocation is largely because companies that can produce low-carbon fuels need to sign significant offtake agreements before they can make a final investment decision on a new production plant.

· Ammonia fuel marks milestone as newbuildings set to hit the water

Newly formed Ammonia Europe seeks closer work with shipping to help close supply and demand disconnect.

Ammonia is more than just a potential marine fuel, according to Stephen Jackson, chief executive at Ammonia Europe.

“We have all the theoretical work done from a technical point of view, and we have the first ammonia-capable vessels set for delivery this year or next,” he said.

· ‘I stand by my staff’, says IMO boss amid simmering tensions with US delegation

Second day of crunch carbon talks bogged down in details over the way forward.

International Maritime Organization secretary general Arsenio Dominguez was forced to step into the debate about carbon rules after the US accused the meeting’s chairman and secretariat of bias.

As the second day of the four-day crunch climate meeting got underway, Saudi Arabia and the US attempted to further stall the debate by suddenly proposing that the rules be accepted by explicit acceptance rather than tacit.

IMO rules and conventions are usually agreed through tacit acceptance, and even the IMO on its website notes that explicit approval rarely works.

· ‘It’s really a nightmare’: US-listed shipowners roll with the punches amid war of port fees

Vessels in transit sped up to reach China before fees imposed. For some New York-listed shipowners, the days following China’s announcement that it would impose new port fees on US-linked ships were a “nightmare” that involved using AI to decipher confusing forms and speeding up ships to arrive before they took effect.

But it ended up becoming a non-event for others, as they realised that they would be essentially unaffected by the measures, which Beijing hatched as a retaliation to Washington’s on Chinese-linked vessels.

Executives at several US-listed shipowning companies described the chaotic days since China’s announcement on Friday last week with varying degrees of humour, frustration and dismissal as they spoke at a Capital Link forum in New York.

· Hamas Is Not Done Fighting

As It Has in the Past, the Group Will Retrench and Rearm

The first phase of the U.S.-brokered cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas is a tremendous achievement, securing the release of hostages held by Hamas for over two years and the end to a devastating war in Gaza in a 20-point plan. But the second phase of the plan will confront a set of thorny issues, including the disarmament of Hamas and the future of Palestinian governance. If past is precedent, Hamas will fight tooth and nail to preserve its political and military standing in Gaza and its commitment to violently oppose prospects for peace.

· The Dilemma of Duty Under Trump

What His Assault on the U.S. Military Means for America

It might be difficult to remember now, but U.S. President Donald Trump delivered his first blow to American civil-military relations in 2017, when he first started talking about “my generals.” He had appointed a former Marine general, James Mattis, as secretary of defense, which is a position typically reserved for civilians to preserve civilian control of the military. Mattis became the first former general to serve as defense secretary since George Marshall in 1950, and he needed to secure a congressional waiver in order to take the job.

Trump also appointed other high-ranking military officers to civilian posts, including former Marine General John Kelly (who served first as secretary of homeland security and then as White House chief of staff) and his first two national security advisers: Michael Flynn, a retired three-star general, and H. R. McMaster, an active-duty three-star general.

Even Vice President Mike Pence’s national security adviser was a retired army lieutenant general: Keith Kellogg (who is now special envoy for Ukraine). Few, if any, previous U.S. presidents had so brazenly tried to benefit from proximity to the U.S. military. Appointing so many generals to such high offices is more typical of a military junta than of a constitutional republic. But Trump revelled in the aura of toughness conveyed by these military men; he delighted, for example, in referring to Mattis as “Mad Dog,” a nickname that the cerebral general hated.

It did not take Trump long to become disenchanted with his generals. Within two years, he fired almost all of them, insulting most on their way out the door. He later said that Army General Mark Milley, his handpicked choice for chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and one of the few Trump kept until the end of his term), should have been executed for treason because he had called his Chinese counterpart to offer reassurances that the United States was not planning to start a war after the storming of the Capitol by Trump’s supporters on January 6, 2021.

When Trump came into office for a second time this past January, he was deeply suspicious of the uniformed military, believing that the retired and active-duty generals he had appointed during his first term had stymied his unilateralist and isolationist instincts. Trump came to see all these generals as part of a “deep state” cabal frustrating his MAGA mandate, and he was determined not to fall into the same trap in his second term.

· Will world’s largest dam project be big enough for China’s economy?

Observers question whether Yarlung Tsangpo power plant can revive growth momentum. Addressing ordered ranks of construction workers, government officials and cadres in traditional Tibetan dress standing at attention in a clearing ringed by misty Himalayan mountain peaks, Chinese Premier Li Qiang three months ago hailed the official launch of the country’s “project of the century” – an ambitious 1.2 trillion Yuan ($168 billion) hydropower project to be built at the site of the world’s deepest canyon.

A bend in the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Medog County, Tibet: China plans to use a system of steep tunnels to divert river flows through power turbines before the water rejoins the looping river at a lower altitude.

· Head of the U.S. Military’s Southern Command Is Stepping Down, Officials Say

Adm. Alvin Holsey is leaving less than a year into his tenure, and as the Pentagon escalates attacks against boats in the Caribbean Sea.

· Gita Gopinath on the crash that could torch

$35trn of wealth

The world has become dangerously dependent on American stocks, writes the former IMF chief economist.

THE AMERICAN stock-market has see-sawed lately amid a flare-up in trade tensions, but remains near its all-time high. The surge, fuelled by enthusiasm around artificial intelligence, has drawn comparisons to the exuberance of the late 1990s that culminated in the dotcom crash of 2000. Though technological innovation is undeniably reshaping industries and increasing productivity, investors have good reasons to worry that the current rally may be setting the stage for another painful market correction. The consequences of such a crash, however, could be far more severe and global in scope than those felt a quarter of a century ago.

The trade war between the two global superpowers, which has polarized the world since the start of the year, is escalating once again. On Thursday, China’s Ministry of Commerce declared it would broaden export controls on rare-earth elements and associated technologies. In response, U.S. President Donald Trump said the next day that a 100% additional tariff would be levied on Chinese goods beginning in November.

Recent communications between Washington and Beijing appear to have become increasingly chaotic.

In mid-September, Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke by phone and reached an agreement on the potential sale of TikTok’s U.S. operations. The two sides are in talks to hold a summit, but uncertainty now clouds its prospects. Depending on how the latest round of the U.S.-China trade war unfolds, it could have a significant impact not only on Asia but also on the whole global economy.

“Governments going broke”, an in-depth look at the looming threat posed by rich countries’ mounting debts. It is written by economics editor, Henry Curr, The Economist. He warns that the world could end up with a nasty bout of inflation.

Theme : “Rich-world public debt is already worth 110% of GDP”. Barring the covid-19 pandemic, it has not been this high since the Napoleonic wars.

Governments will struggle to find a way out of the trap they have made for themselves. They cannot avoid rising interest bills or spending more on defence.

Ageing populations exert an irresistible electoral pressure to hand over more cash. Raising taxes is just as hard.

Many European governments already tax to the max; in America higher taxes are a ticket to electoral defeat.

You might hope that productivity growth, powered by artificial intelligence, would come to the rescue. Sadly, pensions and health-care spending tend to rise with incomes: in big welfare states they will surge along with productivity.

So too will interest rates, offsetting the fiscal windfall that comes from faster growth.

It is therefore worth reflecting while there is still time on the grave harm inflation does to economies and societies.

Uncontrolled inflation shifts wealth from creditors to debtors; from those with cash and bonds to those who own real assets such as houses; and from those who agree on contracts and wages in cash terms to those wily enough to anticipate higher prices. Inflation punishes the middle class and frays the social contract. Be warned.

Microsoft aims to produce the majority of its new products outside of China as early as next year, while Amazon Web Services is expanding its supply chain shift down to the component level, sources briefed on the matter told Nikkei Asia.

Such moves reflect U.S. tech companies’ efforts to decouple their supply chains from China more quickly amid ongoing Washington- Beijing tensions.

Baltic News 16^th October 2025

BALTIC INDICES 16/10/2025

DRY INDEX: 2046 (+49)

CAPESIZE INDEX: 3058 (+142)

PANAMAX INDEX: 1826 (+5)

SUPRAMAX INDEX: 1422 (+4)

HANDYSIZE INDEX: 883 (+5)

BCI TC AVG $/DAY 25358 (+ 1173) BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 16433 (+47)
BSI TC AVG $/DAY 17972 (+ 51)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 15895 (+ 86)

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‘Alpha Legacy’ 2018 82047 dwt dely aps EC.S.America 27 Oct/7 Nov trip redel Poland $25,000 – Louis Dreyfus

‘Ultra Cougar’ 2015 81922 dwt dely Immingham 17 Oct trip via US Gulf redel Skaw-Spain $19,250 – Bunge – <Scrubber fitted>

‘Capricorn Trader’ 2015 81824 dwt dely Tuticorin 22/28 Oct trip via Richards Bay redel India $16,000 – Seapol

‘Shandong Fu De’ 2018 81779 dwt dely Zhangzhou 18/19 Oct trip via EC Australia redel Japan $18,500 – MOL

‘Leo. K’ 2022 81093 dwt dely Pagbilao 19/20 Oct trip via Indonesia redel South China $21,000

‘Shen Hua 812’ 2014 76124 dwt dely Hong Kong 23 Oct trip via Indonesia redel South China $16,500

‘Stahla’ 2012 76059 dwt dely Visakhapatnam 15/20 Oct trip via EC South America redel Singapore-Japan $12,000 – Cofco Agri

‘Yasa Unity’ 2006 75580 dwt dely aps Richards Bay 28/30 Oct trip redel India $13,800 +$380,000 bb – Propel Shipping

‘Shen Hua 803’ 2013 75403 dwt dely Yuhuan 23 Oct trip via Indonesia redel South China $15,500 – GML

‘Sakizaya Brave’ 2013 74940 dwt dely Campha 20 Oct trip via Indonesia redel Japan $16,750 – Kline

‘Tai Steadiness’ 2024 64589 dwt dely Alexandria prompt trip redel US Gulf intention salt $14,000 – NBC

‘Mea Mare’ 2024 64025 dwt dely Tuticorin prompt trip via South Africa redel Singapore-Japan $16,750

‘Ocean Tianchen’ 2018 63562 dwt dely Fujairah prompt trip redel Bangladesh $17,000 – Teambulk

‘Jia Yue’ 2019 63319 dwt dely Lianyungang prompt trip redel West Africa $14,500

‘Genco Mayflower’ 2017 63310 dwt dely Nigeria 14/16 Oct trip via Owendo redel India $27,000 – XO Shipping

‘Pacific Jasmine’ 2016 61473 dwt dely EC South America 26 Oct trip Singapore-Japan $16,750 + $675,000bb

‘Euro Band’ 2009 58761 dwt dely Fujairah 19/24 Oct trip via GOA redel Mediterranean $12,000

‘Jag Radha’ 2009 58133 dwt dely Singapore 16/20 Oct trip via Indonesia redel India $18,000 – Tata NYK

‘Friedrike’ 2011 57696 dwt dely Ponto Ubu 30 Oct trip redel Itaguai $24,000 – Norsul

‘Alrayan’ 2011 56859 dwt dely Haiphong 17/18 Oct trip via Indonesia redel China $10,500 – Minmetals

‘Gladiator’ 2012 56784 dwt dely Santos 17/19 Oct trip redel Algeria $23,500 – Norvic

‘Alanya-M’ 2004 41327 dwt dely Saleef 13/16 Oct trip via Red Sea redel N China – S Korea intention concentrates $16,000

‘Twin Delight’ 2024 40656 dwt dely Montoir 16/19 Oct trip redel Morocco intention grains $21,000 – Norden

‘Yasa Magnolia’ 2025 40558 dwt dely N Brazil prompt trip redel Algeria $25,000 – Norvic

‘Ernst Oldendorff’ 2015 38330 dwt dely Santa Marta trip redel Peru intention coal $34,000 – Ultrabulk

‘Izumo Hermes’ 2020 37301 dwt dely Itagui prompt trip redel passing Otranto $24,000 – Ultrabulk

‘Team View’ 2011 35914 dwt dely SW Pass 20/21 Oct trip redel WC Central America $27,000 – Bunge Latin

PERIOD

‘Guo Hai Lian 681’ 2013 75784 dwt dely Hong Kong 19/20 Oct 4/6 months redel worldwide $14,000 – Norden

VOYAGES
ORE

‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 1/3 Nov $10.35 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto

‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 1/3 Nov $10.45 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto

‘Maria D’ 2016 170000/10 Brazil/Qingdao 10/15 Nov $24.00 fio 3 days shinc/30000shinc

‘Ubuntu Sincerity’ 2024 170000/10 Brazil option West Africa/Qingdao 1/15 Nov $24.30 fio 3 days shinc/30000shinc – Oldendorff

‘Bulk Harvest’ 2012 160000/10 Port Hedland/Qingdao 3/5 Nov $10.65 fio 80000shinc/30000shinc – Cargill

COAL

‘Korea Line TBN’ 80000/10 Tanjung Kampeh/Gangreung 1/10 Nov

$10.32 fio 15000shinc/11000shinc – Kepco tender

‘TBN’ 75000/10 Gladstone/EC India 16/25 Nov $18.50 fio 35000shinc/40000shinc – VSP

‘TBN’ 75000/10 HPCT-DBCT-APCT/EC India 15/24 Nov $17.85 fio 40000shinc/4000shinc – Sail MISC

‘Swissmarine TBN’ 67000-68000 mop Portland/China 5/9 Nov $28.75 fio 20000shinc/32000shinc – Canpotex

Baltic Exchange Index – 16 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 3058 (+142)
Route Description Value($) Change
C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 11.281 + 0.187
C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 24.213 + 0.918
C5 160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao 10.555 + 0.390
C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 12.613 + 0.145
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 22,000 + 550
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan 43,389 + 761
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 28,845 + 1750
C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 26,241 + 1746
C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero 5,306 + 534
C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 18.172 + 0.611

5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 25,358 + 1173

Baltic Exchange Index – 16 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 3058 (+142)

Route Description Value($) Change
C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 11.281 + 0.187
C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 24.213 + 0.918
C5 160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao 10.555 + 0.390
C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 12.613 + 0.145
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 22,000 + 550
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan 43,389 + 761
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 28,845 + 1750
C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 26,241 + 1746
C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero 5,306 + 534
C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 18.172 + 0.611
5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 25,358 + 1173

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 16 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,826 (+ 5)
Route Description Value ($) Change
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 17,445 +145
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 24,289 -243
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 16,617 +128
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 9,466 +57
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 15,139 -10

P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 16,433 +47

The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description                        Value ($) Change
P5_82 S. China Indo RV 17,188 +   244
P7     66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 55.229 – 0.292
P8          66000mt Santos to Qingdao 38.379 – 0.042

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82 Asia Index – 17 October 2025

Route Description Size (MT) Value($) Change
P5_82 S.China one Indo RV 17,219 +31

Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 16 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1422 (+ 4)

Route   Description                                  Value ($) Change
S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 22,679 +91
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 29,989 +46
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 15,371 +92
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 14,470 -50
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero 30,057 +136
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 15,211 0
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 22,257 0
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 17,283 +91
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 18,757 +21
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 12,793 + 100
S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 14,846 +71
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average                17,972 +   51
S10TC   Supramax(58) Timecharter Average            15,938 +   51

Baltic Exchange Supramax Asia Index – 17 October 2025
Route Description Value($) Change
S2_63 N.China one Austr or Pac RV 15,443 +72
S8_63 S.China via Indonesia/Ec India 17,317 +34
S10_63 S.China via Indo/S.China 12,829 +36

S3TC Weighted Time Charter Average 15,228 +50

Baltic Exchange Index – 16 OCTOBER 2025
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 883 (+ 5)

Route Description Value ($) Change
HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 11,693 + 136
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 15,079 +58
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 23,383 +22
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Pass 23,607 +228
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 14,229 +22
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn 12,869 +88
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 12,556 +93

7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 15,895 + 86

“Happy Diwali, and Wishing you a joyous and prosperous Diwali.”

“May the festival of lights bring you happiness and success, Diwali is full of light, joy and laughter.”

Marex Media

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