News

Shipping Markets 19th August, 2025

  • Seaspan grows newbuild pipeline with 12-ship deal in China

Seaspan Corporation has inked a fresh round of newbuilding orders in China, adding twelve 9,000 teu containerships to its fleet pipeline.

The vessels will be built at Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, part of China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), with deliveries slated to begin in 2028.

The deal is the latest in a series of high-profile orders by the Bing Chen- led tonnage provider at Chinese yards. Over the past four years, Seaspan has emerged as one of the most active private sector buyers of boxships from state-owned builders.

At Hudong-Zhonghua alone, Seaspan previously booked three 15,500 teu units in 2021, six 13,600 teu ships in 2023, due between 2026 and 2028, and earlier this year signed a letter of intent for six methanol-ready 8,300 TEU ships, reportedly for COSCO.

Meanwhile, back in April, Seaspan also confirmed Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding (SWS) as the builder of six 11,400 teu vessels. Those ships are priced at $127m apiece, with delivery starting in 2027.

The world’s largest boxship lessor, with a fleet of over 180 ships in operation and more than 40 newbuildings confirmed, concluded the deal

in renminbi rather than US dollars, with ICBC Financial Leasing backing the project. The latest newbuilds, costing more than $100m each, will be delivered as conventionally fuelled, with a dual-fuel ready option.

  • Canada silently rejected / banned American Dairy products at the Canadian border, without warning, without explanation, and no news media reported this. Three billion dollars worth of American Dairy, in the past 48 hours, just disappeared and no one told the world why? More than 200 Containers of Cheese and Milk were quietly turned away, without a trade alert or press release, simply cold, clinical rejection, under the USMCA agreement, the US is allowed to claim 3.6% of Canada’s dairy market. Canada struck back with 292% tariffs and surgical precision. Now those same dairy products are on American shelves re-packaged and sold at 50% off, with no label to say this product was rejected by a foreign government. Meanwhile, in Wisconsin, Farmers are draining Milk into open storm drains, crying in the fields with no Buyers in sight. THE US President has said nothing about this. This is not trade policy but slow death by bureaucracy.
  • China lifts curbs on fertilizers, rare earths & tunnel boring machines to India. In a major development, China

conveyed on Monday it has lifted export restrictions on fertilizers, rare earth magnets, and tunnel boring machines to India, addressing key concerns raised by New Delhi during the visit of Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi, of China. These requests were made in China by India’s Foreign Minister Mr. S. Jaishankar during this visit to meet his counter part in China. The assurance was given by Mr. Wang Yi during his recent visit to India. Shipments are understood to have already commenced, potentially easing supply chain bottlenecks for Indian Industries and infrastructure projects.

Washington on the 18th August:

White House Meeting on 18th August, ends with few signs of progress on Ukraine. President Zelensky of Ukraine pressed for security guarantees in a cordial meeting with President Trump and European leaders.

According to U.S. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Vitkoff, U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Putin agreed at their summit in Alaska on the 15th that the United States can provide security guarantees to Ukraine. “We agreed that the United States and other countries could effectively provide Ukraine with a commitment similar to NATO Article 5,” Vitkoff said on CNN on the 17th. However, he stopped short of agreeing to grant Ukraine NATO membership. European leaders will be attending a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and President Trump in Washington on the 18th. The meeting is intended to show support for Zelensky amid growing U.S. pressure to reach an early peace agreement that would include territorial cessions to Russia.

  • Republican Bid to Help President Trump move past Epstein Falls Flat. Republicans in Congress managed to recess for the summer without voting on the issue, but it has continued to dog them and awaits them when they return.
  • Putin’s Proposal for Land Deal, made to Trump shifts pressure to Zelensky. In Alaska, the Russian leader proposed that Ukraine hand over the remainder of the Donbas region to Moscow to stop the fighting.
  • Hamas accepts New Gaza Cease-fire proposal officials say. It was unclear whether Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel was on board with the terms, which came as Qatar and Egypt were intensifying mediation efforts.

Japan deploys large drone over Senkakus Islands amid China ship intrusions

  • Japan is using a large coast guard drone, the SeaGuardian, to monitor the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea amid repeated incursions into nearby waters by Chinese vessels, sources familiar with bilateral relations said Monday.
  • The use of the MQ-9B SeaGuardian, a U.S.-made remotely piloted aircraft equipped with state-of-the-art radar, is expected to help beef up security in Japan’s territorial waters off the uninhabited islets, encompassing a vast area of about 4,740 square kilometers.
  • China Coast Guard ships regularly sail near the Senkakus, administered by Japan but claimed by China, which calls them Diaoyu. They were spotted on 355 days in 2024, marking a record high since the Japanese government put the islets under state control in 2012.
  • The operation of the drone is apparently intended to showcase Japan’s resolve not to tolerate any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force in the East China Sea.
  • The sources said the SeaGuardian has flown over the Senkakus several times since April, surveilling Chinese coast guard ships and capturing images.
  • It may be tasked with issuing aerial warnings to Chinese vessels not to enter Japan’s territorial waters, according to the sources. The Japan Coast Guard has not disclosed the drone operations around the Senkakus.
  • The SeaGuardian, about 12 meters long with a wingspan of 24 meters, is steered by pilots at a ground operation center. Images and other data collected by the drone are checked by coast guard officers, who also issue instructions.
  • The Japan Coast Guard is currently operating three SeaGuardian drones, with two more to be added during the fiscal year through March 2026.
  • The SeaGuardian has been introduced for surveillance missions in the East China Sea, the Pacific, and the Sea of Japan, and is also deployed for maritime distress and disaster response.
  • Manufactured by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc., the aircraft can fly continuously for more than 24 hours. In a single flight, it can complete a full circuit of the outer perimeter of Japan’s exclusive economic zone.
  • The Japan Coast Guard began operating the SeaGuardian at a Maritime Self-Defence Force air base in Aomori Prefecture, northeastern Japan, but moved its base to Kitakyushu Airport in Fukuoka Prefecture, southwestern Japan, in January to prepare for full-scale operations.
  • Japan to fund companies expanding abroad in areas from chips to ships
  • Tokyo seeks economic security fund to build supply networks for critical products
  • Japan wants to help companies in fields critical to economic security – including semiconductors, rare earths and shipbuilding – invest in Southeast Asian countries and other emerging markets in an effort to build supply chains that are structured to Tokyo’s advantage.
  • Apple is expanding iPhone production in India at five factories as it seeks to lessen its reliance on China for US-bound models. The company is producing all four iPhone 17 models in India ahead of their debut next month, marking the first time that all new variations — including pro-level versions — will ship from the South Asian country from the get-go, according to people with knowledge of the matter.
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It’s commanders have been assassinated, its air defences destroyed and its ranks penetrated by Israeli intelligence.

Yet somehow, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has emerged from the 12-day war with Israel with more power than before.

The IRGC was quick to market its partial victories in the June conflict, like causing billions of dollars of damage with missile attacks on Israeli cities or downing enemy drones.

·       Diplomatic Theater Leaves Crude Markets Unmoved

According to media reports, Chinese refineries have purchased at least 15 cargoes for October and November delivery as India’s state-owned refineries limit their imports of Russian crude amidst rising geopolitical tensions.

Russia’s medium sour Urals grade, accounting for more than half of its oil exports, tends to flow mostly to India because of shorter logistics from the Black Sea and Baltic Sea ports of the country.

Chinese refiners have imported only two cargoes of Urals in June, only one in July; however, as India’s demand started to wane, they’ve scooped up at least 10 tankers for October, quadrupling their intake compared to the 2025 average of 40,000 b/d.

Soaring Chinese imports of Russian oil are also a reaction to higher Middle Eastern prices, after Saudi Aramco hiked its September-loading formula prices to a $3.20 per barrel premium over Oman/Dubai.

Market Movers:

  • UK-based energy major Shell has transferred its stakes in four

contiguous blocks in the central part of the Gulf of Mexico to BP, indicating that the high-impact Penguin prospect might’ve turned out to be dry.

  • Algeria’s state oil company Sonatrach has struck oil in Libya, confirming prospective resources in the onshore Block 065 it operates, just south of the Wafa field that produces 40,000 b/d of crude.
  • US utility company Black Hills agreed to purchase its industry peer North Western Energy for $3.6 billion in an all-stock deal, marking another important step in America’s power M&A landscape.
  • Italy’s energy major ENI agreed to sell a 49.99% stake in its carbon capture and storage projects to BlackRock subsidiary GIP, mostly covering upstream assets in the North Sea.

The Trump-Putin and subsequent Trump-Zelenskiy meetings provided ample talking points for the markets at large; however, the lack of sanctioning threats has been mostly a bearish factor for crude prices. The price drops of late have been relatively tiny, with ICE Brent still trading around $66 per barrel, yet the upside from here seems to be minimal, barring a sudden escalation.

US Keeps Pressure on India’s Russian Imports. Trump’s trade advisor Peter Navarro said India’s purchases of Russian oil were funding Moscow’s war effort in Ukraine, just as a planned visit from US trade negotiators to New Delhi next week was called off.

China Floods the Market with Products. Chinese exports of refined products rose to a 13-month high of 5.34 million tonnes last month, marking a 7% increase year-on-year, driven primarily by diesel flows as Europe continued to buy long-haul volumes, whilst domestic demand in China wanes.

Iran Halts Power Exports to Iraq. Iran halted electricity exports to neighbouring Iraq, citing a surge in domestic consumption as the country’s power demand jumped to 77 GW, whilst Tehran had to ratchet up its own power imports from Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan to prevent blackouts.

China’s LNG Import Slide Continues. With China’s LNG imports trending 20% compared to 2024 readings, July arrivals to the world’s once-largest LNG importer totalled only 35.51 million tonnes LNG, marking the ninth straight month of annual declines as JKM prices remain above $11/MMbtu.

Indonesia Eyes Modular Refinery Bonanza. Indonesia’s government plans to build at least 17 modular refineries across the country, with the country’s sovereign wealth fund, Danantara, keen to sign an $8 billion deal with US engineering firm KBR despite profitability concerns.

Norway’s LNG Troubles Continue. The Hammerfest LNG terminal in Norway’s Arctic was forced to shut its production of LNG this weekend due to an overheating electric transformer, less than two weeks after operator Equinor restarted operations after a three-month maintenance.

Brazil’s Regulator Halts Output at Key FPSO. Brazil’s largest independent oil producer Prio admitted that the country’s local regulator had ordered a full production halt at its 100,000 b/d Peregrino FPSO, citing the need for improvements in risk management documentation.

Glencore Doubles Down on Argentinian Copper. Global mining giant Glencore has submitted applications to Argentina’s authorities for RIGI tax incentives, vowing to develop the $4 billion Agua Rica and $9.5 billion El Pachon copper mines in the country, creating 2,500 new jobs.

Ukraine Strikes Halt Russian Pipeline. Ukraine’s military confirmed that its drones struck an oil pumping station in Russia’s Tambov region feeding the Druzhba pipeline that supplies some 210,000 b/d of Russian oil to Hungary and Slovakia, halting pipeline transportation in the conduit completely.

ADNOC’s Purchase of Santos Delayed Again. Australia’s upstream giant Santos announced that the ADNOC-led consortium, comprising Abu Dhabi’s holding company ADQ and PE firm Carlyle, will not be able to finalize its $18.7 billion bid for the producer for at least a month.

Trump Promises to Slap Tariffs on Semiconductors.

US President Donald Trump vowed to introduce tariffs on imports of steel and semiconductor chips over the coming weeks, adding that rates would be lower at the start to allow companies to relocate their manufacturing to the United States.

US Miner Calls Off Giant Coking Coal Deal.

US mining firm Peabody Energy terminated its planned purchase of Anglo American’s Australian coking coal assets, failing to adjust the

$3.8 billion purchase price after a fire at the Moranbah North mine, paving the way for arbitration.

Russia’s Dormant LNG Giant Awakens.

Four LNG carriers linked to Novatek’s 19.8 mtpa Arctic LNG 2 project are headed towards Asia along the Northern Sea Route, putting an end to months of little activity as both the ships and the project remain under stringent US sanctions.

  • The Pernicious Spectacle of Trump’s Russia-Ukraine Diplomacy

How Demands for Quick Resolution Hinder a Real End to the War

  • The most famous story about an emperor may be about an emperor obsessed with new clothes. In Hans Christian Andersen’s tale, a vain leader hires a pair of seamsters to make him a suit. Promising that the outfit will be elegant but invisible to the incompetent, the seamsters are frauds. Clad in nothing, the emperor marches before his people. Commanded to admire him, they go along, cheering until a little boy bellows out the obvious truth—that the emperor has no clothes. Even so, the procession continues.
  • In trying to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, which Donald Trump once promised he could do “within 24 hours,” the U.S. president is presenting himself as a kind of emperor. He has tried to make his administration the conflict’s diplomatic fulcrum. In the course of a single week, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, and a host of European leaders all journeyed to the United States. Peace, according to Trump, will not be hammered out in Kyiv or Moscow, or in Geneva or Vienna or Doha. It will be forged by him in the White House.

But the Trump administration has no plan for ending the war. The President vacillates from one position to another, discarding policies like gloves—a cease-fire one day and a comprehensive settlement the next, with threats of disengagement along the way. The United States struggles to find leverage over Russia, not least because it has pre-emptively rejected any form of escalation, such as additional sanctions or more military aid to Kyiv.

It also struggles to find leverage over Ukraine because Ukraine is fighting for its life and has many governments beyond Washington that support it. Yet the U.S. president insists on being the peacemaker, and an international public is asked to admire his non-existent plan. On and on the procession goes.

Andersen’s story may have prefigured this moment, although no major actor in the war wants to be the boy. So far, no one is willing to call out Emperor Trump. Moscow does not want to upset a president more sympathetic to Russia than any before and likely any in the future. Kyiv does not want to incur Trump’s wrath, given that Trump could set back Ukraine’s war effort by abandoning it. (In a February meeting with Trump, Zelensky came perilously close to telling Trump he was delusional, but this week, he celebrated Trump’s generosity and probity.) And Europe does not want to alienate the leader of a country that underpins its security when the outcome of a major war is unclear and when Russia is its bonafide adversary.

  • The Weaponized World Economy

Surviving the New Age of Economic Coercion

When Washington announced a “framework deal” with China in June, it marked a silent shifting of gears in the global political economy. This was not the beginning of U.S. President Donald

Trump’s imagined epoch of “liberation” under unilateral American greatness or a return to the Biden administration’s dream of managed great-power rivalry. Instead, it was the true opening of the

age of “weaponized interdependence”, in which the United States is discovering what it is like to have others do unto it as it has eagerly done unto others.

This new era will be shaped by weapons of economic and technological coercion—sanctions, supply chain attacks, and export measures—that re-purpose the many points of control in the infrastructure that underpins the interdependent global economy.

For over two decades, the United States has unilaterally weaponized these chokepoints in finance, information flows, and technology for strategic advantage. But market exchange has become hopelessly entangled with national security, and the United States must now defend its interests in a world in which other powers can leverage chokepoints of their own.

That is why the Trump administration had to make a deal with China. Administration officials now acknowledge that they made concessions on semi-conductor export controls in return for China’s easing restrictions on rare-earth minerals that were crippling the

United States’ auto industry. U.S. companies that provide chip design software, such as Synopsys and Cadence, can once again sell their technology in China.

This concession will help the Chinese semiconductor industry wriggle out of the bind it found itself in when the Biden

administration started limiting China’s ability to build advanced semiconductors. And the U.S. firm Nvidia can again sell H20 chips for training artificial intelligence to Chinese customers.

In a little-noticed speech in June, Secretary of State Marco Rubio

hinted at the administration’s reasoning. China had “cornered the market” for rare earths, putting the United States and the world in a “crunch,” he said. The administration had come to realize “that our industrial capability is deeply dependent on a number of potential adversary nation-states, including China, who can hold it over our head,” shifting the “nature of geopolitics,” in “one of the great

challenges of the new century.”

Evening Edition – Europe:

Donald Trump continued browbeating Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Ukraine’s Volodymyr Zelenskiy into making concessions that he believes could end Europe’s most-deadly war in eight decades. Speaking today in an interview on Fox, the US President warned Putin faces “a rough situation” if he doesn’t behave, while chiding Zelenskiy “to show some flexibility.”

The comments followed a whirlwind stretch of diplomacy in which Trump travelled to Alaska for a tête-à-tête with his Russian counterpart. Three days later, European Union leaders joined Zelenskiy for

roundtable discussions at the White House.

While the meetings didn’t yield tangible agreement among the warring parties, they offered a fillip for negotiation. European officials have started conferring with their American counterparts over a Ukraine security package once the fighting ends. Details will need to be hammered out before Trump gets to send invitations to the ballyhooed trilateral summit he’d like to convene.

Investors aren’t waiting for the dust to settle. The mere hint of

peace pushed European defence stocks lower. More broadly, a huge rally in European defence stocks has stalled this summer, as investors await evidence from company order books of promised government military spending that fuelled their optimism.

·      The Impact of Sanctions on Russia’s Legal

Enablers: Why Shadow Fleet Architects Remain Unpunished

  • The John Ormerod case exposes a vast infrastructure of legal and financial professionals who facilitate sophisticated sanctions evasion whilst remaining largely immune from prosecution. This network of lawyers, accountants, and corporate service providers represents the true architects of circumvention, yet enforcement mechanisms consistently fail to address the professional infrastructure that makes such operations possible.
·        Professional Networks Enable Systematic Russian Sanctions Evasion
  • The complexity revealed in the Ormerod shadow fleet operation demonstrates how professional services underpin systematic evasion that undermines the impact of sanctions on Russia. As detailed by Splash247, Russian oil producer Lukoil financed Ormerod through its shipping division to purchase at least 25 second-hand tankers totalling over $700 million between December 2022 and August 2023.
  • Each transaction utilised sophisticated legal structures that required extensive professional support. Reports that “each tanker was acquired by a special-purpose company that Ormerod established in the Marshall Islands, while Lukoil’s Dubai-based Eiger Shipping provided the funding by making advance payments to charter the ships.”
  • This arrangement demonstrates the professional expertise required to create evasion networks. The establishment of Marshall Islands companies, coordination with Dubai financing entities, and structuring of charter arrangements requires legal, accounting, and corporate services that operate with near impunity whilst their clients face sanctions.
  • Why Sanctions on Russia Fail When Professional Infrastructure Remains Protected
  • The question why sanctions on Russia continue despite widespread evasion becomes relevant when examining how professional facilitators escape accountability. The Ormerod network represents just one visible component of a broader infrastructure that includes lawyers structuring transactions, accountants managing finances, and corporate service providers establishing shell entities.
  • “A UK broker facilitated at least nine of the transactions,” demonstrating how mainstream professional services enable evasion through standard commercial practices. These facilitators understand that enforcement focuses on end-users rather than professional service providers.
  • The legal defence strategies reveal professional sophistication in minimising liability. “Ormerod’s lawyers told the British daily newspaper at the time that he ended his association with the tankers before they were sanctioned,” illustrating how professional advice helps structure operations to avoid liability.
·        EU Sanctions Face Similar Professional Facilitation Networks
  • The professional infrastructure enabling evasion operates across jurisdictions, with EU sanctions facing comparable challenges from networks of lawyers, accountants, and corporate service providers who facilitate circumvention through legal structuring. European enforcement authorities struggle to address professional facilitators who operate within legal grey areas.
  • The trans-national nature of professional facilitation creates enforcement gaps that sophisticated networks exploit systematically. The combination of Marshall Islands incorporation, Dubai financing, and British expertise demonstrates how professional services coordinate across jurisdictions to create comprehensive evasion capabilities.
  • European sanctions regimes encounter particular difficulties addressing professional facilitators who maintain legal separation from sanctioned activities whilst providing essential services. The complexity of proving professional liability creates enforcement challenges that enable continued facilitation.
·        Legal and Accounting Networks Operate with Impunity
  • The professional infrastructure supporting sanctions evasion benefits from legal protections that shield service providers from liability for client activities. Lawyers claim attorney-client privilege, accountants assert professional independence, and Corporate service providers maintain they provide standard commercial services.
  • These professional protections create systematic enforcement gaps that enable continued evasion. The Herbert Smith Freehills case, with its £465,000 penalty for £3.9 million in violations

as reported by GOV.UK, represents exceptional enforcement against professional facilitators rather than typical outcomes.

·        The investigation of over 100 law firms with minimal consequences, as detailed by Global Investigations Review, demonstrates how professional networks continue operating despite widespread violations. This enforcement gap enables systematic facilitation with minimal risk of meaningful consequences.
  • Russian Sanctions Effectiveness Undermined by Professional Expertise
  • The effectiveness of Russian sanctions is significantly compromised when professional facilitators understand enforcement limitations and structure operations accordingly. The shadow fleet operations demonstrate how professional expertise transforms sanctions pressure into business opportunities for alternative service providers.
  • The professional infrastructure adapts faster than enforcement mechanisms, creating systematic gaps that determined evasion efforts exploit. The Ormerod case illustrates how British financial expertise, combined with international legal structures, creates evasion capabilities that maintain operational effectiveness whilst providing legal protection.
  • The scale of professional facilitation suggests that sanctions are not working when entire industries develop to provide circumvention services. The shadow fleet represents just one sector where professional networks have created parallel systems that operate outside traditional regulatory frameworks.
·        Enforcement Resource Constraints Enable Professional Facilitation
  • The enforcement statistics reveal resource constraints that prevent meaningful action against professional facilitators. Regulatory authorities lack the capacity to investigate complex professional networks that span multiple jurisdictions and practice areas. The concentration of enforcement against individual end-users whilst professional facilitators escape scrutiny creates perverse incentives that encourage sophisticated legal structuring. Professional service providers understand that enforcement focuses on visible targets rather than operational infrastructure.

The complexity of proving professional liability creates additional enforcement barriers. Professional facilitators structure their involvement to maintain plausible deniability whilst providing essential services that enable systematic evasion.

·        Systemic Reform Requirements for Professional Accountability
  • The systematic nature of professional facilitation requires comprehensive reform that addresses service provider accountability rather than focusing exclusively on end-users.

Current enforcement approaches that ignore professional infrastructure cannot address sophisticated evasion networks.

Effective reform requires enhanced regulatory frameworks that hold professional facilitators accountable for enabling sanctions evasion through legal and financial services. This approach demands international coordination to address transnational professional networks that exploit jurisdictional gaps.

The professional infrastructure supporting sanctions evasion represents a fundamental challenge to enforcement effectiveness that extends beyond individual cases to encompass systematic design flaws. The continued operation of legal and financial networks that facilitate circumvention indicates that sanctions regimes require comprehensive reassessment to address professional accountability rather than symbolic enforcement against individual targets whilst the architects of evasion continue operating with impunity

  • ​

Baltic Report / Indices 19th August 2025

BALTIC INDICES 19/08/2025 DRY                INDEX:     1964 (- 58)

CAPESIZE   INDEX:     3023 (- 189)
PANAMAX    INDEX:     1637 (+ 7)
SUPRAMAX   INDEX:     1369 (+ 8)
HANDYSIZE INDEX:      708 (+ 6)
BCI    TC AVG $/DAY 25072 (-1566)
BPI82 TC AVG $/DAY 14737 (+ 64)
BSI TC AVG $/DAY 17302 (+ 95)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 12741 (+106)

TIMECHARTER

‘Aurora Borealis’ 2023 82315 dwt dely Singapore 20/22 Aug trip via EC South America redel Singapore-

Japan $14,750 – Norden

‘NBA Monet’ 2012 82099 dwt dely Immingham 22/24 Aug trip via US east coast redel India $24,800 –

Oldendorff

‘Trikeri’ 2023 82016 dwt dely Singapore 20/21 Aug trip via WC Australia & AG redel PMO $16,500 – Cargill

‘Alpha Loyalty’ 2007 75949 dwt dely Hong Kong 18/20 Aug trip via Indonesia redel South China $13,000

‘Kamares’ 2004 74444 dwt dely Hong Kong prompt trip via Indonesia redel South China $10,750

‘Van Hannah’ 2023 63925 dwt dely Weda prompt trip via Indonesia redel WC India $21,000 – Korea Line

‘Jabal Hafit’ 2017 63369 dwt dely Kuantan prompt trip via Indonesia redel Thailand $18,000 – WBC

‘Aggelos B’ 2010 58480 dwt dely Tuban prompt trip via Indonesia redel Bangladesh intention clinker

$18,000

‘Xina Hai Tong 27’ 2011 56738 dwt dely Singapore 25/30 Aug trip via Indonesia redel China $16,300

VOYAGES ORE

‘TBN’ 170000/10 Dampier/Qingdao 3/5 Sep $9.15 fio 90000shinc/30000shinc – Rio Tinto

‘Koch TBN’ 150000/10 West Australia/Kaohsiung 6/9 Sep $8.80 fio 75000shinc/38000shinc – CSE

GRAIN

‘TBN’ 66000/10 Up River /Port Kelang-Butterworth 15/21 Sep $41.50 fio 8000shinc/8000shinc – Omegra

Baltic Exchange Index – 19 AUGUST 2025

Baltic Exchange Capesize Index    3023 (-189)

Route   Description                            Value($) Change

====== ===================================   =====

C2     160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam           11.843    – 0.236
C3          160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao         24.000 – 0.510
C5          160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao     9.195 – 0.572
C7          150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam       14.493  – 0.336
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV         27,821 – 1393
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan     48,500 – 1344
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV                 21,986 – 2887
C14              180000mt China-Brazil RV                 23,955 –   925

C16    180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero         4,550 –   775
C17           170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao  17.911 – 0.413

==========================================   ======

5TC    Weighted Timecharter Average            25,072 – 1566

Baltic Exchange Index – 19 AUGUST 2025 Baltic Exchange Capesize 182 Index

Route    Description                                    Value  Change

=====    ==========================================    ===

C8_182   182000mt Gib/Hamburg transatlantic RV        31,207 -1493
C9_182   182000mt Cont-Med trip China-Japan            52,656 – 563
C10_182 182000mt China-Japan transpacific RV          24,886 – 2887
C14_182 182000mt China-Brazil round voyage            27,423 – 1078
C16_182 182000mt Backhaul                               7,881 –   932

======================================================

C5TC 182 Weighted Timecharter Average                 27,814   -1691

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 19 AUGUST 2025 Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,637 (+ 7)

Route Description                         Value ($) Change

====== ================================= =======
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV                      15,391             + 73

P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 22,483 + 210
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV   13,887    – 113
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib     8,434     – 25
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV                            14,418 + 185

====== =================================   ======

P5TC   Weighted Timecharter Average         14,737 +   64

The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.

Route Description                         Value ($) Change

====== ================================= ======
P5_82 S. China Indo RV                      14,206          – 108

P7     66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao   52,821 + 0.178
P8          66000mt Santos to Qingdao            38,029    + 0.065

Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 19 AUGUST 2025 Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1369 (+8)

Route   Description                                   Value ($) Change

====== =========================================   ====

S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 17,208 +395
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan             27,036 – 207
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV                  15,507 + 257
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa                              15,500       0
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero                                        27,929 +15
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf                                  13,096 +125
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China               18,861 +100
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India                        19,463 + 221
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero       15,739 + 7
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China              15,521 +114
S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East             14,125 – 58

====== =========================================   =====

S11TC  Weighted Timecharter Average                 17,302 + 95
S10TC              Supramax(58) Timecharter Average             15,238 + 95

Baltic Exchange Index – *18 AUGUST 2025* Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 702 (+ 4)

Route   Description                                 Value ($) Change

====== ========================================   =====

HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro    7,093 +29
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston           9,343 +72
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero  16,450 +83
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Pass 16,236 +329
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan                           13,519 +31
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jpn    12,644 -31
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia                       12,625 +12

====== ==============================================

7TC     Weighted Timecharter Average                  12,635 +   65

(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd., 2025

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·       Can new shipping laws bury the ghost of British legacy?

India’s new shipping laws promise smoother seas — modernising rules, easing Indian-flag registration to boost ship tonnage, and introducing a dedicated Coastal Shipping Act. Could this be the tide that lifts India’s shipping industry to its full potential?

Indian exporters shelled out hundreds of billions of dollars to overseas shipping companies over the decades despite a thousand-year maritime history, thanks to the legacy of British enacted laws. A recent legal overhaul is promising but the devil may lie in the details. In a sweeping legislative push, the Indian Parliament has passed three landmark bills in the past month to modernise the outdated framework: the Merchant Shipping Bill, 2025.

  • PM Modi brainstorms road map to fast-track next-gen reforms
  • Prime Minister Narendra Modi meets with top officials to accelerate reforms. The government aims to boost the economy amid global challenges. S&P upgrades India’s credit rating. Modi pledges reforms, including GST 2.0 and self-reliance. India targets a made- in-India chip by 2025. The nation plans increased nuclear power and job creation.

·       What India is now doing to avoid a fertiliser shock.

  • India is the second-largest consumer of fertilizers in the world after China. To meet the demand-supply gap, India imports the critical crop nutrients from many countries. Last week, three Indian fertilizer firms signed a long-term supply contract with a Saudi Arabia firm for DAP – a critical crop nutrient. India is doing this to ensure enough supplies of fertilizers.
·        Could Trump’s tariff trigger India’s next ‘1991 moment’?
  • Severa; economists have called Trump’s tariff jolt India’s “Next 1991 moment” and suggested the Government size this

opportunity to unleash the next round of far-reaching domestic economic reforms. The steep tariffs imposed by US President Trump on Indian goods threaten to significantly dent exports to the world’s largest economy. Half of 50% levy has already taken effect, with the rest kicking in on 27th August, unless it get’s reworked by Pres. Trump or gets postponed to yet another date, after spate of discussions that are happening on both soils.

·    How US-India trade impasse affects container and tanfier shipping

  • US importers of Indian goods hit with 25% levy; import taxes rise to 50% on August 27 due to Indian purchasing of Russian crude
  • Goods from India represented 6% of total US containerised imports in 1H25; US imports from India rose 9% in 1H25 vs 1H24
  • Effects on Indian tanker flows, as well as 25% penalty levy on US box imports, could hinge on negotiations to end Russia-Ukraine war
  • The US and India — the world’s first- and fourth-largest economies

— are increasingly at odds over trade. New US tariffs on imports from India have implications for box flows as well as tanker trades.

·    Tanfier tightness limits China’s ability to absorb spare Russian Urals crude from India

Tanker markets await outcome of the scheduled Friday US-Russia summit in Alaska before making next decision.

China could in theory absorb Urals crude diverted from India, but a combination of tight availability of non-sanctioned tankers and India’s defiance of US tariffs will likely limit that trade, argues Vortexa.

·    Russia adds large handy to its Crimea fleet

Irtysh has disabled its AIS data a few times in the past few months in the Black Sea. Satellite shows vessel berthed at the sanctioned port of Sevastopol.

This is one of the biggest vessels to join Russia’s Crimea fleet Observers say that it is a new trend to send big ships to the Russian-occupied Crimea, and as long as there are no sanctions on grain imports, we may see more of those

·    The weefi in charts: Russia’s far east ports go darfi in AIS

interference outbreafi | LA tops 1m teu, eclipsing Covid-era high | Panama Canal sees boxship boost

  • Russia’s far east is the latest area to experience severe

disruption to AIS data.

  • Los Angeles handled 106 vessels last month, 30% above the five-year average, including 16 ships with capacity of over 13,000 teu and 11 extra loaders.
    • Total Panama Canal transits up 8% in July vs June, with neo- panamax transits rising 19% and panamax transits up 3%.
  • Is the world any closer to seeing a deal struck to end the war in Ukraine after the frenetic diplomacy of the last five days? First, the spectacle in Alaska of U.S. President Donald Trump rolling out the red carpet for Russia’s Vladimir Putin. Then, on Monday, a hastily arranged follow-up meeting between Ukraine President Volodymyr

Zelenskyy – and assorted European Union allies – and Trump in the White House.

The answer, is that the diplomatic whirl has revealed glimpses of what a future peace deal may look like. Or, more precisely, what it looks like for Putin and Trump. It may be a bitter pill for Ukraine to swallow, but what it all suggests is a meeting of minds between the leaders of the two great powers involved.

For all the talk of security guarantees for Ukraine, the peace being looked at by the US president looks to be aligned with that desired by his Russian counterpart.

·        AI is about to radically alter military command structures that haven’t changed much since Napoleon’s army

  • Despite two centuries of evolution, the structure of a modern military staff would be recognizable to Napoleon. At the same time, military organizations have struggled to incorporate new technologies as they adapt to new domains – air, space and information – in modern war.
  • The sizes of military headquarters have grown to accommodate the expanded information flows and decision points of these new facets of warfare. The result is diminishing marginal returns and a coordination nightmare – too many cooks in the kitchen – that risks jeopardizing mission command.
  • AI agents – autonomous, goal-oriented software powered by large language models – can automate routine staff tasks, compress decision timelines and enable smaller, more resilient command posts. They can shrink the staff while also making it more effective.
  • As an international relations scholar and reserve officer in the U.S. Army who studies military strategy, I see both the opportunity afforded by the technology and the acute need for change.
  • That need stems from the reality that today’s command structures still mirror Napoleon’s field headquarters in both form and function – industrial-age architectures built for massed armies. Over time, these staffs have ballooned in size, making coordination cumbersome. They also result in sprawling command posts that modern precision artillery, missiles and drones can target effectively and electronic warfare can readily disrupt.
  • Russia’s so-called “Graveyard of Command Posts” in Ukraine

vividly illustrates how static headquarters where opponents

can mass precision artillery, missiles and drones become liabilities on a modern battlefield.

·      The role of AI agents

  • Military planners now see a world in which AI agents – autonomous, goal-oriented software that can perceive, decide and act on their own initiative – are mature enough to deploy in command systems. These agents promise to automate the fusion of multiple sources of intelligence, threat-modeling, and even limited decision cycles in support of a commander’s goals. There is still a human in the loop, but the humans will be able to issue commands faster and receive more timely and contextual updates from the battlefield.
  • These AI agents can parse doctrinal manuals, draft operational plans and generate courses of action, which helps accelerate the tempo of military operations. Experiments – including efforts I ran at Marine Corps University – have demonstrated how even basic large language models can accelerate staff estimates and inject creative, data-driven options into the planning process. These efforts point to the end of traditional staff roles.
  • There will still be people – war is a human endeavor – and ethics will still factor into streams of algorithms making decisions. But the people who remain deployed are likely to gain the ability to navigate mass volumes of information with the help of AI agents.
  • These teams are likely to be smaller than modern staffs. AI agents will allow teams to manage multiple planning groups simultaneously.
  • For example, they will be able to use more dynamic red teaming techniques – role-playing the opposition – and vary key assumptions to create a wider menu of options than traditional plans. The time saved not having to build PowerPoint slides and updating staff estimates will be shifted to contingency analysis – asking “what if” questions – and building operational assessment frameworks – conceptual maps of how a plan is likely to play out in a particular situation – that provide more flexibility to commanders.

·      Designing the next military staff

  • To explore the optimal design of this AI agent-augmented staff, I led a team of researchers at the bipartisan think tank Center for Strategic & International Studies’ Futures Lab to explore alternatives. The team developed three baseline scenarios reflecting what most military analysts are seeing as the key operational problems in modern great power competition: joint blockades, firepower strikes and joint island campaigns. Joint refers to an action coordinated among multiple branches of a military.
  • In the example of China and Taiwan, joint blockades describe how China could isolate the island nation and either starve it or set conditions for an invasion. Firepower strikes describe how Beijing could fire salvos of missiles – similar to what Russia is doing in Ukraine – to destroy key military centers and even critical infrastructure. Last, in Chinese doctrine, a Joint Island Landing Campaign describes the cross-strait invasion their military has spent decades refining.
  • Any AI agent-augmented staff should be able to manage warfighting functions across these three operational scenarios.
  • The research team found that the best model kept humans in the loop and focused on feedback loops. This approach – called

the Adaptive Staff Model and based on pioneering work by sociologist Andrew Abbott – embeds AI agents within continuous human-machine feedback loops, drawing on doctrine, history and real-time data to evolve plans on the fly.

  • In this model, military planning is ongoing and never complete, and focused more on generating a menu of options for the commander to consider, refine and enact. The research team tested the

approach with multiple AI models and found that it outperformed alternatives in each case.

  • The military will need to dramatically change how it educates its officers. Officers will have to learn how AI agents work, including how to build them, and start using the classroom as a lab to develop new approaches to the age-old art of military command and decision-making. This could include revamping some military schools to focus on AI, a concept floated in the White House’s AI Action Plan released on July 23, 2025.
  • Three shipbuilding clusters to come up at Rs.75,000 crore.
  • Five states re in talks with local, foreign shipbuilders to pick the ideal sites to host the facilities. The Centre is looking at an investment of Rs.75,000 crore in the three brand-new shipyards planned along its east and west coasts, as it targets to make India a global hub for shipbuilding. The investment will be made over 4-5 years, with yards capable of making and repairing sips. Overall, the Government is targeting about Rs.25,000 crore investment per green-field cluster, which may be subject to significant changes based on the final locations and the shipyard sizes. One of the yards may also host a shipbreaking facility supplying material or shipbuilding.
  • Indian state-run firms were looking to tie up with global shipbuilders. India is looking to Japan and Korea for shipbuilding initiatives, with investments in Indian clusters, while existing public sector shipbuildings are separately negotiating with Korean firms for joint ventures. It is the ambition of the Government to make ships of all sizes and build locally, and encourage Indian built, owned and flagged cargo ships. The country’s share in global shipbuilding now remains below 1%. The projection is to raise the share of Indian built ships in India fleet from 5% at present to 7% by 2030 and 69% by 2047. Five states are in talks with local and foreign shipbuilders to pick the ideal locations to host the three facilities.

·         United States and Europe Economies in Charts :

·         Lloyds Register Class News 20/2025:

IMO Guidance on the Carriage of Biofuels Blends by Conventional Bunker Ships

Applicability: Shipowners, ship operators and ship managers.

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has approved its Interim Guidance on the Carriage of Blends of Biofuels and MARPOL Annex I Cargoes by Conventional Bunker Ships (MEPC.1/Circ.917).

Whilst these Interim Guidelines are not mandatory, they will be considered by flag Administrations and their Recognized Organizations in the acceptance of carriage of biofuel blends.

The Interim Guidance states the maximum blend ratio (by volume) of biofuel and MARPOL Annex I cargoes (petroleum derived oils) permitted to be carried by a “bunker ship” has increased from 25% to 30% biofuels, provided that:

  • The “bunker ship” is an oil tanker, as defined in Regulation 1.5 of MARPOL Annex I, that is certified under MARPOL Annex I to carry, transport and deliver fuel oil for use by ships.
  • All residues or tank washings have been discharged ashore unless the oil discharge monitoring equipment is approved for the biofuel blend(s) being shipped.

If the above requirements are met, the International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate does not need to be modified.

For bunker ships carrying more than 30% biofuels

The provisions of MARPOL Annex II (Regulations Controlling Carriage of Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk) and Chapter 17 of the International Code for Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (IBC Code) apply.

For biofuel-carrying ships other than bunker ships 25% or less

Biofuel blends and MARPOL Annex I cargoes with 25% (by volume) or

less biofuel are to be considered a MARPOL Annex I cargo and are required to comply with MARPOL Annex I.

More than 25%

Biofuel blends and MARPOL Annex I cargoes with more than 25% (by volume) biofuel are to be regarded as MARPOL Annex II products and must comply with the requirements set out in Chapter 17 of the IBC Code.

Approved biofuels

The Interim Guidelines set out the approved biofuels in the context of MARPOL Annex II and are indicated in the MEPC.2/Circular, Annex 11 as:

  • tert-Amyl ethyl ether
  • Ethyl alcohol
  • Fatty acid methyl esters (FAME)
  • Vegetable fatty acid distillates.
How Lloyd’s Register can help

Fuel Oil Bunker Analysis and Advisory Service (FOBAS) offers a range of services to ship operators for the safe adoption of drop-in biofuels and synthetic fuels through its comprehensive fuel quality assessment programme, support with the onboard fuel management, operational risk assessment and NOx emission measurement.

  • As the nation emerges as a global hydrogen powerhouse, the inaugural World Hydrogen India (25 – 26 September, New Delhi), organised by S&P Global Commodity Insights, is bringing together 250+ C-suite executives, government ministers, end-users and institutional investors for two days of strategic intelligence that will define the sector’s trajectory.

From decoding the National Green Hydrogen Mission’s implementation to unlocking billion-dollar investment opportunities, this exclusive gathering delivers the cutting-edge insights and

high-level connections essential for positioning your organisation at the forefront of India’s projected $8+ billion hydrogen economy.

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