• The EU is prepared for any outcome in trade talks with the US, including a breakdown in negotiations, according to Ursula von der Leyen. The Commission president made the remarks in the early hours of this morning after discussing the latest proposals from the White House with the bloc’s leaders in Brussels. With the US pushing for what EU officials see as unbalanced concessions, member states must decide whether to accept an unsatisfactory deal, or hit back and risk escalation and the ire of President Donald Trump. The clock is ticking. Tariffs on nearly all of the bloc’s exports to the US are set to jump to 50% when a deadline expires in just under two weeks. Officials believe the best-case scenario remains an agreement on principles that would allow the negotiations to continue beyond the July 9 deadline.
• The US and China finalized a trade truce reached last month, with Beijing agreeing to supply rare earths in exchange for the lifting of US countermeasures. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said that the White House has imminent plans to reach agreements with 10 major trading partners. Countries from Japan to India have balked at signing deals without clarity on separate levies on exports.
Glad It’s All Over
The conflagration in the Middle East, like all those that went before it, mattered chiefly to global markets if it threatened the supply of oil. Iran could, if it wanted, stop tankers from going through the Strait of Hormuz for a while. The perception that it might do so (at great cost to itself) reared after the US attacked Iranian nuclear facilities, and then dwindled when Iran’s limited response against a regional US air base showed that it wouldn’t go that far. This is how odds moved on the Polymarket prediction market:
• Absent at the Creation?
American Strategy and the Delusion of a Post-Trump Restoration
In Donald Trump’s first go-round as U.S. president, his heterodox approach seemed to portend a dramatic transformation in American foreign policy and potentially even the end of the rules-based international order. And yet for the most part, prevailing institutions, groupings, and rules endured. Washington’s alliances held fast, U.S. adversaries advanced their interests in real but limited ways, and American power proved resilient. As a result, the Biden administration was able to renew traditional elements of American influence and restore key fundamentals of U.S. foreign policy, such as active global leadership, alliances and partnerships, and the defence of an open, rules-based international order.
But when Trump leaves office in January 2029, there will be no going back. Trump’s re-election dashed the view that his first presidency was a mere aberration, and his second administration’s early, seismic actions on global trade, skepticism toward allies, and affection for erstwhile adversaries have already changed the United States’ role and image in the world. Some may argue that it is too soon to plan the next administration’s foreign policy because no one knows what further disruptions are coming. But thinking of the future of American foreign policy solely in terms of the post-Trump inheritance runs the risk of being overly reactive or reflexively restorationist.
One notable lesson from the early months of Trump’s second term has been the scope and scale of policy change that is possible in a very short period. The next president should enter office with a clear and constructive vision for the future of American foreign policy and move to realize it with the same alacrity the Trump administration has displayed in its first 100 days. It is not too soon to start debating the contours of that vision.
To begin, the United States needs what accountants refer to as a “zero based” review of its foreign policy: a clean slate from which to reevaluate and justify its long-held interests, values, and policies. Four years from now, many of the familiar pillars of U.S. grand strategy—from alliances to multilateral organizations to global treaties—will likely be transformed beyond recognition. What’s more, the world these tools were intended to help manage will have changed profoundly.
No new president, whether a Democrat, a more traditional Republican, or a Trump disciple, will have the option of returning to the familiar approaches of the post–Cold War era. Starting from a zero base will guard against the tendency to default to old structures and concepts that might no longer reflect the United States’ vital interests and geopolitical context or the needs and preferences of the American people.
Trump has exposed the growing cracks in the U.S.-led International order. But he is not interested in fixing them—quite the opposite.
By the time his second term is over, that old order will be irreparably broken.
Whoever follows Trump will have to reckon with a complex, multipolar international order and decide what role the United States should play in it.
• Did the Attacks on Iran Succeed?
Israel and America Bought Themselves Time but Will Pay in Other Ways
n June 24, Iran, Israel, and the United States agreed to a cease-fire, putting a halt to nearly two weeks of war. During the conflict, Israel hit dozens of confirmed or suspected Iranian nuclear targets. When the United States joined in, it dropped bunker-busting bombs on Fordow, a nuclear site that was hard for the Israelis to reach, and attacked two other facilities. Now, as the dust settles, analysts must begin determining what the strikes accomplished—and whether they were worth the consequences.
It is still too soon to say exactly how much Operations Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer, as the Israelis and Americans named their respective campaigns, set back Iran’s nuclear program. A leaked preliminary U.S. intelligence report estimates the strikes added just a few months to Iran’s breakout time. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump, meanwhile, say the damage was more sweeping. The official assessments released thus far from Israel and the United States generally support the idea that the strikes set back Iran significantly, but they focus on general damage and offer little specificity about the effect on Iran’s breakout time. In truth, even Iran probably does not understand the full scale of the damage to its enterprise, and its leaders are still deciding what to do next.
But experts can start to catalogue the tangible results. They know that the attacks dealt serious damage to Iran’s enrichment facilities and killed many top scientists. They know that important equipment was blown apart and buried. But Iran may still have much of what it needs to make a weapon, including highly enriched uranium, either because it is safely in storage or because it can be salvaged from the rubble. The Iranian government will also now make its efforts more opaque than ever, even if it engages in diplomacy. Iran’s new timeline may therefore vary wildly. The country may never produce a weapon. Or it could produce one very quickly.
• WHAT IRAN LOST
Whatever the effect on Tehran’s breakout time, this much is clear: Iran’s nuclear program was badly mauled. The Isfahan nuclear research center, the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and its associated buildings, and the Fordow fuel enrichment plant—Iran’s three main nuclear sites—were all seriously damaged. Entire parts of Isfahan and Natanz were outright destroyed. Iran’s Arak reactor was destroyed and, with it, any near-term chance that Iran could produce weapons-grade plutonium. The Israelis also attacked several other research and development sites throughout Iran, including parts of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and of the Iranian military’s Organization of Defensive Innovation, which analysts suspect is responsible for nuclear weapons–related research and development. The deaths of at least a dozen Iranian scientists in the Israeli strikes have cost Iran decades of practical knowledge useful to building nuclear weapons. Israeli attacks targeting Iran’s missile program may hinder the country’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon that could fit on a warhead.
• Saudi Arabia strikes eight port terminal deals
The Saudi Ports Authority (Mawani) has sealed long-term concession contracts worth over SAR2.2bn ($586m) to develop and operate multipurpose cargo terminals at eight major ports across the Kingdom.
• The 20-year agreements have been awarded to two international port operators: Saudi Global Ports (SGP), a subsidiary of Singapore’s PSA, and Red Sea Gateway Terminal Company (RSGT), a Saudi-Malaysian joint venture. Each company will be responsible for developing and managing four terminals.
• SGP will oversee the terminals at key ports in the Eastern Province: King Abdulaziz Port in Dammam, Jubail Commercial Port, King Fahd Industrial Port in Jubail, and Ras Al-Khair Port.
• Meanwhile, RSGT, which currently operates the container terminal at Jeddah Islamic Port (pictured), will manage four ports in the Western Province: Jeddah Islamic Port, Yanbu Commercial Port, King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu, and Jazan Port. Upgrades at King Fahd Industrial Port in Yanbu will include the installation of state-of-the-art ship-to-shore (STS) and rubber-tyred gantry (RTG) cranes, as well as new trucks, trailers, and other equipment to improve operational efficiency and reduce turnaround times.
• Transport and Logistics Minister Saleh bin Nasser Al-Jasser, who also chairs Mawani, stated that these new public-private partnerships underscore the Authority’s commitment to boosting the Kingdom’s maritime transport sector, expanding economic diversification, and solidifying Saudi Arabia’s role as a global logistics hub.
• Diana Shipping seals Cargill ultramax charter
• New York-listed Greek bulker owner Diana Shipping has secured a new time charter deal with Cargill Ocean Transportation for one of its ultramaxes.
• The Semiramis Paliou-led company has fixed the 60,404 dwt DSI Polaris until July 21 next year at $12.500 per day. The charter starts on July 1 and Cargill has options to extend the contract for two more months.
• The deal follows Stone Shipping’s charter of the 2018-built bulker in July 2024 at a day rate of $15,400.
• Diana said it expects to earn about $4.66m from the minimum scheduled period of the charter.
• Earlier this month, the company sealed another charter deal for one of its Newcastlemaxes up to end-October 2026, which will bring in at least $11m.
• Global ship recycling landmark arrives with patchy compliance across South Asia
• Fully 16 years in the making, the Hong Kong International Convention for the Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships entered into force today, with the majority of demo yards in Bangladesh and Pakistan – two vital recycling destinations – still not compliant with the international regulation.
• The Hong Kong Convention, first adopted back in May 2009, addresses key environmental, occupational health, and safety risks involved in the recycling of ships.
• “The entry into force of the Hong Kong Convention this year marks a watershed moment in our shared objective to promote sustainable and safe ship recycling practices globally. This achievement reflects years of dedicated work and will renew our drive to safeguard human health and the environment in this critical industry,” commented Arsenio Dominguez, secretary- general of the International Maritime Organization.
• Latest statistics from BIMCO show that India is well on track with the new regulation with 110 yards complying with Hong Kong standards. In Bangladesh, just 10 yards, soon likely rising to 14, are ready, and there are 11 compliant yards in Turkey, but none in Pakistan.
• Pakistan’s federal minister for maritime affairs Muhammad Junaid Anwar Chaudhry has announced this week the approval of Rs12bn ($43m) in belated funds to get the country’s Gadani shipbreaking area up to speed with today’s new regulation.
• Philip Roche, global co-head of shipping at law firm Norton Rose Fulbright, while hailing today’s entry into force as a “major milestone,” warned that the regulatory landscape remains too fragmented.
• “The convention’s impact is arguably limited by its lack of equivalency with the Basel Convention and EU regulations, which continue to restrict access to modern, certified recycling yards in South Asia. Until these frameworks are aligned, shipowners must navigate a complex web of overlapping obligations,” Roche said.
• Research data shows that in 2025 so far, 4.9m dwt has been reported sold for recycling globally, up 12% on 2024’s run rate, the lowest annual since 2007, though still down 57% against the 10- year average. Containership recycling has been especially weak, down 95% on the 10-year average, while gas carrier demolition sales have run at a record pace, up 106% year-on-year, supported by the disposal of steam turbine LNG carriers amid a weak earnings environment.
• Lloyd’s Register awards AiP to MOL and Samsung Heavy Industries for SOFC-equipped LNG carrier
The proposed vessel offers enhanced energy efficiency and lower GHG emissions compared to conventional internal combustion engines.
Lloyd’s Register (LR) has awarded Approval in Principle (AiP) to Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. (MOL) and Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. (SHI) for the design of a 174,000 cbm liquefied natural gas (LNG) carrier integrating Solid Oxide Fuel Cell (SOFC) technology.
The AiP was formally presented during Nor-Shipping 2025, held at NOVA Spektrum in Lillestrøm, Norway.
SOFCs are high-efficiency, high-temperature electrochemical devices that generate electricity from fuels such as hydrogen or natural gas. Using a solid ceramic electrolyte, SOFCs produce significantly lower emissions and offer long-term potential for integration into a wide range of vessel types and energy systems.
The proposed vessel will feature a 300kW SOFC unit to serve as an auxiliary power generator, offering enhanced energy efficiency and lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions compared to conventional internal combustion engines.
This project involved close technical collaboration and thorough risk assessments, including Hazard Identification (HAZID) and Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) evaluations, all conducted in accordance with LR’s Rules and Regulations.
• Sung-Gu Park, President – North East Asia, Lloyd’s Register, said: “This AiP reflects our commitment to driving innovation that supports the maritime industry’s transition to net zero. It demonstrates how collaboration can unlock the potential of transformative technologies for scalable decarbonisation solutions in LNG shipping and beyond.”
• China is still choking Exports of Rare Earths despite pack with the U.S.
• Western companies are struggling to secure approvals for rare-earth imports from Chinese authorities, despite the U.S.-China deal.
• Two weeks after China promised the U.S. it would ease the exports of rare-earth magnets, Chinese authorities are dragging out approval of Western companies’ requests for the critical components, a situation that could reignite trade tensions between Washington and Beijing.
• Western companies say they are receiving barely enough magnets for their factories and have little visibility of future supplies. Firms are waiting weeks as Chinese authorities scrutinize their applications—only to be rejected in some cases. And applications for raw rare earths, which are used to make magnets, are rarely granted.
• What You Need to Know Today
Iranian missiles fired against Israel inflicted some $3 billion of damages, required to fix buildings and compensate businesses. The calculations shared by the Israeli finance ministry and tax body this week indicate the extent to which Iran broke through Israel’s defences during nearly two weeks of rocket fire. Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei claimed victory in the war and said the US’s intervention achieved nothing, in his first comments since a ceasefire came into effect Tuesday. The location of Iran’s highly-enriched uranium stockpile still hasn’t been determined
• Russia’s War Economy Is Finally Catching Up With Its Banks
• Get caught up.
• Four years into its Ukraine invasion, the Kremlin’s economy faces a worsening outlook that is graver than publicly acknowledged, Russian banking officials told us. The arising within the next 12 months is significant.
• Strains within the banking system could raise wider questions for President Vladimir Putin’s ability to continue the war, especially if Kyiv’s US and European allies were to target the Russian financial sector with harsher sanctions. The European Union is currently discussing fresh
• The bankers raised the alarm just a day after European to boost defence spending. Meanwhile, the US is considering Ukraine defend itself against the ongoing assault.
• Iranian missiles fired against Israel inflicted some $3 billion of damages, required to fix buildings and compensate businesses. The calculations shared by the Israeli finance ministry and tax body this week indicate the extent to which Iran broke through Israel’s defences during nearly two weeks of rocket fire.
Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and said the US’s intervention achieved nothing, in his first comments since a ceasefire came into effect Tuesday. The still hasn’t been determined.
• The highest concentration of cocaine users live in Australia and New Zealand, the United Nations Office on, underscoring that global consumption of the is reaching record highs, While more people use cocaine in the Americas than anywhere else, per-capita consumption is most prevalent in Australia and New Zealand. Some 3% of those aged 15 to 64 in Australia and New Zealand used cocaine in 2023, the report said. That’s almost double the proportion in the Americas, and nearly triple the percentage in Europe — the next- biggest consumers of the drug, the report said.
Baltic Freight Indices – News 26th June 2025
BALTIC INDICES 26/06/2025
DRY INDEX: 1553 (- 112)
CAPESIZE INDEX: 2345 (- 379)
PANAMAX INDEX: 1468 (+ 43)
SUPRAMAX INDEX: 1000 (+6)
HANDYSIZE INDEX: 636 (+3)
BCI TC AVG $/DAY 19447 (- 3145)
BPI8 TC AVG $/DAY 13214 (+389)
BSI TC AVG $/DAY 12638 (+71)
BHSI TC AVG $/DAY 11451 (+50)
TIMECHARTER
‘Pedhoulas Commander’ Paralos relet 2008 83684 dwt dely Brake 25 Jun trip via US Gulf redel Skaw-Gibraltar $13,500 – cnr
‘Agamemnon II’ 2002 82212 dwt dely Dhamra 25/27
Jun trip via South Africa redel China intention chrome ore $14,500 – cnr
‘Star Trader’ 2010 82181 dwt dely aps EC South America 10 Jul trip redel SE Asia $15,500+$550,000 bb – Langlois
‘Egret Star’ 2012 81678 dwt dely Valetta 22 Jun trip via NC South America redel Singapore-Japan $17,500 – cnr
‘Figalia Navigator’ 2012 81480 dwt dely aps EC South America 18 Jul trip redel Singapore-Japan $15,500 + $550,000 bb – cnr
‘JY Shanghai’ 2020 81090 dwt dely Ghent 5/7 Jul trip via France redel China intention grain $22,000 – Norden
‘Velos Libra’ 2014 77134 dwt dely aps EC South America 12/21 Jul trip redel Skaw-Gibraltar $22,000 – Cobelfret –
‘Hua Yang Chuan qi’ 2003 76945 dwt dely Hong Kong 27 Jun trip via Indonesia redel S China $11,250 – cnr
‘Charm Loong’ 2008 76636 dwt dely Weda 26/30 Jun trip via Australia redel Singapore-Japan $14,500 – cnr
‘Shen Hua 808’ 2014 75411 dwt dely Hong Kong 30 Jun trip via Indonesia redel Malaysia $9,300 – Straits United
‘Tomini Harmony’ 2015 63950 dwt dely Port Elizabeth prompt trip redel China intention manganese ore $14,000 + $140,000 bb – Drydel
‘Josco Huizhou’ 2014 61648 dwt dely Koh Sichang prompt trip redel Indonesia intention sugar $10,000 – Louis Dreyfus
‘Carmencita’ 2009 58773 dwt dely Cebu prompt trip via Indonesia redel Bangladesh $14,000 – cnr
‘Vishva Prerna’ 2011 57161 dwt dely Salalah 1/5 Jul trip redel WC India intention gypsum $12,000 – cnr
‘VIMC Brave’ 2007 53529 dwt dely Chittagong 2 Jul trip via Indonesia redel China $6,500 – cnr
PERIOD
‘Illawara Fortune’ 2013 95707 dwt dely Kawasaki 30 Jun 4/7 months redel worldwide $11,250 – Swissmarine
VOYAGES
ORE
‘TBN’ 160000/10 Port Hedland/Qingdao 14/16 Jul
$7.25 fio 80000shinc/30000shinc – BHP
$7.35 fio 80000shinc/30000shinc – Cargill
‘TBN’ 160000/10 Port Hedland/Qingdao 12/15 Jul
$7.35 fio 80000shinc/30000shinc – Cargill
Baltic Exchange Index – 26 JUNE 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize 182 Index
Route Description Value Change
C8_182 182000mt Gib/Hamburg transatlantic RV 30,643 – 2571
C9_182 182000mt Cont-Med trip China-Japan 48,719 – 3994
C10_182 182000mt China-Japan transpacific RV 13,841 – 6318
C14_182 182000mt China-Brazil round voyage 22,265 – 1505
C16_182 182000mt Backhaul 6,000 – 1513
C5TC 182 Weighted Timecharter Average 21,847 – 3662
Baltic Exchange Index – 26 JUNE 2025
Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 2345 (- 379)
Route Description Value($) Change
C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 9.836 – 0.478
C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 21.620 – 0.930
C5 160-170000mt W Australia to Qingdao 6.880 – 1.530
C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 13.864 – 0.772
C8_14 180000mt Gibraltar-Hamburg T/A RV 25,750 – 2464
C9_14 180000mt Conti/Med Trip China/Japan 44,063 – 4031
C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 10,282 – 6154
C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 18,567 – 1273
C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero 2313 – 1349
C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay to Qingdao 16.594 – 0.589
5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 19,447 – 3145
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82500mt Index 26 JUNE 2025
Baltic Exchange Panamax Index 1,468 (+ 43)
Route Description Value ($) Change
P1A_82 Skaw-Gib T/A RV 13,750 + 614
P2A_82 Skaw-Gib trip HK-SKorea incl Taiwan 20,054 + 394
P3A_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan, Pacific/RV 12,285 + 325
P4_82 HK-SKorea incl Taiwan to Skaw-Gib 7,866 +70
P6_82 Dely Spore Atlantic RV 13,045 + 359
========================= =======
P5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 13,214 + 389
The following routes do not contribute to the BPI or Weighted TC Average.
Route Description Value ($) Change
P5_82 S. China Indo RV 11,547 +253
P7 66000mt Mississippi Rvr to Qingdao 47,443 + 0.379
P8 66000mt Santos to Qingdao 35.900 + 0.386
Baltic Exchange Panamax 82 Asia Index – 27 June 2025
Route Description Size (MT) Value($) Change
===== ======================
P5_82 S.China one Indo RV 11,727 +153
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index – 26 JUNE 2025
Baltic Exchange Supramax Index 1000 (+ 6)
Route Description Value ($) Change
============================== ====
S1B_63 Cnkle trip via Med or Blsea to China-S.Korea 12,167 – 4
S1C_63 US Gulf trip to China-South Japan 19,400 – 71
BS2_63 North China one Australian or Pacific RV 11,950 + 175
BS3_63 North China trip to West Africa 11,050 + 50
S4A_63 US Gulf trip to Skaw-Passero 20,386 – 321
S4B_63 Skaw-Passero trip to US Gulf 8,836 0
BS5_63 West Africa trip via ECSA to North China 15,193 + 22
BS8_63 South China trip via Indo to EC.India 12,600 + 207
BS9_63 W.Africa trip via ECSA to Skaw-Passero 13,314 + 93
S10_63 S.China trip via Indonesia to South China 9,831 + 290
S15_63 Indian Ocean trip via S.Africa to Far East 11,954 + 71
S11TC Weighted Timecharter Average 12,638 + 71
S10TC Supramax(58) Timecharter Average 10,602 + 71
Baltic Exchange Supramax Asia Index – 27 June 2025
Route Description Value($) Change
S2_63 N.China one Austr or Pac RV 12,069 +119
S8_63 S.China via Indonesia/Ec India 12,789 +189
S10_63 S.China via Indo/S.China 10,013 +182
S3TC Weighted Time Charter Average 11,682 +158
Baltic Exchange Index – 26 JUNE 2025
Baltic Exchange Handysize Index 636 (+ 3)
Route Description Value ($) Change
====== =========================
HS1_38 Skaw-Passero trip Recalada – Rio de Janeiro 5,500 – 29
HS2_38 Skaw-Passero trip Boston – Galveston 7,900 – 143
HS3_38 Rio de Janeiro-Recalada trip Skaw – Passero 17,467 + 214
HS4_38 USGulf trip via USG or NCSA to Skaw-Passero 17,336 – 243
HS5_38 SE Asia trip to Spore – Japan 11,369 + 219
HS6_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to N.China-S.Kor-Jp 10,569 + 63
HS7_38 N.China-S.Kor-Jpn trip to SE Asia 10,256 + 187
7TC Weighted Timecharter Average 11,451 + 50
(c) Baltic Exchange Information Services Ltd., 2025
Brazil Commentary for Week ending 26th June, 2025
Brazil’s economic growth accelerated in the first quarter of 2025, defying the drag of rising interest rates as fixed investments, resilient household consumption, and a strong agricultural harvest supported overall activity. Nevertheless, the government anticipates mounting monetary tightening to increasingly weigh on growth in the second half of the year, with full- year GDP projected to slow to 2.4percent from 3.4percent in 2024.
Exports
Brazil exported 35.1million tonnes of iron ore in May, a year-on-year increase of 7percent, reflecting continued strength in mineral shipments. In contrast, soybean exports totalled 14.1million tonnes, down 7.84 percent from the previous month. This marked the first decline in volumes following three consecutive months of growth.
Imports Fertilizer imports rose to 3.73 million tonnes in May, representing an 8.5 percent year-on-year increase as demand from the agricultural sector remained firm. Wheat imports saw a sharp rise, reaching 639.3 thousand tonnes-up 26.59 percent month-on-month—amid strong domestic demand and replenishment of stocks.
• Brazil’s Gross Domestic Product grew by a robust 1.4 percent in the first quarter of 2025 compared to the fourth quarter of 2024. This was a significant rebound from a weaker performance at the end of 2024 where growth was revised down to 0.1 percent.
• On an annual basis, GDP rose by 2.90 percent in Q1 2025. While still robust, this was a deceleration from 3.6 percent in Q4 2024 and slightly below market expectations.
• The most significant driver of growth on the supply side was the agricultural sector, which expanded by a seasonally adjusted 12.2 percent quarter-over-quarter.
• Brazil’s trade balance for May 2025 showed a surplus of $7.24billion, a 5.22 percent decrease when comparing to April.
• Imports rose by 4.7 percent year-on-year, primarily driven by a 9.5percent increase in manufacturing imports suggesting robust domestic demand within Brazil, despite the high interest rates.
• Agricultural exports were down by 0.6 per-cent year-on-year, partly due to challenges in orange juice exports which fell by 22percent from July 2024 to May 2025 due to Brazil’s “citrus belt” being hit by persistent draughts and extensive heatwaves.
• Brazil’s annual inflation rate eased to 5.32 percent in May2025, down from 5.53 percent in April. This marked a three-month low, suggesting a slight deceleration.
• On a monthly basis, consumer prices rose by 0.26 percent, which was also a decrease from April’s 0.43percent increase and the weakest monthly reading since January 2025.
• Despite this slowdown, Brazil’s inflation rate remained above the Central Bank’s target of 3 percent, with a tolerance band of ±1.5 percentage points. This marked the seventh consecutive month that inflation exceeded the upper limit, underscoring persistent price pressures.
• Producer prices continued to decline, with Brazil’s Producer Price Index (PPI) falling by 0.36 percent in April 2025 compared to March. This marked the third consecutive month of deflation, reflecting easing cost pressures at the production level.
• Among 24 industrial activities, six posted declines, with the sharpest seen in petroleum products (-3.37percent), chemical products (1.08 percent), and metals (-1percent).
• Producer prices rose by 7.27 percent annually in April 2025. This represents a slower pace compared to March’s 8.37percent rise, marking the slowest annual growth in five months.
• In May, Brazil exported 35.1 million tonnes of iron ore, representing a 16.23 percent increase over last month’s figures.
• In May, Brazil’s monthly export volumes rose by 7.01 percent compared to the same period in 2024, reflecting solid momentum in outbound trade. Cumulatively, exports for the year reached 150.1 million tonnes—up 2.67 percent year-on year—marking the highest volume recorded for this period in the past five years.
• Overall, Brazilian exports are projected to grow further in the coming year, expanding the global supply base and potentially exerting downward pressure on international prices.
• In May, Brazil’s soybean exports reached 14.1 million tonnes, a 7.84 percent decline over the month prior, the first drop in volume after 3 months of consecutive growth.
• Year-on-year however, the volumes exported increased by 5.22 percent, while total exports year-to-date amounted to 51.6 million tonnes, a 2.88 percent increase when comparing the same period in 2024.
• The substantial export volume is supported by a projected record soybean harvest for the 2024/2025 season. Estimates from CONAB and the USDA predict a harvest of around 167.9 to 169 million tonnes, significantly higher than the previous year.
• During May 2025, Brazil’s corn exports experienced further decline, falling to 38.9 thousand tonnes—a steep 78.18 percent drop compared to the month prior.
• Year-on-year exports were also significantly lower by 90.77 percent and year-to-date volumes stood at 6.11 million tonnes, reflecting an 18.52 percent decrease compared to the same period in 2024.
• While Brazil’s 2024/2025 corn crop is expected to be one of its largest ever, increased domestic demand and price competitiveness from the US are projected to affect export volumes during the upcoming corn season.
• Brazil’s sugar exports showed an upwards trend for the first time in 2025, reaching 2.26 million tonnes, a significant 45.04 percent increase over April.
• Comparing to the same period in 2024 however, exports declined by 19.77 percent. Year-to-date exports amounted to 9.53 million tonnes, a 29.73 percent decrease over the same period last year.
• While Brazil is expected to have a near-record sugar production for the 2025/26 crop year the higher crude oil prices are incentivizing mills to prioritize ethanol production over sugar, potentially leading to a shift in the sugar mix.
• Brazil’s crude oil exports further increased through May, reaching 9.2 million tonnes, a month-on-month increase of 4.4 percent.
• Crude oil exports also increased by 6 percent on a year-on-year basis, while year-to-date volumes were 5.31 percent lower compared to the same period in 2024.
• Brazilian oil company Prio expects to double its daily output next year when compared with 2024 levels, driven by the development of some key offshore fields with the company currently awaiting approval from Brazil’s environmental agency Ibama to connect wells and begin output at Wahoo.
• Wood pulp exports surged in May, with volumes reaching 2.1 million tonnes, a substantial 40.63 percent increase over April.
• Year-on-year exports also increased by 26.03 percent, and the total volume exported so far this year amounted to 9.4 million tonnes, a 13.52 percent increase compared to the same period in 2024.
• Major investments and the expansion of existing timber plantations are coming online in Brazil with Suzano’s new mill, the world’s largest single-line pulp mill and projects by Arauco and Bracell expected to contribute to increased production in the coming years.
• In May, Brazil’s chemical fertilizer imports rose to 3.73 million tonnes, representing a 2.53 percent increase month-on-month.
• On a year-on-year basis, imports increased by 8.5 percent, while year- to-date import volumes stood at 15.34 million tonnes, marking a 12.51 percent increase over 2024.
• Projections for 2025 point to a continued rise in fertilizer deliveries to Brazilian farmers, with volumes expected to reach 46.6 million tonnes — an increase of 2 percent compared to 2024. This growth is underpinned by improved sentiment and a rebound in farmer investment.
• Wheat imports in May totalled 639.3 thousand tonnes, marking a significant 26.59 percent increase month-over-month. When examining import volumes in comparison to the same period last year however, there was a 2.71 percent drop.
• Brazil is anticipating a surge in its own wheat production in 2025 with forecasts from Safras & Mercado and USDA projecting the wheat harvest to reach 9.1 million tons, thus reducing the need for imports.
• While planted area for wheat in Brazil might shrink due to farmers shifting to more profitable crops improved yields through technology and new crop varieties are expected to offset this.
• In May, vessel congestion at the Port of Santos averaged 31 units, holding steady in line with April’s levels.
• However, the average deadweight of the congested vessels declined by 8 percent on a month-over-month basis, indicating a shift towards smaller tonnage in the waiting line up. Compared to the same period last year, the number of congested vessels was significantly lower, down by 21percent.
• At the Ports of Tubarao and Vitória, combined congestion in May averaged 17 vessels, reflecting a slight 2 percent decrease from the previous month.
• The decline was more pronounced when measured by deadweight, with an11 percent month-on-month reduction in total average tonnage.
• On a year-on-year basis, congestion at these ports was12 percent lower than in May2024, reinforcing the broader trend of easing logistical pressure across Brazil’s key iron ore terminals.
• In May, the Cape size Baltic C3 Index (Tubarao/Qingdao) closed at USD 22 per metric tonne, marking a firming trend toward the end of the month compared to the monthly average of USD 19.01 per tonne. Despite the stronger finish, May’s average represented a 5.15 percent decline from April’s average of USD 20.04 per tonne.
• On a year-on-year basis, the index continued to lag behind, with the monthly average down 25.51 percent from the same period last year.
• The Panamax Baltic P8 Index (Santos/Qingdao) ended the month at USD 31.93 per metric tonne, extending its downward trajectory.
Capesize Baltic Index The monthly average settled at USD 33.71 per tonne, reflecting a further 3.12 percent decline from April’s average of USD 34.80 per tonne. The P8 Index closed May at its lowest level in five years for the fourth consecutive month, underscoring the persistent headwinds facing the Panamax segment. Compared to the same period in 2024, the monthly average fell by 28.53 percent.
Marex Media
“Disclaimer”
All Rights in all material and information on this document is reserved. Any form of reproduction or distribution of the information contained in this by any means whether electronic or otherwise is expressly prohibited including distribution by re- producing it anywhere.
You may view or otherwise use the information, prices, indices, assessments and other related information, graphs, tables, images in this Publication is only for your personal use if you are an authorised user for internal use only.
Data in this publication, includes independent and verifiable data collected from market participants.
Any user of the Data should not rely on any information and/or assessment contained therein in making any investment, trading, risk management or other decision.
I do not guarantee the adequacy, accuracy, timeliness, and/or completeness of the Data or any component thereof or any communication (written, oral, electronic, or
other format). The writer shall not be subject to any damages or liability, including but not limited to any indirect, special, incidental, punitive, or consequential damages (including but not limited to, loss of profits, trading losses, and loss of goodwill).