The Case for Seizing Russian Assets to Fund Ukraine’s Defence.

As Russia continues its war against Ukraine and the Trump administration reduces U.S. aid to Kyiv, European countries have stepped up their support of the Ukrainian people. But more can be done. At this critical moment, the European Union should seize the immobilized Russian sovereign assets that sit in Europe and use those resources to provide Ukraine with a sustainable source of assistance.

In February 2022, just days after Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the United States worked with the G-7 to freeze approximately $300 billion in Russian assets, the vast majority of which were held in Europe.

Reality today in the shipping world market is different than it was just two weeks ago. No one knows what the future holds for global trade, but the Shipping companies are not panicking. They are letting reason and patience prevail. Statements from the US President create so much uncertainty around global trade flows and thus the market in which our shipping companies operate. It can change from one day to the next.

There has never been a ‘Crystal Ball’ available for the Industry to watch and decide and how many “Boeing 747’s will stablize this market”?

Investor confidence in the US has taken another knock this week on concern President Donald Trump’s tax bill will worsen the already swelling deficit — a worry underscored by Moody’s Ratings’ decision last week to strip the world’s largest economy of its top credit rating.

US stocks are set for their worst weekly decline since Trump’s global tariff broadside triggered a selloff at the beginning of April, while yields on 10-year Treasuries have pushed higher this week to top 4.5%. A gauge of the dollar’s strength has slumped to the lowest level since 2023. Havens have risen, with gold rallying almost 4% and Bitcoin climbing 7%.

Rising bond yields are a particular concern. As Trump was putting pressure on House members to back the tax bill, the Treasury on Wednesday found tepid demand at an auction of 20-year bonds. The moves were reminiscent of Trump’s wrangle with the bond markets last month, when he blinked.

Higher yields not only threaten to dampen economic growth — as they translate into higher borrowing costs for everything from homes to cars — but to accelerate the government’s fiscal deterioration. As rates rise, so does the Treasury’s interest bill.

Investors will need to wait and see how Trump’s “one

big, beautiful bill,” which passed the House, makes it through the Senate.

The U.S. House of Representatives has passed an amendment to President Trump’s large tax and spending bill. The bill will now head to the Senate, where some Republicans are demanding extensive amendments. A vote is expected by August. The amendment includes a provision to raise the U.S. debt ceiling by $4 trillion. Without this, the U.S. Treasury Department predicts it could be forced to default as soon as August or September.

We are now halfway through Trump’s 90-day freeze on his so-called reciprocal tariffs, and the mood among businesses, consumers and governments facing them is that

of severe uncertainty. The next 45 days may not provide much relief from the fog. Trump himself has indicated that talks won’t lead to agreements for every nation before the July deadline, saying that 150 countries “want to make a deal” but that many will be assigned their tariff level. Treasury Secretary Scott

Bessent said “if they’re not negotiating in good faith, they are going to get a letter saying ‘here is the rate.”

The Taiwan Tightrope

Deterrence Is a Balancing Act, and America Is Starting to Slip.

As tensions rise across the Taiwan Strait, the policy debate in Washington remains fractured. U.S. strategy broadly revolves around deterring China from attacking Taiwan, and for the past three presidential administrations, it has consisted of three central components: increasing the ability of the United States and Taiwan to defend the island militarily; using diplomacy to signal U.S. resolve to protect Taiwan while also reassuring China that Washington does not support Taiwanese independence; and using economic pressure to slow China’s military modernization efforts.

But there is little consensus on the right balance among these three components—and that balance determines to some degree how deterrence looks in practice. Some contend that diplomatic pressure—along with military restraint, to avoid antagonizing China—will keep Beijing at bay. Others warn that unless Washington significantly strengthens its military posture in Asia, deterrence will collapse. And a third approach, outlined recently, emphasizes that bolstering Taiwan’s self- defence and enabling offshore U.S. support is the best route to sustaining deterrence while also mitigating the risk of escalation.

These prescriptions have merit but fall short of grappling with the paradox at the heart of U.S. strategy: deterrence can fail in two ways. Do too little, and Beijing may gamble it can

seize Taiwan before Washington is able to respond. Do too much, and Chinese leaders may conclude that force is the only remaining path to unification. Navigating this dilemma requires more than a stronger military or bolder diplomacy. It requires a calibrated strategy of rearmament, reassurance, and restraint

that threads the needle between weakness and recklessness. Combined properly, forward-deployed capabilities, diplomatic restraint, and selective economic interdependence can reinforce one another to maintain credible deterrence while avoiding provocation.

So far, however, the Trump administration’s approach to Taiwan has veered between harsh transactionalism, such as the imposition of a 32 percent tariff on most Taiwanese goods last month, and quiet reaffirmations of support for Taipei through bipartisan visits and a pause on the highest tariffs. The administration still has time to settle on a coherent strategy, but the window of opportunity is closing.

LOOSE LIPS START WARS

Currently, the U.S. military is improving its force posture in the vicinity of Taiwan, most notably through expanded access to bases in the Philippines and by reinforcing capabilities in southwestern Japan and the broader western Pacific. In the Philippines, thanks to the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement, the United States gained access to four new strategic sites, bringing the total there to nine. Several, such as those in Cagayan and Isabela Provinces, are just a few hundred miles from Taiwan.

The End of Extended Deterrence in Asia?

China Is Chipping Away at America’s Security Guarantees to Its Allies.

For more than five years, Chinese vessels operating in the South China Sea have repeatedly collided with Philippine ships, sometimes dousing them with water cannons and injuring personnel. In response, the United States deployed a Typhon intermediate-range missile system to the island country last year. It was the first time since the end of the Cold War that the United States had supplied an ally with a weapon of such magnitude—and it kicked off a diplomatic storm. China’s

foreign ministry argued that the installation “disrupts regional peace and stability, undermines other countries’ legitimate security interest, and contravenes people’s aspiration for peace and development.” China, the ministry continued, would “not sit idly by” if the Philippines refused to remove it.

Beijing’s actions and threats against the Philippines are part of a broader attempt to counter the United States’ policy of “extended deterrence,” a strategy that commits Washington to defending its allies against aggression, including, in certain cases, with U.S. nuclear weapons. Beijing has long been critical of U.S. extended deterrence, on the grounds that it is a way for the United States to advance its interests against China. Chinese officials are now ramping up their efforts to undermine it. They have portrayed the United States as a destabilizing force in the region, made attempts to peel off U.S. allies using economic enticements and penalties, and engaged in ever more confrontational military operations. Such acts are intended to sap the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, which is predicated on trust in Washington and faith in the United States’ capabilities.

For the Trump administration, maintaining extended deterrence in the Indo-Pacific should be a priority. It should challenge Beijing’s rhetoric in diplomatic forums and counter Chinese gray-zone tactics, as well as strengthen military cooperation with regional allies. Otherwise, Washington’s power and influence in the region will soon be eclipsed.

THE VIEW FROM BEIJING

For Chinese leaders, U.S. extended deterrence is not a defensive strategy but part of a broader effort by the United States to contain and even roll back China’s rise. Beijing also dismisses the idea that extended deterrence exists because

U.S. allies want it. Rather, Chinese officials see Washington’s strategy as an imposition on Australia, Japan, South Korea,

and others that, in Beijing’s view, belong in China’s rightful sphere of influence.

Hudong-Zhonghua commissions giant new shipbuilding facility north of Shanghai

One of China’s top shipyards, Hudong-Zhonghua Shipbuilding, has commissioned a giant new facility to boost its production of LNG carriers.

The new $2.5bn, 432 ha yard on Changxing Island north of Shanghai will boost the state-run company’s annual LNG carrier output from six to 10 vessels once fully operational.

Hudong-Zhonghua is a flagship site of China State Shipbuilding Corporation, and is also the yard in the People’s Republic that built the country’s first LNG carrier 17 years ago.

Across China, many yards are undergoing expansion, with the country now in control of two-thirds of the global ship orderbook, a position of dominance that has many American politicians on edge with the Donald Trump administration looking at ways to curb this stranglehold China has on ship construction.

Frontline fixes huge new $1.3bn loan to refinance Euronav VLCC fleet deal

John Fredriksen tanker company cuts the cost of paying for 24 ships

Frontline has cut its interest costs with a huge new loan to refinance the 24 modern VLCCs it bought from Euronav in 2023. The John Fredriksen controlled company said it had entered into a new secured term facility worth $1,29bn. It will replace outstanding debt arising from the $2.35 bn.

Laden LNG carrier towed free after grounding off Germany

Captain of 19-year-old steamship being questioned over incident

An LNG carrier owned by Knutsen OAS Shipping ran aground off the German Coast on Thursday with an inbound cargo from the US. German media reported that the 138,160-cbm Iberica Knutsen, built 2006, grounded off the island of Rugen near the entrance to the port of Mukran on the Baltic Sea at around 5.20 hours local time.

Banning scrubbers is short-sighted and counterproductive

Researcher, Shipowner and supplier make the case for exhaust gas cleaning systems
It has been 20 years since the IMO introduced its first guidelines on the use of EGCS (exhaust gas cleaning systems – Scrubbers). Since then, and rightfully so, focus has been on the pro’s and con’s of this technology. Tech developers, shipowners, operators and legislators all

agree on the importance of optimising the environmental performance of this robust technology which efficiently removes sulphur oxides from ship exhaust gases.

Insurer Steamship hit by unusually high losses and record pool claims

Annual results reflect tough year for protection and indemnity clubs from costly casualties. Steamship Mutual was hit by an “unusually” high number of large casualties and record pool claims over the last year, leading to significant underwriting losses, as reported by the Insurer. Figures posted by the P & I club are the latest example of significant underwriting losses for the major industry players who have been bailed out by strong investment returns.

Hapag-Lloyd flip-flops between China and South Korea on next container ship orders

Yawning price gaps and US fees threat prompting rethinks for liner company
German shipowner Hapag-Lloyd has switched shipyard selections for its next tranches of LNG dual-fuel container ship new-buildings from Chinese shipyards to competitors in South Korea and back again, on price and US port call fee moves.

Newbuilding sources and those following the company said Hapag-Lloyd initially started discussions with shipyards in China on a series of up to 12 ships of about 12,500 teu and six to eight 16,000-teu vessels.

Maritime Trade Routes Reshuffling Once More

The global seaborne trade routes appear to be steadily return to their “factory settings” after a series of positive developments over the past few weeks. However, everything is till shaky and could reverse at any time. In a notable development for global trade, the US and China have agreed to temporarily ease a selection of Tariffs and sanctions, marking a significant de-escalation in their on- going trade tensions. Under the agreement, the US has reduced tariffs on Chinese imports from 145% to 30% for a 90-day window, while China has lowered its tariffs on US goods from 125% to 10%. This move has already had a measurable impact on the shipping industry, with a surge in freight volumes expected as businesses accelerate shipments to take advantage of the tariff reprieve. Companies are racing to import goods ahead of any potential re-implementation of higher duties.

In line with Trump-era policies, the US and Iran are reportedly close to reaching a potential nuclear agreement, aimed at limiting Iran’s nuclear program. Pres. Trump indicated that the two nations have “sort of” (customary

political terms used) agreed on key terms. Such a breakthrough, if it happens, in US-Iran relations could have far-reaching consequences for the shipping industry. The easing or lifting of sanctions on Iran could potentially trigger a substantial rise in Iranian Oil exports, driving up demand for tankers and increasing freight volumes throughout the Middle East. What then happens to Global Oil prices only time will tell. Presently, the average age of vessels in the NITC fleet stands at 17 years, while the IRISL operates ships averaging around 18 years old. Will the resolution accelerate ship demolition activity of older dark-fleet ships? paving the way for much-needed modernization of Iran’s aging maritime fleet. This will also reduce demand for the aging ‘Dark Fleet’ vessels transporting Iranian crude covertly.

Consequence of the Rebel Houthi attacks on ships attempting to transit via Gulf of Aden, The Suez Canal Authority has experienced sharp decline in traffic, as a result of which many Ships have their routes diverted around the Cape of Good Hope, contributing to a steep drop in Canal revenues from $2.4 billion in Q4 2023 to just $880.9 million in the same quarter of 2024. The Suez Canal Authority introduced a 15% discount on transit fees for Container ships with a net tonnage of 130,000

metric tons or more. Effective 15^th May, 2025 this incentive applied to both laden and empty vessels transiting in either direction and will be automatically granted, requiring no prior application. Did this attract Major Container Shipping Lines to come back to Suez Canal transit?

Dry Bulk Weekly Monitor

Dry Bulk Fleet Growth 2025-2026

With growing industry attention focused on the latest USTR port fees, we need to take closer look at the evolution of the dry bulk fleet, particularly in light of a noticeable slowdown in new contracting activity. Dry Bulk Fleet projection analysis, between 2020 and 2024, the fleet experienced steady growth, increasing from 4,545 vessels in 2020 to 5,330 by end of 2024. This growth was primarily supported by sustained newbuilding deliveries and relatively low levels of scrapping activity.

In 2020, deliveries surged to 230 vessels, reflecting resumption of shipyard activity following early pandemic disruptions. Deliveries then declined year over year, falling to 201 in 2021, 180 in 2022 and 190 in 2023, before climbing again to 238 in 2024, the highest figure in this

period. Scrapping, remained limited from 13 vessels in 2020 to between 4-8 vessels in subsequent years. This drove consistent fleet growth. By 2023, the fleet in service had reached 5,100 vessels, and by 2024 stood at 5,330, reflecting a compound annual growth of over 3% since 2020.

Looking ahead to rest of 2025 and 2026, projections suggest that the dry bulk fleet will continue to expand. Deliveries are expected to sharply decline to 104 vessels in 2025, representing a 75% decrease from 2024. This slowdown in delivery volumes is offset by inclusion of scheduled deliveries, amounting to 171 vessels in 2025 and 215 in 2026. The fleet will thus increase to 5,603 vessels in 2025 and 5,818 by 2026.

While the fleet is still projected to grow by nearly 500 vessels by end of 2026, the composition and timing of that growth are changing. If scrapping activity remains limited and demand growth does not match capacity additions, there is a potential for a supply overhang in the dry bulk sector by the end of 2026.

Baltic Dry Index Snaps 3-Session Losing streak on Capesize strength:

The Baltic Exchange dry bulk sea freight index, rose on Thursday, breaking a three-session losing streak on the back of a stronger demand in the Cape sector. The BDI gained 4 points to 1,341. The Cape index was up 27 points at 1,882. Average daily earnings for Capes gained

$222 to $15,605. The market expects Capesize rates to strengthen over the rest of the year, peaking in the 4^th quarter of 2025. The Panamax index lost 17 points to 1,269, with average daily earnings that receded by $153 to $11,419. The Supramax index was down 2 points at 986.

Baltic Exchange Index – 23 MAY 2025 Baltic Exchange Capesize 182 Index

Route =====	Description Value Change =====================================
C8_182	182000mt Gib/Hamb T/Atl RV 18,971 – 179
C9_182 + 13 C10_182		182000mt Cont-Med trip China-Jpn 37,369 182000mt China-Japan T/P RV 20,659 +	814
C14_182		182000mt China-Brazil RVoy 18,668 +	355
C16_182		182000mt Backhaul 2,855 +	86

============================================

C5TC 182 Weighted Timecharter Average 19,771 + 359

Baltic Exchange Index – 23 MAY 2025

Baltic Exchange Capesize Index 1900 (+ 18)

Route Description Value($) Change

====== ===================================

C2 160000mt Tubarao to Rotterdam 8.107 – 0.036 C3 160-170000mt Tubarao to Qingdao 18.835 + 0.080 C5 160-170000mt W Australia-Qingdao 8.550 + 0.190 C7 150-160000mt Bolivar to Rotterdam 10.829 – 0.022 C8_14 180000mt Gib-Hamburg T/A RV 15,321 – 251 C9_14 180000mt Cont/Med Trip China/Jpn 33,813 – 125 C10_14 180000mt China/Japan T/P RV 17,236 + 704 C14 180000mt China-Brazil RV 14,194 + 183 C16 180000mt N.China to Skaw-Passero -1.263 + 62 C17 170000mt Saldanha Bay/Qingdao 14.108 + 0.069

============================================

5TC Weighted Timecharter Average 15,757 + 152

Baltic Exchange Panamax 82 Asia Index – 23 May 2025

Route Description Size (MT) Value($) Change

===== ====================== ========

P5_82 S.China one Indo RV 9,414 -286

Baltic Exchange Supramax Asia Index – 23 May 2025

Route Description Value($) Change

================================ ======= =

S2_63 N.China one Austr or Pac RV 10,869 +69 S8_63 S.China via Indonesia/Ec India 12,864 -118 S10_63 S.China via Indo/S.China 9,881 -1

=============================== ======= ===

S3TC Weighted Time Charter Average 11,161 -10

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